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 ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis examines the political process of the health reforms enacted in Chile during the 
Presidency of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006). The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is used to 
answer the question: How were the health reforms during the Lagos administration of 2000-6 
achieved within the existing institutional arrangements that were put in place during the 
authoritarian period? As emphasised by the historical institutionalist literature, Chilean politics, since 
the return to democracy, has been characterised by inertia and limited transformation. My research 
seeks to understand how it was possible to bring about policy change in a context in which everything 
seemed fixed. The contribution of this thesis is twofold: first, examining the health policy reform 
through the lens of the ACF, this study contributes to expand the theoretical development of this 
framework. Second, this study contributes to enrich the existent literature about the Chilean case, 
analysing original data to identify the factors that enable policy change.  
Focusing on explanations for policy change suggested by the ACF, the findings suggest that 
health reform was achieved through a path of negotiated agreement. This agreement was facilitated by 
three main factors: an evolution of coalitions, the strategic mobilisation of resources, and the 
institutional arrangements inherited from the authoritarian regime. 
Using a qualitative case study, informed by the international health policy literature, and using the 
ACF as a theoretical framework, the Chilean case is scrutinised. Evidence was gathered through an 
appraisal of data collected from a variety of documentary sources, as well as the thematic analysis of 
transcriptions of congressional hearings and 26 semi-structured elite interviews. Applying ACF allowed 
me to identify and understand the dynamics of the Chilean health reforms, by examining how actors 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of political transitions during the eighties and nineties became an important issue in 
the analysis of health policy, as democratisation processes were seen as an opportunity to 
introduce policy changes. Indeed, the combination of demographic and epidemiological evolutions, 
technological advances in medical areas, economic crises, and the transitions from authoritarian to 
democratic regime changes, led to a wave of health policy reforms globally (Kuhlmann, Blank, 
Bourgeault, and Wendt 2015). Following the market-oriented recommendations of international 
financial institutions such as The World Bank (WB) and The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a 
number of countries took steps to implement health policy reforms to improve efficiency and 
productivity (World Bank 1993; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 2008). In this 
sector, the main policies adopted in a democratisation context involved fiscal constraints and cuts 
to the public sector, the inclusion of private sector institutions as providers and insurers, and a 
decentralisation of financing and managerial responsibilities from central to regional and municipal 
authorities (Gonzalez and Bossert 1999; Mesa Lago 2005; Kuhlmann et al. 2015).  
The structural reforms carried out during the authoritarian regime of Augusto Pinochet (1973-
1990) in the health sector are good examples of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the Chilean 
example provides a useful case to explore how new policies was introduced by post-authoritarian 
governments. To locate this topic, it must be highlighted that Chile started introducing the market-
oriented radical reforms earlier than the rest of Latin America, and before the political transitions 
that took place elsewhere. The public health system, which emerged in Chile in 1952 following the 
British NHS model, was transformed by the Pinochet regime in 1981 into a segmented system that 
positioned healthcare as a commodity rather than an entitlement. This system was comprised of 
both a National Health Fund (FONASA) and Private Health Insurance Funds (ISAPRES), who acted 
as both insurers and providers (Jimenez and Bossert 1995; Castiglioni 2005). By the end of the 
authoritarian period, the sector accumulated a number of shortages due to cutbacks in public 
expenditure, low investment in infrastructure, and a lack of regulation for the private market around 
the ISAPRES (Barrientos 2002; Taylor 2003). The return to democracy in 1990 marked a turning 
point to introduce major changes to correct the deficiencies created by the dual system.  
However, despite the expectations created by the political transition to liberal democracy, the 
first two democratic governments, led by the Christian Democratic Presidents Patricio Aylwin 
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(1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) of the Concertacion1, postponed the implementation 
of radical reforms to prevent any potential destabilisation from the military. The political stability of 
the transitional period was accompanied by a booming economy, known as the “Chilean miracle”2 
(Landerretche 2014), but no significant reforms were made in the social policy sectors (Pushkar 
2006; Gideon 2007).  
The scholarly literature has suggested that, in this post-authoritarian period, the Chilean 
political system has been characterised by structural inertia and the inability for political elites to 
bring about substantial transformations. Some authors relate this immobility to the consensus-
driven policy style adopted by the new democratic governments, which, despite the participatory 
environment of democracy, aims to restrict substantial transformations through informal and 
‘behind the doors’ practices (Richardson 1981; Pribble 2013; Gideon 2014). In the same vein, 
many argue that this lethargy has been the result of the institutional arrangements inherited from 
the dictatorship). They argue that these arrangements have constrained both the formal decision-
making processes and the political will of the democratic authorities (Gonzalez-Rossetti, Chuaqui, 
and Espinosa 2000; Castiglioni 2005; Pushkar 2006; Ewig and Kay 2011; Siavelis 2016).   
Therefore, the question is, how in such a constrained context do reformers achieve shifts in 
public policy direction? Indeed, the major health reform announced by the new socialist Chilean 
President Ricardo Lagos in May 2000 was the first attempt at changing social policies since the 
return of democracy. He declared that the central objective of the bill was to expand citizens’ rights, 
provide guarantees for access and financial protection for the health service, and to correct the 
deficiencies of the neoliberal reform of 19813. Congress approved the last bill of this reform in May 
2005, after a long process of discussion and negotiation.  
                                                   
 
 
1 The Concertación was a centre-left electoral pact composed of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Socialist Party 
(PS), Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD) and The Party for Democracy (PPD) that ruled Chile from 1990 to 2010. 
The opposition formed the Alianza bloc, comprised of two right-wing parties: Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and 
National Renovation (RN).   
2 This growth was especially notable when compared to other Latin American countries, with a GDP growing at around 
7% from 1990 until 1996. However, in the second half of 1998, due to the Asian financial crisis, Chile experienced a 
major slowdown and GDP per capita fell of -0.8% in 1999 (Oppenheim 2006).  
3 The content of President Lagos’ reform is explained in Chapter 4. 
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Lagos’s health reform can therefore be seen as a landmark development in the post-
authoritarian landscape of Chile, as it would bring about improvements in the health sector and 
break from the prevailing policy inertia of the period. This thesis seeks to explore this issue using 
the case of the health system reform during the Lagos administration of 2000-2006. Using a fine-
grained analysis informed by the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF) it examines how, in a 
context in which everything seemed fixed, it was possible to break the inertia and bring about 
policy change. Consequently, the contribution of this thesis is twofold: first, to examine this reform 
through the lens of the ACF, contributing to expand the theoretical development of this framework; 
and second, to enrich the existent literature about the Chilean case with original data to analyse the 
factors that enabled policy change in the health sector  
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE  
In the light of the difficulties of changing the direction of public policy in post-authoritarian 
regimes, and the lack of research examining that enabled policy change in such contexts, the 
research question that guides this study is as follows:  
How was the health reform during the Lagos administration of 2000-2006 achieved 
within the institutional arrangements that had been put in place during the 
authoritarian period? 
In answering this question, this thesis draws on the work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993), Sabatier and Weible (2007) and Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible and Sabatier (2014) to 
argue that policy change effectively occurred despite the institutional constraints. The Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF), developed by these authors, offers a framework for moving beyond the 
focus on stability of previous studies. According to this approach, major or minor policy changes 
do occur, and to understand the how’s and why’s of the process, one should look at the beliefs, 
strategies and interactions of advocacy coalitions within a specific policy subsystem (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers 2008). Unlike other theories in the same field, 
the ACF postulates that policy change, rather than being caused by a specific moment, could be 
the result of a continuous process affected by a number of variables (Ganon et al. 2007; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Looking at the coalitions involved in the 
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health reform process in Chile, a further sub-set of enquiries arises from the theoretical framework: 
What was the role of coalition structure in explaining the policy change? How did the distribution of 
resources and the use of various strategies influence policymaking in this case? How did 
institutional arrangements and policy legacies affect coalition interactions? The answers to these 
queries will be explored further in the discussion of the thesis, to explain how this reform was 
approved. As such, the focus of Sabatier and colleagues is especially useful to this analysis, as it 
allows for an examination of how actors overcame the obstacles posed by the legacies of the non-
democratic period. 
 There are some limitations in applying the ACF to post-authoritarian cases that this thesis 
seeks to address. Early studies using this framework tended to overlook two main elements for 
explaining policy change. First, the initial work on ACF was largely developed in the pluralist 
American context and has only recently been used in studies beyond the US. Thus, few studies 
have explored the effects of variations in institutional arrangements, or as they are called in the 
ACF, opportunity structures, in coalition interactions. Recent work has enriched this strand of the 
framework by examining cases in non-democratic regimes (Han et al. 2014 in China), and the role 
of democratisation in explaining policy change (Carvalho 2001 in Brazil; Arnold 2003 in Chile; 
Freigedo, Fuentes, and Rodríguez Araújo 2015 in Uruguay). However, more research is still needed 
to understand how coalitions are shaped by different contexts.  
Second, much of the literature that has applied the ACF framework so far, whether in 
democratic, transitional, or authoritarian regimes, has stressed that policy change is explained by 
events occurring outside the policy subsystem. These exogenous events include the 
democratisation process, the enactment of a new constitutions, and more recently, the accession 
to the European Union (Bukowski 2007; Albright 2011), but considerably less attention to alternate 
drivers for policy change (Weible et al. 2011). Consequently, this thesis aims not only to 
understand how a policy shift occurred in the Chilean health sector, but it also seeks to contribute 
towards a theoretical improvement examining different paths and mechanisms for policy change 
proposed by the ACF.  
Regarding the study design and methods, my thesis follows the qualitative strand of previous 
studies on the ACF, using a qualitative case study, an approach that allows an in-depth 
investigation of the policy process, seeking to explore the responses to questions about how 
decisions were made and why some policies were more feasible than others. The time-period 
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examined by my research spans from the announcement of the reform by President Lagos in May 
of 2000, including the processes of design and negotiation, until the last bill was approved at the 
Congress in May of 2005.  
1.2 RELATED WORK 
Taking the contribution of previous pieces of research as a background for this study into 
account, the effects of the Chilean process of democratisation into the analysis of the health sector 
has attracted the attention of several scholars4. Specifically, the starting point of this research is 
motivated by those studies that have previously examined the features of the political process of 
the health reforms in Chile, (see e.g. Castiglioni 2005, 2006; Davila 2005; Ewig and Kay 2011; 
Pribble 2013). These studies have adopted a historical institutionalist approach, looking at 
institutions as a result of historical processes and explanatory variables for health policy change. 
According to this perspective, the trajectory and outcomes of the political process are determined 
through the rules and norms of the political system. As it will be explained further in Chapter 2, the 
concepts of path dependency and policy feedback are used in this body of knowledge, to assess 
the repercussions of institutions created in the past on future decisions (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Pierson 1996; Thelen 1999).  
Much of the literature about the Chilean case points out that the lack of change introduced by 
The Concertación to Pinochet’s health system was a consequence of the institutional 
arrangements set up during his dictatorship. Some of the authors emphasise institutions such as, 
those created by the 1980 Constitution, or the checks and balances between the executive and 
legislative branches, and the prerogatives of each to push policy change forward (Castiglioni 2005; 
Pushkar 2006). Others focus on the character of political parties (Pribble 2013) or the actors that 
emerged from the partial privatisation of the health system, which opposed any change to the 
status quo (Ewig and Kay 2011). All these authors agree that Chilean politics seemed mired in 
                                                   
 
 
4 Health related literature that has explored the effects of democratization in other areas includes: inequality (Barrientos 
2002; Ewig and Palmucci 2012), poverty (Lloyd Sherlock 2013, Pribble 2008), health indicators (maternity care in 
Murray and Elston 2005; infant mortality in McGuires 2010), gender policies (Gideon 2014; Waylen 2014), and policy 
diffusion of social policies (Weyland 2005, 2006).  
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what Pushkar (2006) called “a paralysis in [the] health sector” due to deeply rooted obstacles in 
the political system created by the institutional arrangements of the authoritarian period (Jimenez 
and Bossert 1995; Gonzalez-Rossetti, Chuaqui, and Espinosa 2000; Castiglioni 2005). In spite of 
these interpretations, the examination of the factors that facilitated policy change in this context has 
remained unclear. Thus, examining the shift in the health sector during President Lagos’ period is a 
good case as it shows policy change against the odds. To do so, this thesis explores an alternate 
theory to policy change, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, to unpack the particularities of the 
political process that prompted a significant change in the health sector.  
 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE  
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents a synthesis of the existing research on health 
policy reforms. It begins with an overview of the main theories and concepts used in the analysis 
of health policy reforms. In the second section, it moves on to existing research on health policy 
reforms in countries that experienced transitions to democracy. The last section is devoted to 
reviewing the latest literature on Chilean health reform. It explains the institutional arrangements set 
up during the authoritarian period, which is featured in this literature as the main obstacle for policy 
change in Chile after the regime transition. It concludes that, despite these policy legacies, policy 
change did occur, thus breaking the stability often observed in the literature. Finally, it 
demonstrates how this thesis seeks to fill this gap.  
Chapter 3 considers in detail the theoretical framework of this thesis, which draws out the 
particular value of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) for this type of inquiry. Its focus on 
analysing how actors grouped into coalitions are able to push policy change forward in a context of 
continuity makes it the most suitable approach for elucidating how policy change occurred in the 
Chilean health sector. The last section of the chapter deals with the application of this approach in 
post authoritarian countries. This section unveils the paths of policy change and the implications of 
institutional arrangements in this process. It concludes by highlighting the potential contributions of 
this study in expanding the knowledge of the ACF in these two aspects.  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Chilean health system and the developments in this 
sector during and after the authoritarian regime, to put the results of this research into context. The 
milestones of both the authoritarian and democratic periods are presented, in addition to the 
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characteristic of the private and public sectors. It also explains the content of the health policy 
reform proposed in 2000 in more detail. This chapter sheds light on the issues discussed during 
the political process, as well as the actors and organisations involved in the sector.  
Chapter 5 explains the research design and methodology adopted in this study, providing a 
detailed account of the data collection and analysis. In the first part, it argues for the 
appropriateness of the qualitative case study method for answering the research questions, based 
on previous ACF studies. Empirical data, mainly gathered in two fieldwork stages in Chile, comes 
from semi-structured elite interviews, transcripts of congressional hearings, and other 
documentary sources. The data was examined following a deductive approach, and then 
progressed to a further thematic analysis for the theoretical framework of this study. The last 
section gives a reflexive evaluation of the fieldwork process. 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 report the empirical findings from the analysis of the data collected. Each 
chapter is organised into three sections corresponding to the main themes of the ACF analysed. 
Chapter 6 identifies the coalitions within the health policy subsystem in two different phases of the 
process, categorises them according to their viewpoints of the proposed government reform, and 
explores the interactions between them. The evolution from four initial competitive coalitions to one 
collaborative coalition is a key factor in explaining the approval of the bill. Chapter 7 looks at how 
coalitions use resources and strategies to modify the policy process according to their objectives. 
It focuses on the mobilisation of public opinion, the function of expert knowledge and technical 
information developed within opponent groups, and the role of policy brokers as facilitators for 
policy change. Chapter 8 considers the effects of broader institutional arrangements and policy 
legacies from the authoritarian period and their implications on the health sector reforms. The 
effects of political participation, the electoral system, and the presidential powers are factors that 
emerged from the data as important in this context. 
Chapter 9 takes the analysis of the findings forward into a detailed discussion about the 
empirical and theoretical implications of this investigation. It assesses the extent as to which we 
can gain a better understanding of changes in policy-making in post-authoritarian Chile by 
contextualising the health policy reform within the ACF and health policy literature. Conversely, it 
gauges the contribution of the Chilean case analysis to a nuanced development of the ACF. The 
chapter ends with a summary of key conclusions of the thesis, discusses the limitations of this 
research, and identifies relevant topics for future studies.  
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CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING HEALTH REFORMS IN A CONTEXT OF 
DEMOCRATISATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having presented in the previous introduction the research problem, background, and 
theoretical framework of this thesis, this chapter considers the state of knowledge on health reform 
processes in contexts of post-authoritarian democratisation. This chapter begins reviewing the 
main theories and concepts used in the welfare states literature on advance industrialised 
countries, focusing on the historical institutionalist approach and the concepts of policy legacies 
and veto points in the analysis of health policy reforms. These concepts have also been applied to 
understand the feasibility of the implementation of policy reforms in post authoritarian countries, 
taking into account the institutional arrangements established in a non-democratic context as 
factors that may facilitate or constraint policy change in this sector.  
In the first part of the chapter, I introduced the contributions from welfare states and historical 
institutionalist literature for the understanding of health policy change. The second section presents 
the implications of this approach for the analysis of countries that have experienced transitions 
from authoritarian regimes to democracy. In particular, it emphasises the effects of political 
participation and institutional arrangements from former regimes in health sector reforms. The 
remainder of this section presents existing literature on Chile’s health reforms, explaining the 
institutional veto points and policy legacies from the Pinochet regime, and the implications of these 
institutional arrangements on policy change. This section concludes indicating the gaps of previous 
studies and how this thesis will address these limitations.  
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2.2 BACKGROUND OF HEALTH POLICY REFORM STUDIES 
The existing literature on health policy reforms generally draws upon theories regarding the 
development of social protection systems in welfare states in advanced industrial democracies 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Castiglioni 2005; Hassenteufel and Palier 2008; Beland 2010; Contreras 
and Sehnbruh 2014). While early works sought to explain developments during “the golden age” of 
welfare states, based on economic growth and industrialisation, later studies focused on the 
retrenchment of social programmes during the eighties. The cutbacks of this period were a 
consequence of several processes: economic constraints, political struggles and ideological 
drivers, demographic transition, as well as technological advances that increased the complexity of 
the health sector, stressing the necessity for substantial transformations within the area (Pierson 
1994, 2000; Collins et al. 1999; Korpi 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Barrientos 2002). Further 
studies have considered elements such as globalisation, economic integration (Tanzi 2002; 
Navarro et al. 2004; Starke 2006), ideas (Beland 2010), and policy diffusion (Weyland 2005). 
Individually or together, these approaches have been employed in the analysis of other policy 
domains, such as pensions, unemployment, and education, to understand drivers and results of 
social policy reforms.   
This chapter focuses on health sector reforms. Through case studies and comparative 
analysis, scholars have explored two main explanations regarding the evolution of health policies in 
Western countries that are related to the focus of this thesis. First, there is research associated 
with the power resources or class coalitions approach. This strand explains variations in welfare 
state regimes and health sector outcomes as the results of working-class and political party 
mobilisation (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 2001). Findings from the 
first vein of research suggest that social democratic countries led by leftist governments are most 
likely to promote broader social benefits programmes in coordination with workers’ unions, 
assuming that both entities share social rights values and egalitarian aims. By contrast, 
conservative and liberal governments, as they seek to reinforce individual capacities over social 
benefits, are less prone to cooperating with workers in providing social services (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Hicks and Swank 1992; Korpi 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012; Navarro et al. 2004). 
Adopting a political economic perspective, these studies focus on the impact of class 
mobilisations in social expenditures and indicators of protection systems such as poverty, 
inequality, and access (Navarro et al. 2004). 
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The limitation of these previous pieces of work have to do with their application to other 
contexts. For example, these studies are not applicable where class coalitions are not at the centre 
of negotiations, in cases where there isn’t a strong leftist party demanding more progressive social 
policies; or in countries where workers and unions are not active players in the formulation of 
public policies. For instance, the type of corporatist system existence in some European countries 
has not been replicated in Latin America (Mares and Carnes 2009). Also, the focus of this literature 
is the political bargain actors made as proxies of social policy outcomes, but little attention is paid 
to the contextual factors around policy-making struggles neither to a further elaboration of a 
qualitative meaning of policy change.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I am more interested in understanding the intervening factors 
in the policy process rather than the quantitative outcomes examined by power resource scholars. 
In this way, the policy-centred (also known as state-centred) approach is more closely linked to 
my study. This perspective is focused “on the role of the formal and informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity that frames the 
policy-making process" (Hall and Taylor 1996). Following this perspective, scholars assess the 
weight of formal and informal institutional settings, which define the “rules of the game” for 
influencing the policy-making process, on the success or failure of health policy reforms 
(Immergut 1990; Walt 1994; Steinmo and Watts 1995; Hacker 2004; Marmor and Wendt 2012). 
These studies are based on historical institutionalism, one of the viewpoints within the 
institutionalist perspective, which understands institutions as outcomes of concrete historical 
processes (Hall 1996; Thelen 1999; Beland 2010).  
The political dimension of health reform is about the distribution of power (Moran 1995; 
Bernier and Clavier 2011). At the foci of the institutionalist approach is the understanding of formal 
institutions based around the typology for majoritarian and consensual democracies elaborated by 
Lijphart (1999), which defines the environment and mechanisms by which actors can get access 
to the policy process. Majoritarian democracies (mostly parliamentarian regimes) have a dominant 
executive branch with a unicameral legislative body and unitary, centralised governments. 
Institutionally, this type of regime has a single party majority in the executive, a two party system, 
and majoritarian electoral mechanism. By contrast, in consensual regimes (mainly presidential 
regimes) power is shared between the executive and the bicameral legislative branches, with 
federal administrative organisations. According to Lijphart, a consensual democracy is generally 
comprised of multiparty systems, where various political parties form electoral coalitions to provide 
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a base of legislative support to the executive branch, which often utilises a proportional 
representation electoral system for candidates’ selection. Lijphart’s classification has implications 
for the study of policy-making, as it offers guidance in looking at the checks and balances of 
power between the presidency and the congress; the flexibility of constitutions and specific 
prerogatives of each branch, and the independence of central institutions such as the Central 
banks, for example.  
Following this typology, Immergut (1992) suggests that, in countries where power is 
dispersed, the feasibility of change decreases as the number of steps involved in policy-making 
increases. The institutions involved are veto points that delimit the scenarios in which health 
reforms might be obstructed, creating incentives and constraints for actors engaged in this sector 
(Immergut 1992; Bonoli 2001; Swank 2001; Immergut and Abou-Chadi 2010). By the same token, 
the identification of potential obstacles brings about the concept of veto players, which, as defined 
by Tsebelis (1995, 289) are “individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a 
change of the status quo” and might be interest groups, institutional actors, or specific individuals. 
Altogether, the institutional approach emphasises the examination of veto points and veto players 
in analysing the feasibility of health reforms (Castiglioni 2005; Beland 2010; Dargent 2012). 
The works of Immergut (1990, 1992) in Europe and Steinmo and Watts (1995) in the US, 
which shed light on institutions as veto points, are regarded as seminal contributions to health 
sector studies. For instance, Immergut (1990, 1992) explains how veto points work in France, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. The work investigates the power of medical associations’ and how their 
influence differs according to the features of each country. In those countries with a bicameral 
Congress, Switzerland and France, there are more barriers to introduce health reforms than in 
Sweden with its unicameral legislative body. In other words, the organisation and resources of 
powerful interest groups pressuring against or in favour of the bill are limited by the institutional 
structures in which they are embedded.  
In the same vein, Steinmo and Watts (1995), after the failure of President Clinton’s 1993 
reform attempt, examined the relationship between veto points and policy legacies in the US. The 
authors suggest that the combination of a presidentialist, federal, and bicameral government, as 
veto points, has historically obstructed various attempts to reform the very liberal health system. In 
addition to this, in the case of Clinton’s proposal, through lobbying and campaigning finance 
activities with Congress representatives, private providers and insurers were crucial veto players in 
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blocking the bill while it was discussed in the Congress (Steinmo and Watts 1995; Hacker 1998, 
Tuhoy 1999; Carpenter 2012; Skocpol and Jacobs 2012). Following the concept of ‘stickiness’ of 
institutions elaborated by Pierson (1996, 2001), the combination of institutional arrangements and 
powerful actors involved in the health sector reinforce stability rather than modify it. 
From this perspective, two concepts are key to understanding the influence of historical 
processes in the health sector: policy legacies and path dependency (Pierson 1994; Mahoney 
2000; Pierson 2002; Pierson and Skocpol 2002, Haeder 2012). These emphasise the gradualist, 
rather than radical, pattern of health reforms and stress the idea that past decisions may narrow 
down the choice set of future political actors (Pierson 1994; Peters et al. 2005). Put simply, once 
political decisions are made, they become strong barriers to reverse the results of those decisions. 
Indeed, studies in advanced industrialised countries argue that, in a broader picture, social 
protection systems have become “frozen landscapes” where the pattern is resistant to radical 
changes from organised groups defending the status quo (Esping Andersen 1996; Martin and 
Palier 2008). It would then be fair to say that historical institutionalism strongly emphasises a 
pathway of stability, where policy legacies and path dependent processes create lock-in effects 
that obstruct the achievement of changes in health policy. However, this argument about 
immobility becomes the main weakness of the approach. The institutionalist accounts fail to 
explain episodes where the status quo is replaced by new policies or a conversion of old 
configurations into new structures. How can public policy change occur then?  
Scholars have acknowledged that notwithstanding the inertia from the institutional 
arrangements, or ‘stickiness’, there are specific breakpoints or critical junctures where a historical 
pathway that may lead to a departure from the past policies gets unlocked (Pierson 2001; Hacker 
2002, 2004; Peters et al. 2005; Beland 2010). For instance, the approval of Obama’s health sector 
reform in 2009 contradicts the findings of Steinmo and Watts (1995) who emphasise the 
unconducive institutional environment in the US. Scholars agree that, under the same institutional 
framework as previous reform bills, a combination of a Democrat majority in Congress and a less 
ambiguous proposal generated favourable conditions for reform (Hacker 2002; Carpenter 2012; 
Skocpol and Jacobs 2012). In other words, in responding to particular circumstances and 
strategies, health reforms might overcome institutional resilience to enable change. It is clear that 
an assessment of the feasibility of health reform must consider institutional settings as well as the 
interaction between actors and strategies. The transition of the political regime from authoritarian or 
dictatorial to democracy is often recognised as a critical juncture that could accelerate the 
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implementation of radical reforms. Moran (1995, 778) makes the point about different contexts of 
decision-making saying that “at the centre of health care policy making is an intense distributional 
struggle to control the many resources allocated by health care systems. That contest occurs even 
in non-democratic systems, but the organisation of pluralist politics allows it to be pursued 
openly.” 
 
2.3 DEMOCRATISATION AND POLICY LEGACIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH 
REFORMS  
Scholars studying health policies claim that the transition of political regime opens up a 
window of opportunity for introducing reforms, and also sheds light on the various factors inherited 
from previous authoritarian or dictatorial regimes that influence the course of reforms (Guillen 
2002; Wong 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Mares and Carnes 2008; Falleti 2010; Carbone 
2012). The literature departs from the procedural distinction between the authoritarian period and 
the democratic regimes. According to Bunce (1995, 88), one of the characteristics shared by 
authoritarian states in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe is that “all featured 
limits on civil liberties and concentration of political power in the hands of leaders who were not 
held accountable to the people by means of competitive elections.” In contrast to this, democratic 
regimes are defined as “a set of institutions that, in the context of guarantees of political freedoms, 
permits the entire adult population to choose their leading decision-makers in competitive, honest, 
regularly scheduled elections” (Weyland 1996, 8). The new democratic scenario is embedded in 
an open electoral competition; therefore, it delineates how social actors can get access to the 
decision-making process. It also outlines who can get access, how actors put their demands into 
the public agenda, and how policy makers respond to them.  
From the historical institutionalist approach, the concepts of policy legacies and path 
dependency are central to explaining the outcomes of social policy reforms in the context of 
democratisation. This literature examines how the structures and institutions created under 
authoritarian regimes affect the capacity of actors to influence the policy process (Guillen 2002; 
Castiglioni 2005; Jordan 2009; Roberts 2009; Ewig and Kay 2011; Aspinall 2012). Thus, the 
question is how do legacies from authoritarian regimes affects health policy reforms in newly 
democratic countries?  
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In explaining the feasibility of health policy reforms, scholars give attention to two dimensions 
of policy legacies. First, the direction of the reforms and who is affected by the initiative; and 
second, the institutional framework and its impact on health sector decision-making (Bonoli 2001; 
Swank 2001; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Pribble 2013). However, studies show irregular patterns 
in the inclusion of new actors in decision-making and how the integration affects the 
implementation of health reforms after the political transition. 
 
 
2.3.1 Direction of reforms and political participation 
In determining the direction of reforms, scholars have examined the transformation of health 
systems in former authoritarian countries, noting that health reforms may adopt different paths 
depending on the aims to be addressed (e.g. financial constraints, managerial issues, or 
redistributive objectives): privatisation, universalistic systems, or an intermediate option (Kaufman 
and Nelson 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 2008).  For instance, studies on the health sector in Latin 
America, show that while some countries introduced changes toward market-oriented systems 
(such as Argentina and Peru), countries like Uruguay have mainly developed policies to maintain 
their universalistic systems (Castiglioni 2005).  
The content, aims, and direction of health policy reforms are essential to understanding their 
feasibility, as they define who is involved and what political struggles are expected. Cutbacks in 
social programmes that were previously based on principles of universalism (i.e. free access to 
health services) are more unpopular within civil society as the citizenry as a whole was directly 
benefiting from the existing conditions. This was the case in post-authoritarian countries with 
extensive public health systems that, after the regime change, underwent, as a result of austerity 
plans, a reduction in universalism. Studies conducted by Haggard and Kaufman (2008) and 
Roberts (2009) agree that the privatisation of health care was difficult to accomplish in Eastern 
European countries. The state-owned system from the communist years (known as the Semashko 
model) created constituencies willing to defend the entitlement of free healthcare services for the 
all, although there was a lack of quality and efficiency in the universalistic system as health 
workers and professionals observed it. Thus, despite the history of entitlements, in almost all the 
former communist countries, reforms were on the political agenda after the regime transition but 
implemented at different paces (Roberts 2009). 
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 Meanwhile, the expansion of centre-left governments in Latin America in the 2000's, known 
as the new left5, boosted the expectations of citizens by promoting an agenda of universalistic 
social policies (Ewig and Kay 2011; Gideon 2014). However, evidence from political economy 
studies has shown that not all of the leftist governments have pursued expansionist plans, as the 
country-specific characteristics, historical features, and economic contexts restrict the 
implementation of policy reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Flores-
Macias 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013).  
For instance, in most post-authoritarian countries in Latin America and some Southern 
European countries, in which national health systems have been built or reformed on the basis of 
liberal principles, the private sector is a strong player, in a context where market rules have largely 
benefited wealthy entrepreneurs giving them control of economic and political resources. Guillen 
(2002) presents contrasting cases in the reforms of Portugal and Greece, which have moved 
towards universalist healthcare systems. In these countries, even though there was a significant 
portion of private entrepreneurs in the health sector before the transition, they did not block reforms 
in the new democratic period. However, these groups hindered its implementation after reforms 
were enacted. One external factor that could have affected the health reforms in these cases (that 
could also be applied in a different way to Eastern European countries) is the motivation of the 
private sector to achieve the standards required to join the European Union (EU). Private sectors’ 
entrepreneurs would be interested in reaching consensus with governmental authorities and would 
not block the accession to the EU by showing internal struggles, but would obstruct 
implementation to ensure their interests were not affected. The case of Chile is paradigmatic of the 
private sector involvement that will be further explained in the next section. 
With respect to medical associations, it is commonly accepted that doctors have particular 
assets concerning information and knowledge. Medical associations place them in a network of 
contacts comprised of political and economic elites that puts them in a favourable position to get 
access to decision makers (Starr 1982; Roberts 2009; Carpenter 2012). The importance of 
                                                   
 
 
5 Néstor Kirchner (Argentina 2003), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil 2002-2006); Evo Morales (Bolivia 2005), in Chile, 
Ricardo Lagos (2000) and Michele Bachelet (2006 and 2014 respectively); Rafael Correa (Ecuador 2006); Hugo 
Chávez (Venezuela 1998), and Tabaré Vásquez (Uruguay 2004). 
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doctors in the context of health reforms depends on several factors, such as: to what extent they 
can use their power to block or support the process, the reforms’ content, and whether they are 
engaged in private or public sectors or in both. For example, if the proposal intends to regulate 
medical practice or increase existing regulations, doctors associations would be likely to oppose it. 
This would lead to a series of strategies, such as national strikes or public campaigns, intended to 
pressure decision makers to reverse the proposal (Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Kwon and Reich 
2005). However, following Immergut’s arguments (1990, 1992) the power and influence of 
medical groups are still framed and shaped by institutions; which varies for instance, if 
professional associations are formally included to participate in Ministerial boards on national 
policies, or if there is citizen legal initiative that permits interest groups to propose laws.  
Some cases show that due to repression and limited participation, organisations such as 
doctor’s associations and health worker unions lost power during authoritarian regimes. In the 
case of Chile, healthcare unions that had previously played important roles in the expansion of 
social policies were banned by the Pinochet regime. Even after the regime transition, labour 
organisations that were dismantled during the dictatorship did not fully recover and lost the veto 
player status they had before the breakdown of democracy (Roberts 1998; Castiglioni 2005). 
In post-authoritarian countries, relationships between health sector unions and leftist parties 
can be expected to vary from those in advanced industrialised countries that have not 
experimented with authoritarian regimes. The nature of the relationships in the latter have been 
elaborated by power resource scholars (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 2001; Huber 2001) who 
suggest that the expansion of social policies is a result of the collaborative ties between unions and 
centre-left political parties. However, this body of knowledge fails to explain those cases where 
labour groups are not formally institutionalised, or where leftist political parties are not attached to 
the aims of workers. For instance, scholars note that some Southeast Asian countries that 
effectively introduced universalistic social policies were characterised by weak unions and left-
wing parties (Kwon and Reich 2005; Wong 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Mares and Carnes 
2008).  
On political participation, the link between democratic regimes and citizen involvement, as a 
per se dynamic from the political regime change is, at best, mixed, as several political historical 
accounts show different results. For instance, after the change of political regimes, in the majority 
of Latin American countries health reforms were conducted in a top-down manner rather than 
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through an inclusive process. Indeed, health policy reforms have mostly been implemented 
following governmental proposals without public debates or open participation (Kaufman and 
Nelson 2004; Mesa-Lago 2005). In this line, some studies refer to the role of bureaucrats and 
public employees as a team that provides technical support for policy-making and play an 
important role, because the autonomy of civil servants shields them from political polarisation 
(Gonzalez-Rossetti and Bossert 1999; Gonzalez-Rossetti 2001; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Wong 
2006; Roberts 2009; Dargent 2012). The strongest teams in charge of the reforms within the 
bureaucratic apparatus are found in Latin America, where they constituted a significant force for 
promoting change and challenging opponents of the reforms, and based on technical knowledge 
and skills, are critical in understanding the processes of case studies in this region (Kaufman and 
Nelson 2004). The analysis of these technocratic groups within the governmental apparatus in post 
authoritarian countries takes into account that some of them were actually following the 
orientations of the international organisations that were pushing forward cost-efficiency 
mechanisms and the out-sourcing of public services, in the context of the Washington Consensus 
based on guidelines of the World Bank Report of 1993. Analysing pensions and health reform, 
Weyland (2006) adopts the concept of policy diffusion for the dissemination of the neoliberal 
reforms in Latin America, and other studies highlight the importance of the spread of principles and 
norms facilitated by the globalisation, which connects the “role of ideas” with the concept of policy 
diffusion (Weyland 2005; Mares 2009; Linos 2011). International Institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank appear as actors 
with a fundamental role in understanding the wave of structural reforms which took place in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America from the 1980s onwards, taking into consideration their capacity 
to impose conditions for the obtaining of credit (Bresser Pereira et. al 1993; Stallings 1993). 
Although these strategies has been explore for the cases of Latin America scholars suggest to be 
cautious about the direct implication of the international organisations as drivers for policy reforms; 
as the national and internal situation of the countries still matters in to determine the feasibility of 
policy reforms (Lloyd-Sherlock 2005; Nelson and Kaufman 2005; Weyland 2006). 
In contrast to stronger groups of technocrats, weak and unprepared teams are more likely to 
be influenced by interest groups or pressures from outside the government. This happened in one 
of the Eastern European countries examined by Roberts (2009). The author presents the case of 
the Czech Republic, where many experts occupying bureaucratic positions were purged from the 
public administration under the authoritarian period. When the newly democratic governments 
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started to restructure the health system, they used an unprepared bureaucracy which delegated the 
development of the reform plan to medical experts outside the government.  
The Brazilian and South Korean cases present contrasts to the top-down reform after regime 
change. For instance, and unlike in the authoritarian years, the health reforms in democratic South 
Korea integrated civil society groups into the decision-making process. Kwon and Reich (2005), 
and Wong (2006) explain that health reforms in the late nineties were embedded in a bottom-up 
process. The authors describe the formation of the Health Solidarity Coalition, comprised of 80 
social movements groups (i.e. broad cross-class groups, including unions, the middle class, 
professionals, academic experts, and rural populations), that built connections and ties with 
governmental authorities to push for an integration of medical insurances. Wong (2006) suggests 
that two main aspects permitted the approval of the reform in South Korea after the political regime 
change: this transversal organisation of civil society groups with experts in the area; and a 
government with leadership and central authority willing to respond to the civil society demands.   
The Brazilian case is different from other Latin American countries as the universalisation of 
health, a bottom-up process, was prompted by actions taken during the authoritarian years, and 
was completed during the democracy (Arretche 2004; Falleti 2010). According to these authors, 
the military (1964-1988) carried out various initiatives to co-opt the rural population, for instance, 
permitting elections for regional authorities, or implementing progressive health programmes in 
areas where they had little control, as strategies to legitimize the government. These plans allowed 
the Sanitaristas (leftist medical activists) members to reach relevant positions within public 
administration, “infiltrating the state” and developing a pro-universalism agenda. All the cases 
reviewed above confirm the various patterns regarding directions of health reforms and 
participation in post authoritarian cases.  
 
 
2.3.2 Veto points: implications for health sector reforms   
 
The factors that influence the direction of health reforms and the actors involved depends 
directly on the institutional framework in which they are embedded. In this way, a great deal of 
studies on health policy reforms have considered the implications of constitutional frameworks and 
the distribution of policy-making authority that emanate from them. For instance, the effects of the 
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type of regime, the organisation of government (federal or unitary), electoral systems, legislative 
mechanisms, and the degree of state’s involvement in the provision of health have all been studied 
(Immergut 1992; Huber et al. 1993; Bonoli 2001; Castiglioni 2005; Jordan 2009). In this sense, 
constitutions demarcate the scenarios and mechanisms within political systems in which health 
reforms can be authorised, thus converting these arrangements into veto points for policy change. 
The general assumption is, the higher the number of veto points, the more obstacles to reform 
(Immergut 1992; Bonoli 2001; Roberts 2009). Following Lijphart’s (1999) distinction, presented in 
a previous section of this chapter, most Latin American countries are consensual–presidential 
regimes with some variations, for instance federalist vs. unitarian structures, or electoral systems. 
The implications of the dispersion of power between the executive and legislative branches, of 
presidential regimes versus parliamentarian, unicameral or bicameral legislative bodies, and 
electoral system are analysed in some studies on health reform in post-authoritarian countries 
(Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Castiglioni 2005; Pushkar 2006).  
Issues tackled in the literature, such as the presidential powers to authorise health policy 
changes (e.g. decrees, urgencies, budgetary controls, to initiate reforms without the authorisation 
from Congress) determine to what extent the president requires the support of legislators. The 
literature suggests that health reforms led by executive branches would be easier in countries 
where the leader of the government is elected by parliament. In this case, she or he could count on 
the support of legislators to implement their political agenda (Bonoli 2001; Kaufman and Nelson 
2004; Scartascini 2011). Nevertheless, studies of health reforms in South Korea (Kwon and Reich 
2005; Wong 2006), Brazil (Arretche 2004) and Chile (Olavarria 2011) report that where the 
president has ample prerogatives in policy making, his or her role and degree of involvement in the 
process of implementing the health reform has been key. Kaufman and Nelson (2004), from a 
comparative examination of health reforms in Latin America, suggest that legislative bodies were 
less important than presidential leadership and their commitment to the reform. Although some 
cases show that deliberation within the Congress was an important part of passing the health 
reforms bill (for instance, in Colombia), most successful initiatives responded to the presidents will 
push the reform (Ramirez 2004). 
In relation to mechanisms for participation, similar to the case of Switzerland explained by 
Immergut (1990, 1992), in Brazil and Colombia referendums and Constituent Assemblies permitted 
the involvement of people, allowing them to formally push their initiatives forward. Both Latin 
American examples show that the achievement of redistributive goals in the health sector was 
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permitted by mechanisms that promote a wider participation of actors (Arretche 2004; Ramirez 
2004). Federalism and decentralisation have also been part of studies on health sector reforms due 
to their effects on the aggregation of interests. Both factors distribute the control of resources and 
delegate decisions to regions, empowering autonomous actors to fight against central 
governments (Guillen 2002; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Jordan 2009; Falleti 2010). Federalism, 
according to Falletti (2012), played various roles in the Brazilian universalistic health reform. It put 
some reformers in local and national positions to facilitate a bottom-up process, it extended the 
influence of political parties to the local land state levels, and also an increased interest of regional 
authorities to build networks with governmental and legislative branches. 
 
Table 1: Factors considered by the literature on health reforms in post authoritarian countries 
Direction of reforms and political participation 
 
Content and emphasis of reforms 
Procedures and degrees of participation (who and 
how): bottom up/top down; technocrats, civil society 
representatives, medical associations, unions. 
Veto points and veto players  
Veto points refer to institutional rules that creating 
incentives and constraints, while veto players are 
actors which agreement is essential in the decision-
making. 
Policy legacies 
Constitutional norms, informal rules and procedures 
Constituencies. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
2.3.3 Policy legacies and veto points in Chile 
 
Several studies on health policy change in Chile have looked at the institutional veto points and 
veto players to explain the stickiness and inertia of the political and economic model after the return 
of democracy (Gonzalez-Rossetti et al 2000; Castiglioni 2005; Davila 2005; Pushkar 2006; Ewig 
and Kay 2011; Pribble 2013). According to these studies, health reforms implemented since 1990 
were mostly incremental due to policy legacies inherited from the authoritarian years. In 1981, 
Pinochet sought to consolidate the regime through a new constitutional framework, which was 
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implemented using fraudulent procedures, that was sanctioned through a vote on September 11, 
19806 (Varas et al. 2012; Fuentes 2013). This text established the political and administrative 
organisation and also contained a number of ad-hoc laws that regulated civil society participation 
under the authoritarian context. Before he passed control of the government to the new authorities 
in 1990, there were some, widely agreed, changes made to the Constitution. Both the enactment of 
the 1980 Constitution and the amendments of 19897 are known as “authoritarian enclaves” 
(Garreton 1995), established by Pinochet to define the formal distribution of power and the rules of 
governance that limited the road of democratisation. In relation to the existing literature, the key 
veto points and policy legacies from the Constitution and additional “authoritarian enclaves” are 
explained below.  
One of the focuses of the analysis of Castiglioni (2005; 2006) was in the understanding of the 
feasibility of health policy reforms is the distribution of power among authorities. It has been 
argued that the President has prerogatives that exceed the legislative faculties of the Congress 
(Dockendorff 2011; Luna 2014). Specifically, the executive has the exclusive legal initiative on 
issues related with budget, collective bargains, social security laws, and new public institutions. In 
the same vein, the President is entitled to veto those legislations proposed by the Congress’ 
representatives, and also to modify the timing of the legislative agenda, introducing legislation or 
decreasing the urgency needed for discussion. Additionally, all the issues related with public 
budget are controlled by the Executive giving the president the most important role in the decision-
making process. 
A second arrangement is the minimum of votes required in the Congress for policy change, 
which depends on the type of laws that ranges from absolute quorum, for instance, law regarding 
national security or civil rights; to those ordinary laws that just need the minimum number of 
                                                   
 
 
6 Claudio Fuentes (2013) in his book “El Fraude” (The Fraud) presents an in-depth analysis of the ambiguous 
circumstances that surrounded this plebiscite.  
7 In addition to the constraints posed by the legal framework, a subset of organic constitutional laws were enacted in 
the last days of Pinochet’s regime, that, due to the quorums stated in the Constitution, could not be reversed unless 
approved by 4/7ths of Congress. These laws, known as the “Binding Laws” (Leyes de Amarre), became a straitjacket 
for later authorities. For instance, an educational law (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza- LOCE) and the 
penalization of the abortion (which was permitted in Chile since 1931) were enacted (Valenzuela 1997; Taylor 2006; 
Angell 2007; Fuentes 2010; Varas 2012). 
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congress representatives present in the legislature (Fuentes 2010; Garreton and Garreton 2010). 
Constitutional changes –to actually change these rules– require higher quorums. These include 
reforms on aspects such as the electoral system, public administration, and constitutional courts, 
among others.  
The third institutional arrangement mentioned in the literature, is the role of the designated and 
for life senators. Ex-presidents could become senators (so Pinochet could get a seat); and the 
designated senators were ex-commanders for each armed, navy, air, and police force. 3 
representatives from the Supreme Court (two ex-ministers and the National Comptroller) and two 
senators nominated by the president, one a former university provost and one ex-minister (Fuentes 
2010; Garreton and Garreton 2010). The aim in including these senators was to ensure that there 
would be no majority in Congress to give the armed forces a place in the legislative process, and to 
counterbalance the executive power.  
The last institutional arrangement frequently tackled by the literature as an obstacle for policy 
change, is the electoral system. Congress’ representatives are elected by a proportional 
representation system with a D'Hondt formula of two-member districts for both chambers. Each 
political party or coalition nominates two candidates in an open list, to choose one. The one with 
the most votes gets one seat, while the second seat goes to the candidate with the most votes 
from the second list, unless the second candidate from the same party or coalition as the first 
majority gets double the votes. That means that even if the second majority obtains just 33,4% of 
the vote, he or she can be elected even though the second most voted candidate from the opposite 
list has more votes than 33,4%. As a consequence, in many districts there is one representative of 
the centre left bloc and one from the right (Cabezas and Navia 2005; Aninat 2006). Other 
implications from this system is that the elites have control of the appointments of candidates, as 
each bloc is decided in advance as to who is the strongest candidate to ensure at least one seat, 
and outsiders have little chance to get the minimum number of votes.  
Informal legacies are also discussed in the literature. Studies have emphasise that informal 
connections in Chile society are strongly marked by the concentration of small groups of power 
people because their socio-economic background. In particular, the intensification of wealth 
concentration in an economic elite, most of them benefited from events such as the Land Reform 
under Salvador Allende Government in the 70’s (Reforma Agraria); the sale of state-owned 
industries after the democratic breakdown (buying shares of public enterprises in non-transparent 
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transactions) and from the internalization of the economy since 1990 (Monckeberg 2001; 
Undurraga 2011). Societal structures have replicated the configuration of elites by friendship and 
familiar ties, which are extremely important when it comes to decide where elites’ children are 
educated or with whom to make business, favouring endogamic relationships (Thumala 2007, 
Undurraga 2011). For instance, politicians, entrepreneurs, and academics have attended to a 
specific range of schools, most in the capital of the country, with a certain political and religious 
profile. As a demonstration of this, two studies illustrate that the Chilean legislators shares a very 
similar educational background and the majority of them studied at the San Ignacio School 
(Colegio San Ignacio) founded by the Jesuits Congregation (Espinoza 2010, Joignant and Navia 
2003), sharing a network of professional contacts built in the school years.   
Since the return to the democratic regime in 1990, the business elite became a major player in 
the decision-making process as they supported right leaning views, through the linkages between 
these business groups and right-wing political parties (Fairfield 2015)8. Religiosity is another 
important characteristic that bonds these groups, mainly to the right leaning elite, as they belonged 
to different sects of the Catholic Church (i.e. Opus Dei, Legionaries of Christ and Schoenstatt), 
creating a network of wealthy, right-leaning, and Catholic devotees (Varas 2012) who influenced 
the decision-making process according to their values. 
As the combination of economic, religious, and political power was a characteristic from the 
right, while the more lefitest group, were no confessional, some of them with owners of companies 
of members of boards in different companies, and formal political power as various them were 
working in governmental positions. The Chilean author Cortes Terzi (1997) called “the extra-
institutional circle of power” which shares knowledge and have difference levels of influence given 
their privileged position in the Chilean society as decision makers within and outside the 
governmental positions.  
Previous studies have examined the political processes of health reforms in post-authoritarian 
Chile, tackling the effects of the institutional arrangements from various angles.  One such case is 
the work of Castiglioni (2005; 2006) that observed the concentration power in the president’s 
                                                   
 
 
8 In her book, Fairfield (2015) explores, in detail, the consequences of business group involvement on the outcomes of 
taxes’ reforms in Argentina and Bolivia and Chile.   
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hands as it has been recognised as a key feature of the Chilean political system. In contrast, she 
argues that despite the prerogatives of the executive authority defined in the Constitution, due to the 
binominal electoral system, presidents in Chile generally do not count on a clear majority, as there 
is a draw of the two main electoral blocs, Alianza and the Concertacion. In other words, the 
distribution of seats in the congress implies that several negotiations between the executive and 
legislative branches are needed to push bills forward, diluting presidential powers (Castiglioni 
2005, 2006; Pushkar 2006). In the study of the Lagos reform, Castiglioni (2006) also indicates 
that designated senators increased the minimum votes required to approve the bills, preventing 
further policy changes as most of these senators permanently supported right leaning viewpoints. 
Also giving attention to the congress but looking at the political parties’ behaviour, Davila 
(2005) and Pushkar (2006) argue that internal conflicts within the Christian Democratic Party 
between conservatives and progressive factions affected the course of the health reforms, shaping 
the final outcome within Congress. Davila (2005) suggests that the conservative standpoints of 
relevant congressional representatives from this party obstructed the governmental plans as they 
disagreed on the funding methods proposed for the reform. Using their political advantage within 
the Concertacion, they pressured the government into modifying the original proposal, cutting 
down the most controversial issues about the economic resources, and then moderating the final 
results of the reform. Additionally, since 1990, an informal procedure adopted between political 
parties within the Concertacion is pointed out by Siavelis (2016) in the process of designation of 
authorities in ministries and undersecretaries, which is widely known a “cuoteo” in the distribution 
of these positions that became a particular strategies to distribute power in a multiparty system. 
This “cuoteo” was the process in which the nomination of a minister who was a militant of one 
party from the Concertacion, for instance, a Christian Democrat; was necessary complemented 
with a nomination of an undersecretary of a different party from the bloc for example, the 
nomination of a Socialist Party member to maintain the political equilibrium between parties. 
According to Siavelis (2016) authorities nomination was perceived not as a meritocratic process, 
instead was an informal arrangement to keep the political power controlled by the elites parties, as 
people nominated were not always professionally prepared to assume that position. 
Slightly in contrast with the above, Ewig and Kay (2011), and Pribble (2013) suggest that 
despite the remaining institutional legacies, the two last governments of the Concertación led by 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) have introduced substantial –but 
still incremental– changes in the health and pension sectors. These authors note that these sets of 
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reforms should be understood in the context of the spread of the new left in Latin America, in 
which politicians promoted expansionist social policies. However, the post-retrenchment or post 
neoliberal reforms are largely mediated by domestic politics, which shape the scope of changes 
introduced by each government.  
For instance, scholars point out that due to a privatisation of social policies under the 
Pinochet’s dictatorship, private insurers and providers in the health sector introduced during the 
eighties became veto players in the democratic period. Specifically, Ewig and Kay (2011) confirm 
the incrementalist character of the Chilean political system based on the involvement of the private 
sector and the weakening of civil society under Pinochet imposed several constraints for Lagos, 
due to the strong ties of these private actors to right-wing politicians, which represented the best 
option for status quo in the political debate, ensured this (Gonzalez-Rossetti et al. 2000; Castiglioni 
2005; Ewig and Kay 2011; Fairfield 2015). Pribble (2013) examines the discussion of the Chilean 
health reform looking into what extent the Lagos initiative guaranteed coverage of all citizens. 
Based on the role of political parties and their internal organisation, Pribble (2013) argues that the 
Lagos’s health reform was a significant attempt towards universalism, in the end, it was a limited 
policy reform as it did not achieve the goals in providing the levels of coverage expected.  
Altogether, the scholarly literature on Chile emphasises the inertia of the health sector after the 
return to democracy which fits more closely to the arguments of historical institutionalism and veto 
points. According to these arguments, due to the institutional resilience of the political system, any 
reform is constrained by the stickiness of policy legacies and path dependence and is likely to have 
limited impact. In that sense, it is important to understand how and why this healthcare reform was 
achieved within the incrementalist Chilean political system. How did the consensus style adopted 
by post-transitional governments enable policy change in the health sector?  
While some studies have been explored, the implications of the institutional factors to confirm 
the stability and limited change, the interaction of actors embedded in this context and strategies 
employed to foster change have been less explored. Furthermore, extant literature also opens a 
question about the meaning of change, or more precisely, what sources facilitate policy change 
and what the extent of the transformation is. Following the studies of Hall (1993), Streeck and 
Thelen (2005), Mahoney and Thelen (2010), about gradual institutional change, Ewig and Kay 
(2011), and Pribble (2013) refer to the outcome of the reforms as incremental universalism or 
layering change due to policy legacies. Nevertheless, recent studies of policy change look at 
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alternative theories to explain why some countries succeed in reforming their health sectors in 
spite of the weight of institutions, and go beyond the binary scenario of incremental or non-existent 
change (Studlar and Cairney 2014). This is very much in line with the suggestions from Peter Hall 
(2010) regarding the necessity to integrate additional perspectives to the institutionalist analysis of 
policy change, specifically from a sociological approach and rational choice theories. While his 
recommendation did not explicitly mention theories of public policy, he suggests the analysis the 
policy process as a contention of power between actors within the institutional frame to improve 
our understanding of policy change. Precisely, in the next chapter I assess alternate theories that 
contribute to a more comprehensive picture of the policy process and the sources that drive for 
policy change, providing a detailed explanation of the theoretical framework of my thesis.  
 
2.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter reviewed the main theories, concepts, and dimensions employed in the analysis 
of health reform, focusing on those studies concentrated on post-authoritarian countries. Within 
the extant literature, the historical institutionalist approach is often used in explaining the concepts 
of policy legacies and path dependency, to understand the effects of previous decisions in current 
situations. A large number of studies have been conducted in advanced industrialised countries, 
emphasising “a frozen landscape” of the health systems as reformist actors’ struggles are 
provoked by the institutional roots in each country. The second section examined the literature on 
post-authoritarian countries concentrating on two main dimensions: political participation and 
institutional veto points. Evidence from the studies indicates that despite the international 
processes, factors affecting the feasibility of health policy reforms in post-authoritarian contexts 
vary from one case to another. The last part of the chapter presented previous research about 
health policy in Chile, explaining the particular features of the political system as legacies and veto 
points inherited from the authoritarian regime. These arrangements have been recurrently 
considered as impediments for policy change failing to explain cases as the health reforms 
analysed in this research. In order to fill this gap, the following chapter presents a theory of policy 
change, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) elaborated within the public policy field, which is 
a suitable approach to analyse policy change in the Chilean health sector, beyond the historical 
institutional explanations. 
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CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter considers the state of knowledge on health reform processes, 
particularly in the post-authoritarian countries. Studies based on the Chilean case were also 
reviewed, identifying the gaps in the existing literature to explain policy shifts in the new democratic 
context. Considering the limitations of institutionalist perspectives and with the aim of overcoming 
stability and single events, such as causal explanations of change, the present chapter focuses on 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a suitable approach to understand the factors that lead 
policy change, in spite of institutional policy legacies and path dependency effects.  
The first section of the chapter begins examining the contribution of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) and its premises, highlighting its particular value for developing a comprehensive 
understanding of policy process. In the second section, I appraise the factors that explain policy 
change, providing examples from studies that have employed the framework.  Lastly, I present a 
number of previous ACF works on post-authoritarian regimes, showing how the Chilean case helps 
to fill the theoretical and empirical gaps.  
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3.2 THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK (ACF) 
Sabatier et al. put forward the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to take into account the 
interactions of actors grouped into coalitions, their strategies and their beliefs within a particular 
policy subsystem. It combines these factors and stable institutions with dynamic mechanisms that 
influence the policy process (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 1993; Sabatier and Weible 2007). 
As such, the ACF as a research programme offers a more comprehensive picture of the policy 
process, allowing for observations of the interaction between structure and agency, and providing 
an interpretative framework of the policy process that facilitates the comparison of cases, areas, 
and disciplines. 
 
3.2.1 The foundations of the ACF 
There are five main theoretical premises that constitute the core of the advocacy coalition 
framework: First, the policy process is analysed in a policy subsystem, which is a specific area 
delineated by geographical or organisational boundaries and composed of participants which aims 
to determine the course of the policy process (Sabatier and Weible 2007). For research purposes, 
different areas or sectors (i.e. education, forest, media, pollution, or health) can be defined as 
subsystems. It should be noted that these policy subsystems may be at the national, local, or 
transnational level9 (Carboni 2012).   
Secondly, within the policy subsystem, there are coalitions, composed of individuals, groups, 
or organisations that interact regularly, and seek to influence the decision making in the domain of 
interaction (Sabatier and Weible 2009). The idea of coalitions, which generally range in number 
from one to four, is a distinctive feature of the ACF and distinguishes it from approaches focused 
on state authorities (e.g. institutional perspectives), or those theories that put the individual at the 
centre of the analysis (e.g. rational choice approach). Coalitions may include an array of actors, 
which, depending on the policy domain under study, includes governmental officials, interest 
groups, political parties, civil society representatives, researchers, and journalists. In this approach, 
the definition of actors goes beyond formal positions, including people located outside the policy 
                                                   
 
 
9 Such as topics related to globalisation processes or the political process at the European Union level. 
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subsystem that might get involved in the process. This innovative consideration about whom is 
involved in the policy subsystem activities differs from other theories such as the rational choice, 
as in the ACF actors interacts frequently in different degrees and extents within coalitions and not 
individually guided in formal and informal positions of power. Jenkins-Smith et al (2014) points out 
the conceptual distinction between principal actors (who are central and consistent members) and 
the peripheral actors (who are not regularly involved in coalitions activities). In this line, Howlett 
(2010) presents a table of public and non-governmental actors that are involved in policy 
processes:  
 
Table 2 Actors in policy processes 
Actors Public governmental sector Non-governmental sector 
Core actors Central agencies and task forces Consultants, political parties staffs  
Professional governmental policy 
analysts 
Pollsters, donors 
Peripheral actors Commissions, committees Public interest groups, business 
associations, trade unions 
Research councils, scientists, 
international organisations 
Academics, think tanks, media, International 
NGO’s 
Source: Adapted from Howlett, M.  2010. 
 
The third premise of the ACF is that members form coalitions because they share beliefs and 
common values. Furthermore, they possess similar views about what issues must be solved and 
what the best alternatives for dealing with those issues are. These beliefs are framed in a 
hierarchical system that goes from wide normative principles (like views about human nature), to 
the translation of these principles into policy solutions (i.e. market vs. state regulation), and on the 
third level, to instrumental policies. One of the advantages about to organise the different types of 
core and peripheral actors in coalitions, is the simplification for its study as the wide array of 
people involve can be grouped and analysed in groups that share some beliefs, values and 
activities to be analysed by scholars. Among the challenges of the framework, is helping to 
researchers is to understand how and why these individuals coalesce and to what extent they have 
coordinative activities that might stimulate policy change. 
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Fourth, this framework claims that the interactions in a particular policy subsystem have to be 
understood in a long-term perspective (over a decade or more), from the point when coalitions 
form to the moment they interact regularly. This process, which is cumulative, may take a decade 
or more. As this premise could be interpreted as a rule that prevents studies focused on shorter 
periods, it has been clarified by Jenkins-Smith, Norhrstedt, Weible and Sabatier (2014) that there is 
no limitation into applying the ACF in policy process of less than ten years period, which it would 
depends on the research question and theoretical emphasis of the investigation.   
The fifth point refers to the role of technical information. Since the complexity of any policy 
subsystem requires long term commitment and specialisation, technical knowledge and scientific 
expertise provide support and legitimacy to coalitions’ views and opinions. In this case, the ACF 
emphasises the role of scientific communities and experts as advisors within political subsystems. 
These premises of the ACF model are presented in the next diagram, which can be separated into 
two parts. On the right side is the policy subsystem based on the core principles of the ACF, and 
the left side shows the factors of the general political system in which the subsystem, the health 
sector in this study, is entrenched. This will be explained in more detail in the next section.  
Figure 1 ACF Flow Diagram of the policy process 
 
 
Source: Sabatier and Weible (2007). 
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3.2.2 Stable parameters and opportunity structures 
The interaction of coalitions within the policy subsystem is embedded in a scenario comprised 
of stable parameters and dynamic factors, which are simultaneous constraints and resources for 
the actors involved. Stable parameters, such as the characteristics that shape the values and rules 
of a society, are less likely to change over time. This can be seen as the general context for the 
political system that defines how the problem area is conceived, how natural resources are 
distributed, and what the rules and norms that determine the boundaries for interaction are (Blank 
and Burau 2010; Gupta 2012; Fisher 2014). 
The ACF also identifies a category of “opportunity structures" as part of these external features 
and was developed as a response to the critique that the ACF used the US institutional framework 
as its analytical background. This concept allows the application of the framework to countries 
with different political systems by including two interrelated dimensions: the openness of a political 
system, and the degree of consensus needed for major policy change (Weible and Sabatier 2007).  
Both dimensions are linked with Lijphart’s classification (1990) of democracies (see Chapter 2) 
regarding to the dispersion of political power and the majorities required to change the status quo. 
It is based on the idea that the higher the number of veto points, the more barriers there are for 
policy change.  For instance, in majoritarian systems that have a dominant party in government, 
the number of formal veto points is lower than in countries with multiparty alliances in government. 
According to Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers (2008) the differences in the consensus required and 
the number of accessible venues for influencing the policy process determines the configuration of 
coalitions and the degree of their participation in the decision-making process. As such, the ACF 
does not neglect the institutional arrangements presented in the historical institutional literature in 
previous chapters.  
 
 
3.2.3 Coalition beliefs systems  
The core idea of the ACF is that coalition members hold particulars views and beliefs that 
determine their actions and decisions. This is unlike other approaches, such as rational choice that 
assumes that an individuals’ behaviour is strictly motivated by self-interest and the maximisation of 
benefits (Sabatier and Weible 2007). Instead, in the ACF, driven by common interests, individuals 
share beliefs and work together. These common interests are then translated into strategies 
	   34 
designed to achieve a coalition’s goals in a particular policy subsystem (Zafonte and Sabatier 
2004). According to this model, there are three levels of beliefs: deep or normative core, policy 
core, and secondary aspects. While the first category of beliefs consists of a set of views based on 
general principles or cleavages (left-right/, conservative/liberal), the policy core is the position of 
actors on the policy subsystem under analysis. The secondary aspects are the instruments that 
translate policy core beliefs into decisions within the subsystems. The next table presents the 
distinctions between different levels of beliefs:  
 
Table 3 Belief systems 
            
 
A crucial feature of the ACF is the assumption that the first level, normative beliefs, is the most 
difficult to change. Rival coalitions might perceive and interpret the same issue in quite different 
ways because they have polarised frames of references. This is the basis for competition within 
the ACF framework. People within coalitions tend to filter and process information according to 
their beliefs, remaining relatively stable over the years. Nevertheless, the second and the third 
Table 1 Belief systems 
Source: Sabatier (1993, 31). 
 




and ontological axioms  
Fundamental policy positions 
concerning the basic strategies or 
achieving normative axioms of deep 
core beliefs. 
Instrumental decisions and 
information searches necessary to 
implement policy core. 
Scope Part of basic personal 
philosophy. Applied to all 
policy areas 
Applies to policy area of interest (and 
perhaps a few more).  




Very difficult; akin to a 
religious conversion 
Difficult, but can occur if experience 
reveals serious anomalies 
Moderately easy; this is a topic of 




The nature of man: 
Inherently evil vs. socially 
redeemable. 
Part of nature vs. dominion 
over nature.  
 
Narrow egoists vs. 
contractarians.  
 
Relative priority of various 
ultimately values: freedom, 
security, power, 
knowledge, health, love, 
beauty, etc.  
Basic criteria of distributive 
justice: whose welfare 
counts? Relative weights 
of self-primary groups. All 
people, future, 
generations, non-human 
beings, Socio- cultural 
identity (ethnicity, religion, 
gender, professions)  
Proper scope of governmental vs. 
market activity 
 
Proper distribution of authority 
among various unit (e.g. levels) of 
government. 
 
Identification of social groups whose 
welfare is most critical 
Orientation on substantive policy 
conflicts e.g. environmental 
protection vs. economic 
development. 
 
Magnitude of perceived threat to 
those values.  Basic choices 
concerning policy instruments, e.g. 
coercion vs. inducement vs. 
persuasion.  
Desirability of participation by various 
segment of society: 
Public vs. elite participation 
Experts vs. elected officials  
Ability of society to solve problems in 
this policy area:  
Zero-sum competition vs. potential 
for mutual accommodation 
Technological optimism vs. 
pessimism. 
Most decisions concerning 
administrative rule, budgetary 
allocations, disposition of cases, 
statutory interpretation, and even 
statutory revision. 
 
Information concerning program 
performance, the seriousness of 
the problems, etc.  
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levels of beliefs are more susceptible to change. For example, new information and knowledge can 
modify coalition members’ perceptions on the policy subsystem. Instrumental decisions or 
secondary aspects of beliefs systems, which may differ within a coalition, are more likely to be 
adaptive, as actors may be willing to make concessions in order to achieve solutions to specific 
problems. Derived from this classification of beliefs, is an understanding of the degree of policy 
change. The ACF postulates that major policy change occurs “as a change in the policy core 
aspects of the policy subsystem, and minor policy change [takes place] as a change in the 
secondary aspects of the policy subsystems” (Weible, Sabatier, and Flowers 2008, 3). The 
distinction of levels of policy change is the particular interest for this thesis, as it provides a point 




3.2.4 Power and coalitions resources 
 
In a scenario where institutions, ideas and power are interconnected, advocacy coalitions 
deploy power and resources to shape the policy process in their favour. The potential use of these 
resources is primarily connected with the concept of power, which can be understood in two 
ways. First, it is about how power can be effectively exercised over other actors; and second is the 
ability to control specific assets (money, social positions, information for instance) in order to 
achieve the desired outcome (Buse et al. 2005). As the former is concerned, many have argued 
that power constitutes the basis of the political dimension of health policy (Walt 1994; Moran 
1995; Oliver 2006) as such, it is worthwhile elaborating on the discussion about how power is 
exerted, with what aims and with what consequences.  
According to the contributions of authors such as Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1970) 
and Lukes (1974), power can be analysed on different dimensions. The unidirectional dimension of 
power is illustrated in Dahl's definition (1957) which says that power is a process in which A uses 
their resources to compel B to do something they would otherwise not do. This definition 
emphasises the dominance of one party over another. In this scenario, all actors’ preferences are 
in the same position to determine the course of the policy process, but the outcome reflects the 
superiority of one actor’s interests. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) draw attention to an additional 
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dimension: the capacity of actors to determine what issues are important in the public agenda and 
leave out topics that are not in their interests or that might harm the position of dominant actors. 
This explains why, in some cases, actors choose to not make decisions (Allison 1971). A third 
view of power is what Steven Lukes (1974) called ‘thought control’, in which the "exercise of 
power is constituted in the ability to manipulate and shape the wants, needs, values, and norms of 
behaviour of a population" (Crinson 2009, 15), and in that way, a dominant actor can oblige others 
to act against their will. The definitions summarised above are complementary, indicating that the 
concept of power can be applied in different manners. Thus, the overarching idea of these 
dimensions for the ACF is that political competition is a manifestation of different arrays of power 
and coalitions within a policy subsystem emphasising the various ways of power. For instance, it 
can be applied to bargaining between coalitions, coercion by one group over another, or to group 
compliance.  
Resources are understood as the strategic asset that coalitions may use in their efforts to 
change existing policies. Indeed, it is how various resources are distributed in a society that 
determines the degree of an actor’s involvement in the policy process (Nohrstedt 2011; Fisher 
2014). Therefore, the success of advocacy coalitions depends a great deal on the type of 
resources they possess and their ability to exercise them effectively. Sabatier and Weible (2007: 
189-201) outline a typology of these resources:  
Table 4 ACF Typology of resources 
 




Actors in positions of legal authority that may include agency officials, 
legislators, and judges. Dominant coalitions usually have more members in 
positions of formal authority than minority coalitions. Strategies for coalitions 
include placing allies in positions of legal authority through elections or political 
appointments. 
Public opinion Opinion polls showing support for a coalition’s policy position. A supportive 
public is more likely to elect coalition supporters to legislative and other positions 
of legal authority and to help sway the decisions of elected officials. A typical 
strategy for advocacy coalitions is to spend a lot of time trying to garner public 
support. 
Information Information is a resource utilised by policy participants to win political battles 
against opponents. Strategic uses of information include solidifying coalition 
membership, arguing against an opponent’s policy views, convincing decision 
makers to support your proposals, and swaying public opinion. This is one of the 
reasons why the ACF emphasizes the role of researchers within coalitions. 
Mobilisable 
troops 
Policy elites often use members of the attentive public who share their beliefs to 
engage in various political activities including public demonstrations and 
electoral and fund-raising campaigns. Coalitions with minimal financial resources 
often rely very heavily upon mobilisable troops as an inexpensive resource. 
Financial 
resources 
Money can be used to purchase other resources. A coalition with ample financial 
resources can fund research and organize think tanks to produce information; 
bankroll sympathetic candidates, thereby gaining inside access to legislators and 
political appointees; launch media campaigns to earn public support; and 
advertise their policy positions to strengthen their number of mobilisable 
activists. 
Skilful leadership Skillful leaders can create an attractive vision for a coalition, use resources 
strategically, and attract new resources to the coalition. Skillful entrepreneurs are 
needed to bring about actual changes in policy. 
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These resources might be seen as a combination of assets rather than as separate tools 
used by coalitions to influence the policy process. After identifying actors within a policy 
subsystem, or coalitions according to the ACF, it is important to analyse empirically what specific 
resources is the determination of who is in and who is out of coalition and the ways they use these 
to exert their power to induce policy change. Thus, the criteria to define their role within the ACF 
flow diagram is assessed in terms of the availability of resources and the capacity of influence. As 
I mentioned in the previous section, the very definition of coalitions is that an array of actors in 
different positions in both public and private spheres that have joints preferences and to perform in 
coordinated activities, which means that there is a need to asses of who belongs to coalitions and 
what makes valuable to these groups in pursuing their goals in the policy subsystem. The 
identification of these actors are based also on the amount of economic resources and legal power 
via governmental positions for instance, reputational power is highly important, this is, how others 
perceived those individuals capacities to impose their will around the policy sector. Within the 
policy subsystem thought, there are additional actors that play a role differently than the pure 
coalitions’ members in order to push forward coordination to achieve a consensual outcome. It is 
in this context of power competition, then that some individuals that can act as mediators on 
power competition (Ingold and Varone 2012), fulfilling the role of policy brokers among and within 
coalitions, consensual goal that puts those individuals in a different position than those who 
belongs to coalitions who are searching to positioning their beliefs over the others. Brokers tend to 
be part of administratively agencies but Jenkins-Smith et al (2014) point out that there is not a 
specific criteria that defines who is a broker and where comes is from; but the principal idea is that 
these figures have moderate positions beyond self -interest motivations looking for feasibly 
solutions. It is worth noting that the process of brokerage is necessarily framed in a institutional 
context, which determines the capacity of policy brokers to articulate and to mediate the levels of 
conflict within a policy subsystem, but this is a still an unexplored area of the ACF that could be 
further investigated taking into account the countries’ opportunities structures previously 
mentioned (Ingold and Varone 2012; Diaz Kope et al 2013; Fisher 2014).  
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3.3 PATHS OF POLICY CHANGE AND ACF APPLICATIONS IN POST-
AUTHORITARIAN CONTEXTS 
One of the most valuable contributions of the ACF is the conceptualisation of mechanisms for 
policy change. Unlike other public policy theories such as the Multiple Streams and the Punctuated 
Equilibrium, the ACF suggests there are four paths for either major or minor policy changes. First, 
external events or unexpected episodes that take place outside the policy subsystem (Zafonte and 
Sabatier 2004). Second, internal shocks or events that take place inside the policy subsystem that 
may directly affect the stability of coalitions and the distribution of resources (Kübler 2001). The 
third mechanism, policy learning, incorporates the role of scientific knowledge and considers how 
the information provided by experts can promote a revision of beliefs by coalitions. This revision of 
beliefs may lead to policy change (Abrar et al. 2000). Fourth, negotiated agreements, which are 
collaborations across coalitions, in which the polarisation of the conflict is reduced and the actors 
involved are willing to reach a consensual agreement (Kübler 2001; Larsen et al. 2006). These 
paths of policy change will be explored in more detail below:  
External events refer to unexpected episodes that take place outside the policy subsystem, 
affecting the course of the political process and the coalitions’ scheme in the area under study. 
External perturbations may force major transformations, in which actors should be adjusting their 
beliefs to the new context created by the event. Some episodes, such as the election of a new 
government, may lead to a change in the direction of policies, or, due to the emergence of 
new issues like new diseases or natural disasters, to the modification of priorities on the political 
agenda. Sabatier and Zafonte (2004) present an example of how external events may affect policy 
subsystems. Their study on automotive pollution control in the US between 1963 and 1989 shows 
that the development of policies in this area were affected by two events: the 1973-4 oil embargo 
and the 1980 presidential election. 
Internal shocks are events that take place inside the policy subsystem, which may directly 
affect the stability of coalitions and the distribution of resources in the sector. In his study, Kubler 
(2001), analysed the developments in drug policy (public health) in Switzerland and confirmed the 
idea that internal events have implications for the policy subsystem. He suggests that there was a 
simultaneous modification in another public health area that stimulated changes in drug policy. 
Specifically, the political battle about how to control the spread of AIDS. In this case, the 
transmission of the AIDS via the interchange of injectable drugs was limited by implementing a 
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plan for needle control. This had positive side effects by reducing the target of the drug policies, 
which aimed to impose harm reduction policies and control all the possible sources of infection.  
Policy oriented-learning incorporates the role of scientific knowledge and considers how the 
information provided by experts is able to promote a revision of beliefs in coalitions. Although 
knowledge is a powerful resource that coalitions use to support their arguments, the impact of 
expert information is limited because deep core beliefs are extremely difficult to change, even in the 
face of strong technical references. Nevertheless, information is effective in modifying the 
secondary aspects of beliefs and in producing minor, as opposed to major, policy changes. For 
instance, Abrar et al. (2000) examined policies on domestic violence in the UK in 1975 and 1995. 
Their work supported the ACF argument that, if there is a professional forum providing technical 
resources to coalitions, policy-oriented learning is expected. In this case, between 1975 and 1995 
there was a permanent presence of feminist activists, which created awareness about the need to 
take action and create policies to stop violence against women.  
Negotiated agreement refers to collaboration across coalitions, in which the polarisation of 
conflicts is reduced, and there is a willingness to reach a consensus. This need for agreement may 
be stimulated by a situation that the authors called “the devil shift” (Sabatier and Weible 2007; 
Jenkins-Smith et al. 2015), in which competing coalitions estimate that their opponents are rather 
powerful and threatening (more than themselves) with the capacity to active the potential 
institutional and informal veto points against their interests, and therefore, they will actively look to 
diminish conflict in order to avoid damages (Ingold and Varone 2012). The results of the 
interaction between groups consist of a process of agreement rather than a sum-zero battle with 
clear losers and winners. Additionally, this scenario is more likely to occur when coalitions 
perceive that the costs of maintaining the status quo are too high for them. This is what Sabatier 
and Weible call “a hurting stalemate’ situation, where actors are willing to negotiate and explore 
alternatives to achieve a plausible solution for all the parties involved. If the alternatives are 
restricted, the chances of agreement increase because the previously warring coalitions can 
modify their expectations and get at least some of their policy goals in the public policy outcomes. 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) proposed a list of conditions for actors who want to pursue this path of 
negotiation: incentive to negotiate seriously (a hurting stalemate), composition, leadership, 
consensus decision rule, funding, duration and commitment, empirical issues (a process in which 
secondary beliefs are modify by the acquisition of new knowledge), building trust, and alternative 
venues.  
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After the inclusion of negotiated agreement in the ACF in 2007, only a few studies have 
explored how and why coalitions collaborate within specific policy subsystems, with the exception 
of a couple of studies published before 2007, such as Larsen et al. (2006) and Kubler (2001), 
which illustrate this path. As an illustration, Larsen et al. (2006) investigated the advocacy 
coalitions present in the discussion of the Danish pharmacy policy from 1996 to 2001. They 
analysed official documents to identify the coalitions and used qualitative interviews to describe the 
mechanisms involved in coalition formation and interaction. In looking at the factors that promoted 
the approval of the pharmacy policy, they found that the original competing coalitions were able to 
make concessions via compromise (giving up some issues, in order to obtain others). Along with 
the commitment of coalitions to put the policy forward, Larsen and colleagues (2006) suggest 
another reason for this compromise among parties: the lack of alternate venues. As the core of the 
corporatist system is based on the negotiation between the government, interest groups, and 
associations, there is a limit as to who can get access to the decision making process. If 
negotiation is the norm for corporatist states, then the challenge for the ACF is to explain those 




3.3.1 Paths of policy change in post-authoritarian countries 
Research applying the ACF in former authoritarian regimes, to examine the legacies of the 
non-democratic governments on new democracies, has increased in recent years. Similarly to the 
cases examined above, studies from European and Asian countries also show that most of the 
transformations have responded to external events. Albright (2011), for example, discusses causal 
mechanisms of change in flood management policies after the natural disasters in 1998 and 2001 
in Hungary. She argues that despite these shocks, two other processes were catalysts for policy 
change: internal democratisation and EU integration. These processes opened new venues for 
participation. Former minority coalitions were able to take advantage of this particular context to 
challenge the dominant views of government coalitions. In the same vein, Bukowski (2007) 
analysed the developments of the Spanish water policy subsystem in both pre- and post-
authoritarian periods (1939-2004), and came to conclusions similar to those of Albright (2011). 
Her findings suggest that the environmental paradigm from the dictatorship (uncontrolled 
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exploitation of natural resources led by the State) was replaced, twenty years after the return to 
democracy, by increasing regulation and control of natural resources. This change happened after 
a combination of various events: the change of political regime in the mid-seventies, a significant 
period of drought in the centre-south of Spain, the Spanish elections in 1996 and 2004, and the EU 
integration. However, in this study, the author did not clearly differentiate the paths and the study 
identifies internal shocks with external events such as causal mechanisms. This is particularly 
when referring to the periods of drought, which in the latest conceptualisation of the ACF, 
correspond to an internal episode of the policy subsystem. If we consider this, it is possible to say 
that two paths of policy change were operating simultaneously in the Spanish case. The 
combination of internal and external paths is also reflected in the study of Kim (2012) where he 
examined policy changes in natural resources in the South Korean case. He suggests that in 
addition to the change of regime in the late eighties, the Asian economic crisis at the end of the 
90's and the pollution problems in other parts of the region delayed the implementation of the 
Saeandgeum Tidelan project.  
Until the recent study about the Uruguayan case presented by Freigedo et al. (2015) empirical 
studies conducted in Latin America have not explored the factors that lead change, mainly focused 
on the impact of policy legacies on the feasibility of policy change. As such, in studies of Brazilian 
and Chilean natural resources, legacies from the authoritarian period have caused inertia in the 
policy subsystems. The study by Carvalho (2001) in Brazil examines the metallurgical development 
in the Amazonian region. It concludes that due to clientelistic dynamics between the government 
and the local peasantry formed during the authoritarian regime, this coalition was able to reverse 
pro-environmental policies, blocking the possibility of environmentalist groups to put the protection 
of the Amazon on the political agenda. Similarly, Arnold's research (2003) analyses the progress of 
native forest policy in Chile between 1992 and 2002. He argues that government proposals to 
regulate the exploitation of native forests were persistently blocked by powerful actors from the 
forestry industry. These actors were part of the group of entrepreneurs that built companies in a 
very unregulated context under the military regime, which allowed extensive privatisation of natural 
resources and social policy areas. Arnold (2003) suggests that the role of the government was 
rather neutral, as they did not develop their own agenda, but rather tried to mediate between 
environmentalist and forest industry representatives. Additionally, the author suggests that the lack 
of environmental civil society organisations (another legacy of the dictatorship) reinforced the 
control of economic elites. This explains the inertia in this sector after the return to democracy.  
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Freigedo et al. (2015) shares this idea about the implications of policy legacies on the 
continuity in the health sector in the study of health policy subsystem in Uruguay.  They suggest 
that the left-wing alliance that took office in 2004, took advantage of the “window of opportunity” 
opened, to propose and implement a reform in the health sector. Unlike other studies on post 
authoritarian states, this study brings two new aspects into the discussion. First, the identification 
of a single dominant coalition that pushed the reform facilitated by compromise achieved by 
coalitions members forward. Second, the authors expanded their analysis to the implementation 
stage that prompted the disintegration of the dominant coalition, as they increasingly disagreed on 
the secondary instruments. In fact, the former coalition members obstructed the implementation 
process. Freigedo et al. (2015) suggests that the government had “diminishing returns” in terms of 
their power, which became a weak articulator of the implementation.   
This overview of the sub-set of studies applying the ACF analyses policy making in post-
authoritarian regimes, showing a variation in the forces that drive policy change and highlight two 
main gaps, which I will consider in the analysis of the Chilean health reforms, as part of the 
contributions to this framework. For instance, while the democratisation is confirmed to be an 
opportunity for transformation, the prevalence of actors or elites from the precious authoritarian 
could be seen as an informal policy legacy that affects new democratic governments. In Chile, as 
Arnold (2003) suggests, companies in the forestry sector started in an unregulated environment, 
strengthening the power of economic groups that wanted uncontrolled exploitation of the forest, 
obstructing policy change. Thus, the process of inclusion or exclusion of actors as part of 
democratisation should be analysed in depth.  
The last point, similar to the criticism of historical institutionalist accounts, is the predominant 
focus on exogenous events such as explanatory factors for policy change. This is demonstrated in 
the case studies from Europe reviewed above, where integration to the European Union has been a 
source of pressure for implementing reforms in a variety of policy subsystems. While some 
internal events have been considered in combination with external events in prompting policy 
change, other paths of policy change from the ACF have been overlooked; in particular, policy 
oriented learning and negotiated agreement. It should be noted that the lack of research regarding 
those paths was noticed in the latest review of applications of ACF. This review also suggested that 
little research has been done into recently democratised countries and in those countries that have 
not experienced authoritarian regimes (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009; Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014). 
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3.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter explains the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), assessing its value as an 
analytical approach to examine the policy process based on the analysis of coalitions interactions, 
and the mechanisms of policy change in a more integrative manner; to understand the feasibility of 
transformations in the face of established institutional arrangements and in the absence of external 
events and shocks.  
Restating the contribution of this thesis and before to explain the Chilean context, a brief 
word is required about what makes this study on the decision-making process in Chile distinctive. 
As a consequence of the political transactions between political parties during the transition and 
consolidation of democracy, a large number of studies refer to the Chilean political system in the 
post-Pinochet regime period as a consensus-driven system (Funk and Navia 2006; Sehnbruch and 
Siavelis 2014). In this context, analysing the process through the ACF permits us to understand 
how policy change in the health sector occurred, and presents us with an alternative to the widely 
accepted institutionalist view that emphasises the inertia of the Chilean political system after the 
end of the dictatorship (Castiglioni 2006; Ewig and Kay 2011).  
By reviewing the various applications of the ACF, I conclude that there is little research in 
two main areas of the framework: first, the analysis of opportunity structures, particularly in post-
authoritarian or non-democratic contexts; and second, in the examinations of paths of policy 
change beyond the influence of external events. In this way, the explanation of the ACF in this 
chapter illuminates the main findings of my research, reported in chapters 6, 7, and 8. To 
contextualise the political process of the health reform, the following chapter presents an overview 
of the development of the Chilean health system, and analyses the milestones before and after the 
political regime change.   
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CHAPTER 4 THE CHILEAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, I examined policy change theories highlighting the value of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) such as a theoretical lens to unfold the intervenient factors of 
the health policy reform in Chile. Taking into consideration that the ACF put particular emphasis on 
the importance of long-term processes to understand the formation of coalitions and policy 
change, this chapter provides an overview of the organisation of the health policy subsystem in 
Chile.  
The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the examination of the political process in Chile, 
analysing the impact of the reforms carried out by Pinochet’s authoritarian regime on the 
subsequent developments in this sector during the first two Concertación governments. The 
purpose of the examination of both periods is to give a better understanding of the underpinnings 
behind the reform proposed by President Lagos. Considering that the focus of this study is on the 
policy process rather than an evaluation of the reforms’ contents and outcomes, this chapter 
analyses the milestones of the health sector. Therefore, this shorter chapter is comprised of two 
main sections that correspond to both pre and post-authoritarian periods.  
 
4.2 A NEOLIBERAL SHIFT ON THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
The origins of the health policy subsystem in Chile is understood as a consequence of the 
achievements of workers’ bargaining rights in the first part of the nineteenth century, which led to 
an expansion of the welfare system in Chile. This is similar to the way the European social 
protection systems were developed. In 1952, the Chilean health sector was organised following the 
example of the British NHS implemented four years before, integrating several institutions into one 
autonomous National Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Salud, SNS). This institution was 
responsible for sectorial plans and guidelines, “acting as a manager, financier and provider of 
health services for all citizens, but mainly catered for blue-collar workers and indigents, their 
spouses and children up to the age of 15 (Davila 2005, 16). In coordination with the Ministry of 
Health, the SNS delegated some responsibilities to regional institutions and was financed by 
mandatory contributions from employers, employees, and the state. This structure remained until 
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the latter years of the seventies, when Pinochet’s team implemented a substantial reform to reduce 
the role of the state in favour of a privately managed sector.  
One of the facilitators of the implementation of radical reforms in social policies had to do with 
the authoritarian context. Since Congress was closed down, authorities organised committees 
within ministries, comprised of military members and technocrats that shared market-oriented 
views, to develop policy proposals. The technocrats, widely known as the “Chicago Boys”, were a 
group of Chilean economists educated at the University of Chicago and were followers of 
Friedman’s ideas (Gonzalez-Rossetti et al. 2000), that carried out an economic transformation in 
the eighties, based on the rules defined in the book called “The Brick” (El Ladrillo). This volume 
was a compilation of the various reforms intended to put in place by the militaries and the 
technocrats, which included the reorganisation a number of areas such as social policies, legal and 
administrative, among others. The most accurate translation of the Chicago boys’ neoliberal ideas 
was the complete restructuring of the pensions sector, which consisted of the full privatisation of 
the entities responsible for managing individual savings and the definition of new procedures for 
worker retirement (Barrientos 2002; Castiglioni 2005)10.  
The Pinochet reform of the health sector was a pivotal plan during his government, in which 
implemented two main changes: with the first policy, the military government sought to 
decentralise11 the previous National Health Service (SNS) into the National System of Health 
Services (SNSS) (Barrientos 2002; Cereceda and Hoffmeister 2008); creating autonomous health 
centres responsible for the provision of services at municipal level12 (Mardones and Azevedo 
2006), but the financial matters were administrated by central authorities.  
The second change was the privatisation on the providers and insurers side. In 1981, the 
health system was divided into two institutions: the National Public Health Fund, FONASA (Fondo 
                                                   
 
 
10 Ossandon (2008) provide a detailed explanation about the privatised pensions reform in 1981 that led a re-
structuring of the health system. 
11 The process of decentralisation could include “a variety of reforms characterised by the transfer of fiscal, 
administrative, and/or political authority for planning, management, or service delivery from the central Ministry of 
Health to alternative institutions” (Berman and Bossert 2000,1).  
12 This also happened in the education sector, in which municipalities became the managers of the public primary 
schools. 
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Nacional De Salud) and Private Health Insurance Institutions known as ISAPRES (Instituciones De 
Salud Previsional). According to Unger et al. (2008, 542), 
 “The two systems followed completely different rationales: the public system, a traditional 
“Bismarckian” social security system (members contribute a proportion of their wages to 
receive health services according to their need), promoted solidarity via risk-sharing and 
the internal redistribution of health care resources, while the private system offered health 
insurance policies corresponding to each individual’s contributions.” 
FONASA, was created to collect and manage the provision and financing side of the public 
system, gathering the compulsory contributions of people (mandatory and voluntary that depends 
on their income and type of job) in addition to the resources from the governmental budget. People 
enrolled in FONASA are classified in one of four categories: A, for people with no or very low 
income, while those in the group D have higher income. On the other side, ISAPRES (Instituciones 
de Salud Previsional) manage the accounts for individuals who opted to buy a private insurance. 
ISAPRES market sells individual health plans, designed according to sex, age, health risk among 
other specifications established in legal contracts (Cid 2008; Ossandon 2008).  
Both public and private institutions are responsible for providing health services. In the public 
sector, there are two types of institutions: primary centres managed by municipalities, and 
hospitals with different levels of complexity, administrated by the National Health Service System 
(SNSS). Private providers offer a wider range of medical facilities, such as private practices, 
clinics, specialised medical centres, and laboratories. The number of people that opted for 
ISAPRES progressively increased, reaching around 16% of users in 1990 (Pribble 2013). It should 
be noted that in 1986, when the contribution for health increased from 4% to 7%, the government 
offered a subsidy of 2% to incentivise people to transfer from FONASA to ISAPRES (Gonzalez et al. 
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Figure 2 Organisation of health system after 1986 to date 
 
Source: Ministry of Health Report (2004); Davila (2005) 
As dissention was not allowed and the participation of civil society representatives in the 
national health council was suppressed, the authoritarian regime could put social policy reforms 
forward without obstacles. According to Labra (2002), there was a weakening of workers unions, 
particularly in the health sector, in comparison with the power gained by the private sector. Since 
its formation in 1948, the Colegio Medico played a central role in decision-making as part of the 
consulting board of the Ministry. Initially, they participated in the discussion, and became an 
obstacle to bureaucrats’ plans since they were seen as being closer to the Allende’s, who was a 
doctor and former Minister of Health. The government took two actions to prevent the conflict with 
the professional association: first, the discussion of the reform was moved from the Ministry of 
Health to the Ministry of Labour (as part of the larger plan of reforms). Second, in 1981, Decree 
Law 3.621 scaled down the power of the Colegio Medico, as the government converted all 
professional associations into corporate associations (Asociaciones Gremiales), thus transforming 
them into groups without compulsory affiliation. The Colegio Medico lost two main qualities: the 
capacity of professional supervision and its participation in policy-making, which in turn, permitted 
the authoritarian regime to privatise the health sector with less opposition (Castiglioni 2006). 
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The introduction of the private sector opened the door for the entrance of a number of 
business groups with interests in the health market. These groups were ideologically close and 
personally connected with the team of technocrats responsible for the plan’s execution. For 
instance, Gonzalez et al. (2000) illustrates these ties by explaining that Manuel Cruzat, one of the 
authors of The Brick, was one of the owners of a holding company that had life insurance 
companies. As a demonstration of the influence of these business groups, in 1984, the ISAPRES 
created a trade association, the ISAPRES Association13 (Asociación of ISAPRES), to represent their 
interests in public discussions affecting the industry. The ISAPRES Association is a critical player 
even in the present day. In this context, the triangulation of interests between right-wing political 
parties, religious groups, and the economic elite became part of the healthcare sector.14  
The changes in the health sector during the authoritarian period show an evolution from a 
highly centralised and publicly managed system to a decentralised structure with a combination of 
public and private sectors including insurers and providers of health services. The resulting 
structure enhanced the market mechanisms behind the provision of health services, giving 
healthcare a status of commodity rather than an entitlement. Even though the Constitution 
enactment in 1980 guaranteed the right to healthcare, the view within the government was in 
tandem with the words of the Air Force Colonel and Health Minister Alberto Spoerer of that period, 
stating that "health care is not given; rather, it must be obtained by the people" (Reichard 1996, 
88). 
 
4.3 THE CHILEAN HEALTH POLICY SUBSYSTEM IN THE 1990s 
The mixed system created by the reform in 1981, with FONASA and ISAPRES sharing the 
health market, was preserved in the 1990s. In social policy sectors, the first two transitional 
governments of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) reduced high levels of 
                                                   
 
 
13 As with any other professional or business groups, these associations are based on voluntary affiliation similar to the 
Colegio Medico after the reform. 
14 For instance, doctors working in private clinics linked with religious groups could not (in theory) offer advice on 
medical contraception methods, suggesting only natural techniques accepted by the Catholic Church (Dides 2006).  
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poverty, increased social expenditure and ensured access to health for the most vulnerable 
segments of the population, rather than carried out structural transformations.  
During the first period, in order to compensate the scarce public investment of the preceding 
period, the Aylwin administration (1990-1994) sought to improve the public subsystem by taking a 
number of steps to strengthen primary care, improve hospital infrastructure and reinforce 
prevention and promotion as public policies. Two Ministers led this process, Jorge Jimenez de la 
Jara and Julio Montt, both from the Christian Democratic Party. One of the most important 
initiatives of the Aylwin presidency was to strengthen the supervisory capacity of the state over the 
ISAPRES, by creating a Superintendencia as the main regulatory body for private health insurance 
companies. Specifically, this institution developed specific regulations (from general laws) and 
produced statistics and rankings about the function of the market and the firms involved 
(Ossandon 2008).  
The second phase took place during the government of Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), which 
sought to modernise the public sub-system by strengthening the regulatory role of the Ministry. 
Ministers Carlos Massad and Alex Figueroa, also from the Christian Democratic Party were 
responsible for these initiatives, for instance, the approval of the “FONASA" law that strengthened 
the duties of the public sector, and some changes in the "Medical Act" to regulate the contracts of 
municipal employees, and their services. Although the initiatives of previous governments helped to 
reduce the deficiencies in healthcare, various factors were still disturbing the health system. Data 
from the health sector shows, such as the distribution of affiliates from 1990 to 2000 in the next 
table, part of the problem that this reform intended to address.  
 
Table 5 Distribution of affiliates to FONASA and ISAPRES (%) 
Year FONASA (%) ISAPRES  (%) OTHERS  (%) 
1990 73.1 15.9 11.0 
1991 69.5 18.9 11.5 
1992 63.7 21.8 14.5 
1993 60.9 24.5 14.7 
1994 60.6 25.7 13.7 
1995 59.6 26.0 14.4 
1996 59.0 25.9 15.0 
1997 58.8 26.1 15.2 
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1998 60.5 24.4 15.1 
1999 61.5 21.7 16.8 
2000 65.6 20.0 14.4 
Source: FONASA 
 
By 2000, FONASA covered around 66% of the population, whereas the private sector covered 
approximately 20% of the population. Although it could be argued that the problems of ISAPRES be 
restricted to the population who subscribed to private insurance plans, the effects cream skimming 
had an impact on the entire system. One the one hand, there was discrimination in the selection of 
people according to their risk in the access to health care, creating a segmented and inefficient 
market for the public sectors. In fact, between 1990 and 1998, ISAPRES received around 40,3% of 
the health expenditure from the public budget and covered less than 18% of the population (Cid 
2008). The unbalanced distribution of patients is another problematic issue emanated from the 
dual systems, where the distribution by income quintile shows that the highest income groups 
were concentrated in ISAPRES (Quintil V) and the poorest in FONASA (Quintil I): 
 
Table 6 Distribution of health insurance system by population quintile income, 2000. 
Quintile FONASA ISAPRES OTHER 
I 87,5 3,1 9,4 
II 80,1 7,8 12,1 
III 61,0 7,6 25,4 
IV 53,4 29,5 17,1 
V 29,6 54,2 16,2 
Source: Cid 2008. 
 
Besides the concentration of wealthy people in ISAPRES, it also had a higher percentage of 
the younger and healthier segments of the population, as private insurance companies are reluctant 
to accept individuals over the age of 60 and “women on a reproductive age” (Ferrer 2004). As 
there was no regulatory framework, ISAPRES were able to adjust their premiums by age and 
gender group, according to the potential individuals’ risk, in what it is called cream-skimming 
(Bitrán et al. 2008). They could reject them based on pre-existing medical conditions, or 
significantly increasing the price of insurance plans. By 2000, there were approximately fifteen 
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ISAPRES, which offered around 16,000 different health plans with various levels of coverage for 
specialists appointments, medical treatments, operations, depending on the cost of the plan (Bitrán 
et al. 2008; Ossandon 2008). These companies sold special plans for women between 20 and 38 
years old, colloquially referred to as "uterus health plan" and "non-uterus health plan” (Planes con o 
sin utero), that is, if a woman was planning to get pregnant, the price of the plan was higher, if not, 
the plan was cheaper. According to the private insurers, this disparity in prices is related with costs 
associated with post-natal sick leaves (Gideon 2007). Additionally, ISAPRES restricted the mobility 
of patients as information was shared by the entire private insurance system (without authorisation 
of patients). If a person decided to leave an ISAPRE, they could get a rejection from other 
companies because of a pre-existent condition or risk associated with their clinical history. The 
lack of regulation was crucial in permitting these discriminatory actions (Drago 2006; Cid 2008; 
Ossandon 2008; Pribble 2013).  
Conversely, FONASA was composed of the elderly, those who had chronic diseases, people 
with lower incomes, and the homeless. In the public system, the primary centres and hospitals 
provided services where poor infrastructure, waiting lists, and lack of personnel and specialists, 
made services lag behind those provided by private practices and clinics. Another difficulty was 
related to doctors’ schedules. In public sector, salaries were less competitive than in the private 
sector and it was very common for doctors to concentrate their mornings in public institutions 
while working in private clinics where they could receive higher wages in the afternoon. The 
consequence of this dual practice was that hospitals did not have the necessary personnel in the 
afternoon. They were unable to provide appointments or perform surgery for people covered by 
FONASA, which reinforced the inefficiency of public institutions, causing long waiting lists and 
dissatisfaction among users (Montt 2005; Sanchez and Labbe 2005).  
Ten years after the return to democracy, President Lagos sought to address the imbalances 
between the public and the private system, as well as emphasising citizens’ rights as the foci of the 
reform to change the individualist approach of the existing model. Being the first non-Christian 
Democrat president after the transition gave him the leeway he needed to present a more 
progressive social agenda. The two most important areas of the reform proposal were: first, the 
introduction of a set of laws designed to regulate private sector activities. And, second, making the 
State a compulsory provider and legal guarantor of a new program to ensure universal access and 
financial support for a list of conditions prioritised according to the recurrence and costs by the 
AUGE Plan (Plan AUGE), which is a system of Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees. Although 
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this reform was widely known as the AUGE reform after the most recent programme, the original 
Lagos bill was comprised of five specific laws, which were the following:  
 
Table 7 Lagos health reform proposal 
Sources: Ministry of Health Report (2004); Congressional Hearings (several years) 
 
The idea of the reform was announced during the Lagos’s presidential campaign, where he 
expressed his will to make substantive changes to the health sector, and it was confirmed after he 
took office, in his first annual speech in the Congress in May of 2000, initiating the policy process 
of the health reform.  
 
LAW TITLE AND 
NUMBER 
DESCRIPTION 





Guarantees financial resources for the reform, 
including a 1% increase in the value added tax (VAT). 
09 June 2003/ 
14 July 2003 
Law No.19.966: 
General Guarantees in 
Health (Plan AUGE). 
Creates a system of explicit guarantees in access, 
opportunity, quality, and financial protection for a list of 
priority pathologies. The public and private sector were 
obliged to provide these benefits without conditions. 
22 May 2002/ 




Ensures the system’s stability and protects affiliates. 
11 June 2003/ 
28 August 2003 
Law No. 20.015: 
Private Health 
Insurance 
Improves transparency and control through the 
establishment of a regulatory agency called 
“Superintendencia of ISAPRES.” 
02 July 2002/ 
17 May 2005 
Law No. 19.937: 
Health Authority 
Separates the roles of health care and health regulation, 
and creates a system of accreditation of public and 
private providers.  
 
02 July 2002/ 
24 February 2004 
	   53 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter aimed to present the main features and trajectories in the Chilean health system, 
providing the contextual factors to understand the Lagos’ health reform process. It argued that 
Pinochet’s dictatorship left a myriad of legacies within the health sector that explain the subsequent 
developments within this policy subsystem in the new democratic period. Specifically, the 
introduction of the private sector as an insurer and provider of health care following the neoliberal 
principles promoted by the military authorities and set up by a group of technocrats in 1981. With 
this background and after the return to democracy in 1900, the subsequent Chilean governments 
have mainly maintained the free-market model implemented under Pinochet´s regime. The first 
attempt to introduce a substantial reform, in this sector was prompted by President Ricardo Lagos 
in 2000, aiming to correct the adverse effects of the neoliberal reforms. Before this initiative 
became a law five years after the announcement, there was a long period of design and 
formulation, which is the political process analysed in depth in chapters 6, 7, and 8 of this thesis. 
The following chapter presents the research design of this study, explaining decisions and 
procedures in the collection and analysis of data.  
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided an account of the health system organisation in Chile, to 
contextualise the political process of the reform proposed in 2000, from which it is possible to get 
a better understanding of this thesis’ findings explored in the followings chapters. 
The current chapter presents the study design and methodological decisions that I made to 
analyse the Lagos health reform through the lens of the ACF, which follows the qualitative tradition 
of previous advocacy coalition studies. The aim of this chapter is therefore, to provide clarity 
regarding the research process I engaged in, explaining the choice of a case study design, as well 
as the techniques employed during the process of data collection and analysis.  
This chapter begins by explaining the rationale behind the research design and methodology 
used. The second section provides a description of the process of data collection from two main 
sources: documentary analysis and elite interviews. This is followed by explaining the strategies 
and steps involved in the process of data analysis. The last section offers a reflexive account of my 
experience conducting this doctoral fieldwork. 
 
5.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN: A CASE STUDY APPROACH 
 In terms of research design, either deductive or inductive reasoning can be used to gather 
information about the object of study, which might be employed iteratively in the course of the 
investigative process. Given the nature of my research question and the theoretical framework 
used, I employed mainly a deductive approach as the examination of the Chilean case was ACF-
driven, in which the research followed a theory that guides the data collection and analysis 
(Harrinkari et al 2016). Considering the growing applications of the ACF, methodological 
challenges have increased simultaneously in case studies as well as comparative empirical works, 
as researchers are required to clarify the steps of research and analysis more precisely, in order to 
strengthen the use of the framework in wider contexts, topics and policy subsystems. In particular, 
early ACF investigations were distinguished in terms of research techniques in a Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith´s book (1993) and later works were updated in two thorough reviews made by 
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Weible and colleagues (2009; 2011) pointing out the state of the methods’ designs and different 
focuses within the advocacy coalition framework. As these compilations show both 
methodological strands, qualitative and quantitative (and mixed methods) have been followed by 
scholars to analyse the policy-making processes depending on the theoretical emphasis given in 
each study. For instance, Weible et al. (2011) point out that ACF literature has tackled three main 
lines of inquiry such as structure coalitions, political learning, and policy change. Guided by the 
ACF model, the choice of the research design and methodology choices varies from those studies 
which are hypothesis-testing oriented, where the quantitative work puts emphasis on the numbers, 
amounts, or frequencies of the variables examined, helping researchers to confirm if a case(s) is 
congruent with theoretical propositions (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). It is worth noting that within the 
ACF, that although in this thesis there is no use of statistical hypotheses, the ACF model includes a 
series of 9 statements that have been tested by scholarly research applying quantitative techniques 
of analysis to explain beliefs change and coordination15. In the range of these techniques, recent 
studies have employed for instance, Social Network Analysis (SNA) to map actors within 
coalitions, given the similarities with the concept of policy communities and networks (Adam and 
Kriesi (2007), with the aim to unpack the connections and ties among actors. Another technique of 
research used to test hypothesis has been content analysis of political statements, or 
congressional hearings when data is available that include the conversion of those statements in 
frequencies and then analysed statically. 
When it comes to looking for in-depth explanations about advocacy coalitions, qualitative 
methods are the choice of research. In this case, the process of data collection also offers various 
options, such as in qualitative case studies, where it can actually employ different techniques, 
which include interviews, focus groups, surveys and historical documents, which are chosen by 
their validity for the case in question (Buttolph, Johnson and Reynolds 2008). As a non-
experimental method, qualitative research seeks to investigate the significance and qualities of 
social phenomena thoroughly, focusing the analysis on a specific decision, place, or problem (King 
et al. 1994). Seawright and Gerring (2008, 105-6) observe, one of the primary virtues of the case 
study method is the depth of analysis that it offers. Here, depth refers “to detail, richness, 
                                                   
 
 
15 The list of the hypothesis and its discussion can be found in the article of Jenkins-Smith et al. 2015, pages 195-204.  
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completeness, [and] wholeness.” Given the lack of capacity to develop statistical inferences or 
identification, or law-like regularities, such depth may present both strength and weakness in 
qualitative case studies. However, scholars defend its utility for producing significant insights from 
one single study that could shed light on the phenomenon, produce theoretical generalisations, or 
open new areas for further research on a large-scale project. With the purpose of illuminating the 
decisions around the political process of the health reform, I have opted for a qualitative research 
design that allows me to conduct research emphasising depth rather than breadth (Ulin et al. 
2005). These mechanisms allow the research to extend the explanatory capacity from an individual 
case study to a larger class of units (Gomm et al. 2000; Gerring 2004; Flyvbjerg 2006; Swanborn 
2010). Suggestions to overcome limitations of qualitative case studies have been focused on a 
detailed process of research, stressing that such research should include: a clear theoretical 
framework and a solid methodological design that supports the reliability of the findings and avoids 
ad-hoc conclusions (Yin 2002; Flyvbjerg 2006). For example, Yin (2002) indicates that in the case 
of data collection, rigorous research includes the following steps: attentive observation of the 
context around the issue under analysis that supports the credibility of study findings; a clear 
definition of measurement instruments; a careful and exhaustive review of multiple sources, 
coherent with the line of inquiry. Regarding the generalisation of this case study, I expect that the 
conclusions that emerge from this thesis may shed light for further research in other social policy 
areas. Using the same methodology, in different policy subsystems, for instance, education or 
pensions, one could find the same types of actors, coalitions in this case, that could lead a 
different explanation of similar problems. This study therefore, expands the qualitative strand of the 
ACF. 
Previous studies with qualitative techniques for data collection has been used by Winkel and 
Sotirov (2011) Harrinkari et al. (2016) and Menahem and Gilad (2016) where the process of data 
interpretation is embedded in the process of coding and interpreting interviews and written 
sources, with the main purpose of identification of advocacy coalitions and their beliefs. Winkel 
and Sotirov (2011) for example, interrogated policy stakeholders in the forest sector in Bulgaria, 
and data collected was code guided by the ACF.  Findings showed that the interaction of advocacy 
coalitions in national forest policy were influenced by external events, were previously stated 
commanded policies, and were replaced by the dissemination of market oriented management 
after 1990. Mixed methods have also been used for the ACF examination. With a focus on policy 
change, the work of Leifield (2013) combines both a qualitative content analysis and a social 
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network analysis, revealing the existence of a transition from one coalition to another dominant 
coalition that was able to bring about a pension reform in Germany. The research techniques 
helped to operationalise the content of actors ‘discourses (from newspapers archives) and 
transformed into binary data and then to a graphical representation of networks within the previous 
and subsequent dominant coalition.  
 Another way to explore actors´ opinions is presented by Fisher (2014) who took a step 
forward in the examination of coalition structure in Switzerland, integrating Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) software to identify causal relationships between advocates and policy change 
processes, measuring the degree of consensus. Based on the data from expert surveys in various 
policy sectors, the author concludes that dominant coalitions do not necessarily lead to major 
policy as it is requires a certain degree of collaboration, low intensity conflicts among coalitions, 
and specific opportunity structures. Further research might depart from these results and expand 
the explanatory power via the replication of surveys in other cases. In my study for instance, a 
survey would not have been a suitable technique of obtaining information, as this type of 
instrument is more adequate for gathering responses to standardise questions and produce 
aggregated results from a large selected number of participants. Moreover, surveys of different 
types, e.g. descriptive or longitudinal, aim to establish trends and a cause-effect relationship 
between variables rather than analyse the meanings of the phenomena. Therefore, they might limit 
the capacity of the researcher to fully capture individual perceptions and knowledge from a 
respondents’ narrative. For this reason, my choice was to conduct elite interviews and document 
analysis, as both techniques provided me with a great deal of flexibility in my search for a 
comprehensive account of the policy process. Thus, in developing the interviews schedule and the 
collection of various documents, I was informed by both previous ACF studies and literature about 
health reform processes in Chile and elsewhere, to get a sense about topics and samples that 
other researchers have considered beforehand in the analysis of this sector. This characteristic 
helped me to define my questions and to re-evaluate the direction of my research while I was doing 
fieldwork. A semi-structure interview is one of the two methods of choice to identify coalitions as 
well as the narratives of policy process from the actors itself. The second method, documentary 
analysis, consists of the exhaustive examination of a wide array of documents, such as official 
reports from governmental institutions, interest group publications, newspapers, congressional 
hearings, to name a few. Data from both sources are coded and analysed based on thematic 
analysis, as it is explained in the following sections.  
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5.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
As the central purpose of my research is to gain a better understanding of the process by 
which the health reform was designed, discussed, and passed within the Chilean political system, 
documentary analysis and interviews provided a narrative about the history and configuration of 
events. From this, I was able to draw general conclusions about the health reform process. Data 
collection was based on two main sources: the examination of documentary sources and semi-
structure interviews with the Chilean politicians and elites connected to the reform being studied. 
However, separately, these sources did not provide an accurate representation of the policy 
process, and none of them were treated at face value for several reasons, for instance, due to the 
biases of public media or the self-perception of power from respondents. It is worth noting that, to 
judge the validity of my interpretations in the appraisal and evaluation of written records, I consider 
how and in which context these documents were produced (MacDonald 2001, 31). Furthermore, I 
was aware about the necessity of integrating all forms of data that could provide me with a more 
thorough picture. For instance, to get a better grasp of the events I read about, I needed, in order to 
elaborate an in-depth narrative, to gain a greater understanding of the actors' views. In the next 
section, I examine how I utilised both sources and the challenges I faced in their collection. 
 
5.3.1 Document analysis  
The starting point of my research consisted of examining the documentary data to identify the 
main actors, political events, and processes during the discussion of the health reform. 
Documentary sources were collected for the period 2000 to 2006, with two main functions: first, it 
provided a detailed landscape of the Chilean political system and health sector as portrayed in the 
public domain; and second, it helped to identify the people that would be interviewed during 
fieldwork. The focus of the documentary appraisal was on those documents with information about 
the actors and their opinions, rather than on the technical aspects of the reform, such as indicators 
or economic calculations from the reform proposal. Although I tried to recover as much of the 
information available as I could, some data could be missed from reading the public records, for 
instance, informal institutions or venues. As such, the triangulation (which consists of a process to 
confirm a proposition through the examination of various independent source/methods) of different 
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data sources was a key step to reducing potential bias in the analysis of responses (Bowling 2002; 
Yin 2002). In order to avoid the problematic partiality related with a single method of data 
collection, my data was gathered via different techniques, interviews, and document analysis 
(Rubin and Rubin 2011). This provided the multiple angles necessary to question the policy 
process and create a convergence of findings. This is why, in addition to the interviewees’ 
narratives, it was important to compare different sources. The documents I reviewed are elaborated 
on in the section below.   
 
5.3.1.1 Institutional materials and publications  
Reports and minutes created by non-governmental actors, for instance, think tanks and private 
sector companies or associations were reviewed. Think tanks from both sides, close to both the 
centre-left and right wing parties, which produce regular reports on different policy areas, including 
health, were chosen. From the centre-left, the Concertación publications from Centro de Estudios 
del Desarrollo (CED), Fundacion Chile 21 and Expansiva were considered. From the think tanks 
close to the right-wing Alianza, papers and reports from Libertad y Desarrollo (LyD), Instituto 
Libertad (IL) and Centro de Estudios Publicos (CEP) were included in my review. Other 
publications prepared from the specialist research of the Unit of Legislative Process Support from 
the Library of Congress were also included. All these documents are listed in the references 
section and some are cited in the chapters of this thesis.  
 
 
5.3.1.2 Transcripts of Congressional Hearings  
 
I collected a set of documents from the Library of Congress called the History of Law (Historia 
de la Ley), which are similar to the British Hansard, which includes a compilation of written records 
from congressional hearings. These large sets of documents (around one thousands pages each) 
contain the presidential message in which the bill is explained and delivered to Congress, as well 
as a complete transcription of the debates that took place within Congress. I looked at these 
documents for each bill of the health reform package that were presented to Congress, from 2002 
to 2005: History of Law No.19.937 (Authority Law), History of Law No.19.966 (Plan AUGE), 
History of Law No.19.888 (Health Financing Law), History of Law No.20.015 ('large' ISAPRES 
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Law) and History of Law No.19.859 ('brief' ISAPRES Law). These transcripts reflect the legislative 
debates in both chambers (Deputies and Senate), including sessions with all its members 
(discusión en sala) or/and debates within specific sectorial committees (discusión particular) that 
are sometimes open to people invited by congressmen to discuss a particular issue of the bill. 
Furthermore, looking at these documents allowed me to gain information about who was invited 
and what they proposed, vis-à-vis legislators' views.   
 
 
5.3.1.3 National newspapers  
 
I searched in digital archives of articles in the Chilean mainstream press from March 2000 to 
December 2005,16 using the following keywords: salud (health), sector salud (health sector), 
reforma a la salud (health reform), Plan AUGE (AUGE Plan), in the most widely read national 
newspapers: El Mercurio, La Tercera, La Segunda, La Nacion.  El Mercurio y La Segunda (a 
political and business focused evening paper) are publications from the company El Mercurio SAP, 
while La Tercera belongs to the COPESA Company. Both conglomerates are owned by two of the 
richest families in Chile, Edwards Eastman and Saieh respectively. Given their market concentration 
and influential relations with the Chilean elites –which is related with the informal networks within 
the country explained also in Chapter 2- (Gronemeyer and Porath 2015), these two conglomerates 
are normally referred to as a powerful duopoly. La Nación was a daily, government-subsidised, 
newspaper and therefore closer to official authorities, but its print version was cancelled during the 
Sebastian Piñera Administration in 2012.  I also consulted press notes from publications with lower 
circulation but widely read by the Chilean elite such as Diario Siete+,17 Diario Estrategia and 
Revista Que Pasa. The circulation and readership for these newspapers is summarised in the 
following table.  
 
                                                   
 
 
16 As this research does not include the implementation phase, I narrowed my search until the year the Congress 
enacted the last law of the health reform. 
17 Diario Siete + was a weekly newspaper published from March of 2002 to September 2004. 




Table 8 Chilean newspapers figures 
Newspaper Format Circulation Readership 
El Mercurio Broadsheet 166.698 
*Double on Sundays’ edition 
372.475 
La Segunda Weekly afternoon 
paper-compact format 
32.000 74.687 
La Tercera Broadsheet 137.179 367.017 
La Nacion Daily-compact format 
*Until 2010 
10.000 31.520 
Source: Data from Benavides et al. (2009) for the first semester of 200718. 
 
Being aware that there is a potential for bias (Bowling 2002), in particular, regarding the 
mostly right-wing political oriented Chilean press19, I triangulated the information from these 
sources with legislative documents and the opinions collected in the interviews. Information found 
in the press was used as a reference to understand the context and objective facts during the 
process, as well as the provision of names for my interviews. A limitation in reviewing these 
secondary sources was the inaccessibility of governmental minutes and reports from the activities 
of the Minister and the executive committee. When I asked the library of the Ministry of Health 
regarding information on this process, they said they did not have information and referred me to 
Doctor Carlos Montoya, who has published a couple books about the Chilean health system. When 
I got in contact with him, he also explained that he was also not able to find this information, so he 
had to rely on the information found in the media. Furthermore, at the time of my fieldwork, the first 
                                                   
 
 
18 The National Agency Press (ANP) not longer provides these data, so I looked at other sources that had collected 
appropriate data. Although the year reported exceed the period of the reform under examination, figures presented here 
are consistent over time, after checking other sources, for instance: 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-chile-20121122.pdf 
19 Regarding the bias to the right, Navia and Osorio (2015) remark that the main newspapers in Chile, El Mercurio (and 
its evening paper, La Segunda) and La Tercera, represents the interests of the right. This has its origins in the 
newspapers opposition to the governments of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) and Salvador Allende (1970-1973) and a 
propagandistic support of the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1989). It is also worth noting that according to the CIA 
reports disclosed on 2003, El Mercurio and its owner, Agustin Edwards Eastman, received funds from the US 
government to pursue activities in order to destabilise the Allende Government. 
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right wing government since 1990 was elected into office, meaning that people who had managed 
that information from previous periods were probably no longer there. This is one of the reasons 
why the interviews, which I will explain in the following section, were a useful source of data that 
allowed me to obtain the narratives of former authorities.  
 
5.3.2 Fieldwork in Chile: interviewing political elites 
 
I conducted fieldwork in Santiago, Chile after obtaining approval from King's College Research 
Ethics Committee (REP(EM)/12/13-3) from November 2012 to January 2013, and from October 
2013 to January 2014. The main purpose was to conduct interviews with political, technocratic, 
and economic elites involved in the Chilean health sector. I included those individuals who had 
formal positions of power, or were appointed in specific roles within governmental departments, 
political parties or interests groups. These held roles such as ministers, congressional 
representatives, and leaders of trade unions, among others. I also considered those individuals 
who were not in publically visible positions, such as advisors or technical professionals who, given 
their credentials and expertise, had privileged access to decision-making centres and regularly 
participated in the policy process. To define my sample, I followed a purposive sampling criterion, 
based on my previous knowledge about the policy process in Chile and information from other 
studies that have previously examined the health sector, in which I sought to interview a group of 
individuals that were part of the policy formulation process. These persons could share  their 
valuable knowledge with me regarding the political context and views around the political process 
in which they were engaged.  
This selection of participants was supplemented by snowball sampling. During fieldwork, at 
the end of each interview, I asked the respondent if she or he could suggest other people for me 
include in my list of interviewees. This was a useful procedure as various participants offered to 
call, during the interviews, other persons to arrange a meeting. I also asked for other names which, 
after few meetings, resulted in the same names being repeated, which mainly confirmed the 
informants I needed to recruit.  As qualitative research is based on the assumption that reality is 
not objective, and social phenomena are always complex; the understanding of the health reform 
process has to include an analysis of the perceptions, motivations and opinions that influence 
interactions and social constructions between individuals. To capture these individuals' meanings, 
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the data collection method in this study was a semi-structured one-on-one interview. This type of 
interview was the preferred option for exploring political elites' perceptions, as it did not restrict the 
richness of responses obtained, unlike a rigid questionnaire.  
I completed 26 elites interviews20 out of 37 people contacted in both trips. From this number, 
just one person, a doctor specialising in public health, actively refused my request for an interview. 
He gave me a personal opinion regarding the process, saying that the issue was still very sensitive 
and he was not responsible because other people did not do what was appropriate. The remaining 
ten people either did not reply to my contact, excused themselves for medical reasons, or due to a 
lack of time. Of course, they were aware that they could have used those justifications to hide the 
fact that they were not inclined to give me an interview.  
During these interviews, an interview guide, with a list of questions and topics to be covered, 
was used and focused on the opinions and experiences of interviewees during the reform process. 
Informed by health policy literature that has previously studied the political process of reforms 
(Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Castiglioni 2005; Wong 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008, among 
others), the interview schedule was based on four categories of open-ended questions permitting a 
'responsive' interview technique (Rubin and Rubin 2011). The categories used in the topic guide 
were: a) Knowledge and position about the reform b) Macro-institutional context, c) Relevant 
actors; d) Decision-making process. Questions were added depending on the interviewee to 
explore more in-depth aspects that emerged during the conversation. A preliminary interview 
schedule21 was discussed with my supervisors twice, then, to test questions, timing, and 
coherence of the schedule, the instrument was piloted with a colleague in Chile. After this 
procedure, some questions were rephrased, and the general order of the schedule was refined to 
ensure that the conversation could flow properly.  
An Information Sheet and Consent Form (Appendix B and C) was sent to participants by email 
when meetings were arranged, and at the beginning of the meeting participants were asked to read 
the information letter and sign the consent form. All the interviews were conducted in Spanish (my 
                                                   
 
 
20 A list of interviewees is included in the Appendix D. 
21 The schedule is included in the Appendix E. 
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mother tongue), and they generally lasted between 45-90 minutes.22 They were all audio-recorded 
and transcribed by myself. While 23 of the interviews conducted in Chile where face-to-face, after 
returning in London, I managed to carry out three interviews by phone/Skype. With the exception of 
the lack of personal interaction, I did not encounter any particular problems using this type of 
communication. 
 In the analysis process, interviews were not taken at “face value”. I am aware that 
politicians and elite members are individuals who are aware of their status, and for whom, their 
public image is very important. They are also experts in media interviews and self-presentation and 
are aware of how they can exercise their powers. All these factors may affect what they say even 
in reference to an event in the past (Arksey and Knight 1999; Odendahl and Shaw 2002). My 
responsibility as a researcher was to elicit their communication, to interpret their responses in 
context, to unpack what they were (not) saying, and to contrast and compare the information 
provided by them.  
The triangulation of data across different sources was employed, comparing the various 
interviewees' stories with the accounts from documentary analysis and media information for a 
more comprehensive picture of the process. For instance, one of the former Ministers of Health, 
Osvaldo Artaza, explained to me that one of the reasons he was removed from his position was his 
conflictive relationship with the president of his political party (Christian Democrat). This was at 
odds with what I read in one of the books about the reform (Olavarria 2011) which says that the 
higher authorities in his party supported Artaza and so I realised that this dissimilar account of 
events needed to be tackled with caution. Other researchers have faced similar challenges, for 
instance, Duke (2002) mentioned that her initial work on policy networks was on prison drug 
policy, followed by a strategy of methodological triangulation. Her first step was analysing 
documentary records, as many actors were involved in the production and consumption of a 
number of written sources. This information was later ratified in semi-structure interviews. 
According to the author, as was the case for my own research, interviews were the only way to 
                                                   
 
 
22 Two particular interviews lasted 20 minutes; see Fieldwork Evaluation section in this chapter.  
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generate rich and detailed data on their perceptions and experiences, but both processes of data 
collection are interconnected in providing an in-depth knowledge of the case.  
 In reflecting my ‘positionality’ in doing this fieldwork, I can see that there were advantages 
to being a relative 'insider'. My insider status facilitated access to my sample, as I spoke the 
language, knew the cultural environment, and had an existing network of contacts. Although, I am 
neither part of the economic or political elite, or a political party militant, my educational 
background (I studied Political Science at Universidad Catolica de Chile, which is one of the top —
semi-public— Chilean universities) and professional credentials opened doors when approaching 
potential interviewees. As I have previously worked in two of the most important universities in 
Santiago, where I met and collaborated with well-known professors, politicians and policy-makers; 
as in Chile it is a common practice for former politicians to occupy academic positions when they 
retire and academics often leave their jobs at universities to work in the public sector. All of these 
contacts facilitated my access to key informants. 
 The literature on elite interviews suggests several ways for recruiting respondents: network 
contacts, gatekeepers, and events attendance (Arksey and Knight 1999; Odendahl and Shaw 
2002). In my case, I followed all the routes mentioned. In general, I relied a lot on my personal 
contacts, as I knew they might know people in the area and who were willing to help me. This was 
the case with a friend's mother, who knew one senior executive of an ISAPRE because they were 
both members of the Catholic congregation “Legion of Christ”. To book an appointment with him, I 
wrote an email to him, pointing out that I was a friend of my friend. After this email, it was a very 
straightforward exchange and he became my first interviewee in December 2012. 
 My interview with President Lagos was through a previous colleague. She was an advisor 
to the President during his administration, and after that, she was still working with him on a 
temporary basis. She introduced me to Lagos’ personal assistant via email, asking her to put me in 
his calendar for an interview about the health reform. After a couple of weeks, the assistant wrote 
back to me, saying that the president would be able to meet me for half an hour. She also invited 
me to stay with him afterwards in a meeting with a team of students from Harvard that were there 
for a seminar about public health in Chile. This was the last interview during my first trip to Chile, 
which was rather convenient as I was far more prepared at the end than at the beginning of my 
fieldwork. The gatekeeper, the President’s personal assistant, was key, because she was the one 
who mentioned my research to the President and asked him to give me space in his schedule. All 
	   66 
of this worked well because my colleague and this personal assistant have been working together 
for several years, but also because my colleague trusted my skills as researcher and my personal 
integrity. 
I also attended some events to gain access to interviewees. One of them took place in 
London, where I had a second chance to arrange an interview with a former Deputy and Senator 
(who previously cancelled an appointment booked in Santiago) while he was on a personal trip (his 
wife was studying English in London) in an event organised by Canning House. I approached him 
to ask for an interview and he agreed to meet me at the Chilean Embassy that afternoon. In other 
cases, there were people who were not in my networks and I just made a cold contact with them 
by email, explaining my research topic and asking for an interview. This approach also worked on 
a number of occasions, and people without having much information about me, gave me an 
appointment. Recruitment of informants ceased when I reached a saturation point, meaning that 
additional interviews were not providing new information.  
 According to Gubrium and Holstein (2002), one of the challenges in doing interviews is the 
dynamic between the informants and the researcher. One of the factors that can affect this 
dynamic is gender and also class position. In my case, I would say that, generally, being a female 
researcher did not adversely affect my position as an interviewer, but it would be fair to say that in 
the opposite way, they did not felt threaten or uncomfortable to be interviewing by a woman and 
they therefore spoke freely. Even when some respondents tried to take control of the questions, I 
would say they did not adopt a condescending position because I was a woman necessarily; but 
this more neutral and collaborative attitude was explained more based on my appearance and the 
fact that I have Caucasian facial features which is identified as someone from the upper class “to 
be one of them”. I might say that a favourable tone of the conversation would be also similar with a 
young male researcher with similar physical attributes than me; but it would be certainly different if 
the one conducting the interview was a woman from an ethnic minority from Latin America with 
darker skin or with a recognisable indigenous name, that could even not get access to the elite 
because “it did not seem part of them”.  
I do recognise there is gender issue in terms of representation, in the sense that all the 
informants, with the exception of two, were male. The two females I did interview occupied 
advisory positions but did not have an official role. Although three more females were contacted 
(but did not respond), this gender balance is indicative of the lack of women’s participation in the 
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decision-making sphere in Chile at the time of the reforms. For instance, calculus from the 
Electoral Service data show, the average female representation in the Congress from 1990 to 2010 
was 11% in the Lower Chamber, while in the Upper Chamber it was 6,2%23. Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting that during the second fieldwork phase, two prominent politicians there were involved 
in the Lagos’ health reforms. Both Michelle Bachelet, former Minister of Health and elected 
president in 2006, and Evelyn Matthei, a Senator from the UDI party were running in the 
presidential election of 2013, that could be seen as a slight signal of improvement in this 
unbalanced situation, but I would say that the gender equality gap is still an overlooked issue in the 
Chilean society.  
In general, I would say I felt comfortable during the interviews and people were very respectful 
when they learnt I was studying in London, sponsored by a prestigious scholarship from the 
Chilean government (various people asked me about my funding for studies in the UK). I think 
these credentials helped me to establish a rapport with informants and to have a cordial interview 
dynamic. With the exception of two cases, both happened to be deputies, people took time to 
answer my questions with good disposition. Furthermore, one of my interviewees, a former 
Minister of Health, called me three times to arrange a second meeting. At the same time, he told 
me that he was looking for someone to write a book about his experience during the reform, but 
did not ask me anything after the meetings. Overall, I think most of the respondents were pleased 
by the fact that, after almost ten years, someone was interested in what they did during the policy 
process. 
 Scholars such as Arksey and Knight (1999), Duke (2002), Gubrium and Holstein (2002) 
point out that anonymity is an issue and challenge facing researchers conducting elites interviews. 
Given the position of authority of the participants, their opinions and comments could be used by 
others, something the participants are aware of, and therefore, might be reluctant to be cited or 
named. However, in my research, all the respondents accepted the terms described in the consent 
forms regarding interview recording and the identification of participants by their names. A couple 
                                                   
 
 
23 Data available at http://servel.cl, retrieved September 20 2015.  
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of informants asked me not to transcribe some phrases or asked to talk off the record during the 
conversation and this information was not transcribed. It is worth noting that in most cases, these 
comments did not add substantial information. When I noted that something could be important, I 
tried to ask them in a different manner when I was allowed to record again. In general, anonymity 
did not determine the content of the conversation. People seemed to talk very freely during the 
interviews, and doing the interviews in my mother tongue was certainly an advantage for having a 
fluid conversation. It is worth noting that most of the participants who were part of the Lagos 
Administration were not in governmental positions at the time of the fieldwork. This was due to the 
changes in the presidency that moved from a pact of centre-left political parties to a right-wing 
alliance. Some of the former politicians were in academia, some others worked independently, and 
others were occupying seats in Congress. Instead, during the fieldwork, people close to the right 
wing were in the government and I could perceive that some of them, i.e. a person working in the 
Ministry of Health, had a more critical view of the ISAPRES than I have would expected.   
In relation with the timing of my fieldwork, gaining access to people in the second round of 
interviews was more challenging because there was a presidential and parliamentary election in 
December of 2013. Potential interviewees were involved in political campaigns; including the two 
candidates running for the presidency, Michelle Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei. Both were key actors 
in the reform under study: one as the first minister of health, and the other one as a senator. After 
several attempts, neither of them was accessible. While contacting Bachelet was impossible 
(although I knew people that were working with her campaign), Matthei agreed to give me an 
interview by Skype after her holidays.24 However, when I emailed her for a follow-up, she never 
replied. I was informed by the press that, after the elections, she retired from the public scene and 
became a maths professor in a semi-public school for poor children. 
 
                                                   
 
 
24 Evelyn Matthei lost the presidential campaign against Michelle Bachelet in the second round of voting on December 
15, 2013. 
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5.4 THEMATIC DATA ANALYSIS  
In order “to identify, to analyse and to report patterns or themes within the data”, this case 
study adopted a thematic analysis as a qualitative analytical method (Braun and Clarke 2006: 79). 
The researcher embraces an exhaustive data review and interpretation in this process. This case 
adopted a deductive approach and used personal accounts and documentation to gain a better 
understanding of the phenomenon of interest. After the process of data collection –informed by 
literature on ACF and health policy– the construction of meaning and interpretation was a crucial 
part of developing conclusions from my sources. A deductive analysis based on the central 
elements of the ACF was employed in exploring the data as a fruitful guide to frame, make sense 
of, and to understand what I was told or read in the data. I opted to limit this thematic analysis to 
two sources, congressional hearings, and interviews (excluding newspapers and institutional 
reports); while newspapers and other documentation were used as contextual information, 
providing a landscape of the process. In the next table, I list the steps I followed in the analysis of 
the data.  
 
Table 9 Steps to Data Analysis 
Interview Transcription – Collating documents 
Reading and first coding (pen and paper) 
Uploading and Second coding process in Nvivo 10 
Interpretative reading of transcriptions, coding and then clustering into themes. 
Iterative process that includes disconfirming evidence to enrich the data analysis 
Presentation of themes in a narrative that include verbatim statements or 
paragraphs from sources, and subsequent interpretation and discussion of 
findings. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Transcribing the interviews was indeed the first and the most useful way to familiarise myself 
with the data and to recall the context of the meetings. My interviews were conducted in Spanish 
and I transcribed them in the same language. Once I completed the transcription, the first step was 
to print out interviews and then start open coding these documents in a pencil and paper style. 
According to Rubin and Rubin (2011), the coding process consists of: 1) recognising those 
sections from your data that give you “a better understanding of your research problem”, 2) 
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assessing their pertinence; and, 3) explaining them in your own words. Codes were initially 
identified among texts, and when issues were linked to the same issue or topic, they were grouped 
together in analytical categories. The same excerpts could be labelled with several different codes.  
In my analysis of data, a coding process was deductive, considering the components of the 
ACF as a theoretical framework. At first, I was coding interviews freely and the sections of the 
Congressional Hearings that corresponded to transcriptions of legislative sessions. The second 
round of coding was done using the Nvivo 10 (a qualitative data analysis software) organising the 
data in framework analysis matrices. One of the advantages of working with Nvivo was that it 
helped organise the material according to the source and codes. This simplified the visualisation of 
codes and facilitated the process of grouping them together into sub themes and themes. I 
uploaded a copy of the interviews and congressional hearings to Nvivo and then chunks or texts 
that captured something meaningful were iteratively tagged under a code. This process resulted in 
either confirming or adding new codes to the first round of the coding process. The analysis of 
interviews and congressional hearings yielded 519 codes, which were organised into nine themes, 
which were related to the components and premises of the ACF regarding coalitions, stable 
parameters, and opportunity structures among others. 
 
Table 10 Set of Themes Identified 
Reform Agenda: background, stages and results  
Identification of coalitions: competing views about the reform 
Dynamic and evolution of political coalitions 
Public opinion and mobilisation of political resources  
Technical knowledge to build consensus 
Influences of policy brokers on the process of change 
Political participation and contestation within the health sector 
Presidential powers and strategies of influence  
Electoral system and distribution of political forces 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
These themes are the basis of my findings, which are explained in a detail in chapters six, 
seven, and eight. While the transcriptions and data analysis were done in Spanish, a selection of 
relevant quotes from my sources was carefully translated (Van Nes et al. 2010), and placed in the 
following chapters to create a narrative of the policy-making process. Each quote ends with the 
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identification of the interviewee by his or her surname and the year of the interview. The quotes 
from congressional hearings and newspapers are also indicated at the end of the quote. 
 
5.5 FIELDWORK EVALUATION  
On reflection, I think the most difficult informants were parliamentarians, because, as their 
assistants said to me, they had very busy schedules and no time to waste on other things. 
Although I managed to get a couple of interviews at Congress, they were not very useful because 
these meetings lasted less than 20 minutes. I had to travel a couple of hours to get to the Congress 
(which is not in Santiago). Then, the appointments were delayed by around one hour in both 
cases, and the actual interviews were less useful in terms of information compared to the rest of 
the meetings. They scarcely addressed my questions, instead talking about whatever they wanted, 
or lecturing me about the current political circumstances in the health sector. I had to ask politely, 
several times, if we could go back to the previous years. I asked many probing and repeating 
questions, but it was quite difficult for me to face and manage the ego and the 'self-promotion' of 
these particular interviewees. I am aware that these responses were a way to, either avoid 
answering specific questions or because they wanted to make their position of power clear. I 
would say that by doing further interviews, I learnt more about how to deal with these situations 
and I became more confident in controlling the agenda of the meeting. In contrast to my interviews 
with the deputies and parliamentarians, in my interview with former President Lagos, he attentively 
responded to the questions I was asking. My main concern for this particular interview was how to 
make the most of those thirty minutes and how to manage my questions smartly, given the fact 
that Ricardo Lagos is well known as a statesman with an irascible character.25 My concerns were 
based on his strong personality, but I was surprised as he was very interested in what and why I 
was doing this research.  
                                                   
 
 
25 His strong personality is always linked with a political interview programme in the Chilean TV, in 1986; where he 
publicly defied Pinochet. 
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 I also included some people who had less visible positions, such as advisors or 
researchers in think tanks, who were not always on the front line, but who had privileged 
knowledge or information and played a significant role in policy-making as experts. They had 
expertise and were in those positions as technocrats, but they were very often also part of the 
Chilean elite as they belonged to the upper-middle class who attended traditional schools and 
universities. They provided me with more details or with unofficial accounts about what happened 
between politicians and the tone of these conversations. These interviews were by far the most 
useful and relaxed ones because they were less focused on explaining themselves and more 
focused on the process. They also helped me to identify other relevant people, whom I had not 
initially considered at the beginning of my fieldwork or to discard actors who were not actually very 
important. This was particularly true in the case of the deputies, who were included in my original 
list. However, after several interviews I realised that their role was not as relevant as I had initially 
thought, as the most important decisions were made outside the Chamber of Deputies.  
 My final reflection on the interviews is that for me, interviewing executives from the private 
health companies was a challenge. This was because I do not share any of their ideological views 
and because I believe these companies are quite responsible for the unfairness of the Chilean 
health system. I had to prepare myself to not show my own prejudices in the conversations. I think 
this worked well as they felt comfortable telling me their views and I felt confident asking 
questions. Also, they presented me with some ideas that challenged my previous conceptions of 
the business. For instance, the research director of the ISAPRES Association, Gonzalo Simon, said 
me “everyone criticised the private sector because we did not do this or that, but the thing is that 
nobody takes seriously the responsibility to improve the public health system which covers more 
than 70% of population.”  
Despite this, there was an incident at the end of one meeting that made me reflect on my role 
as a researcher. One of the respondents asked me if I would be interested in doing consultancy 
about the future of the ISAPRES. I replied with a vague answer, because I did not want to break the 
amicable tone of the interview. Nevertheless, I do think I faced an ethical dilemma, because this 
proposition involved a payment that could somehow affect my independence as a researcher. On 
the other hand, I do not think that this person was looking to influence my views about the private 
sector and my reflections on my thesis, given the limited effect it would have on this policy 
process. I think that he wanted to know more about the possible effects of the reform and to take 
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advantage of my previous knowledge. Nevertheless, it was a situation that made me reflect on my 
own values and behaviour as a researcher when confronting potential conflicts.  
 Moving onto the limitations of my fieldwork and data collection, I failed to obtain interviews 
from right-wing politicians. Unfortunately, none of the senators on the health commission from the 
Alianza consented to being interviewed despite multiple attempts. I previously acknowledged that I 
ceased recruiting informants when I stopped getting new information from the interviewees; 
however I was open to incorporating additional interviews from these particular informants. 
Unfortunately, this did not happen even though I sent several requests just before the start of my 
data analysis. I also failed to interview two other senators from the Concertación who were part of 
the health commission. Edgardo Boeninger, passed away in 2007; and Mariano Ruiz Esquide, 
because his old age, was not doing public activities at the time of my fieldwork, I was told by his 
assistant. I am aware that the lack of these interviews, as well as the ones with the former Minister 
Bachelet and Senator Matthei, represent a limitation of my research. In order to mitigate this, I tried 
to gather all the documentation (books, articles, press notes, legislative documents and policy 
reports) available that could allow me to understand their positions and opinions about the reform 
processes.  
5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the research design used in this thesis, including an explanation of 
the data collection and analysis, and a reflexive account of my fieldwork, situating this study within 
the qualitative strand of the ACF works. In looking at the policy process, I adopted a qualitative 
case study approach to analyse the meanings and significance of the Chilean health reform 
through the lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and informed by international literature of 
health policy reforms, two main techniques of data collection were employed in this study: semi-
structured elites interviews and documentary sources. After conducting 26 interviews with political 
and technocratic elites and the review of documents, data gathered was deductively analysed 
based on a thematic analysis and 9 themes emerged related to the theoretical framework. Based 
on the analysis of the data, the next three chapters present the findings of this study.   
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CHAPTER 6 THE EVOLUTION OF COALITIONS WITHIN THE HEALTH POLICY 
SUBSYSTEM 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Last chapter presented the research design and the techniques used on the collection and 
analysis of data, which was gathered from two main sources, i.e. semi structures interviews and 
the examination of secondary sources. The findings of this analysis are explained in the three 
following chapters.  
Based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework, this chapter begins with the identification of 
coalitions during the health reform process, explaining the beliefs systems and viewpoints of the 
actors that were engaged in the discussion, distinguishing two main phases of interaction. This 
chapter will shows that instead of a rigid scenario, there was an evolution of coalitions throughout 
this process, as the health reform unfolds. The main relevance of this dynamic configuration of 
coalitions is to understand how policy change was achieved. The presentation of the data includes 
quotes from the elites interviews, and excerpts of the transcriptions of congressional hearings and 
newspapers, indicating at the end of each quote, the surname of the interviewee or the 
documentary sources.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in the first section, the main principles that guide the 
reform are introduced. The second section identifies the coalitions during the first period of the 
proposal discussion, and thirdly, I explore the fusion of these coalitions in the second legislative 
stage in the Senate. Last section summarise the findings regarding the coalition structure.   
 
6.2 THE REFORM AGENDA  
Until the Concertación’s third term in office, there were no significant attempts to restructure 
the health care sector. One of the reasons for the lack of structural reforms in the social sectors is 
explained by an ex-advisor of President Lagos:  
“This centre-left group sought to avoid conflicts and polarisation after the return to the 
democracy, preventing any change that could destabilise the political system, creating a 
similar environment of conflict as it happened during the Unidad Popular. The fear from the 
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past prevented structural changes to the political and economic model implemented 
during the dictatorship” (Ottone 2013). 
Other respondents suggest that fear was not the only factor preventing reform and the fact that 
Concertación's members enjoyed a comfortable position once they had achieved political power 
also played a role, 
“The question among the Concertacionist was: why we should change something that is 
highly convenient? People in the centre-left built political power and they were also 
beneficiaries of the market-oriented economic model, so there were no incentives to 
change the model” (Davila 2013).  
 However, the consolidation of the Concertación’s power after a decade in office created an 
opportunity for President Ricardo Lagos to make reforms to the health sector. During his 
presidential campaign, President Lagos emphasised his commitment to implementing sectorial 
reform to fix the deficiencies in the health system. Even though health care outcomes in Chile were 
good in comparison to other Latin American countries, there were some critical unsolved issues, 
such as the unregulated market of ISAPRES and the deficiencies of the public health system. In an 
interview with me, President Lagos asserted that considering his previous experience as a Minister 
of Education and Infrastructure, 
“I was able to recognise the changes needed by Chilean society. After the developments 
we made in infrastructure, the judicial reform and housing programmes developed by 
Aylwin and Frei, I felt that we, the Concertación, were lagging behind, and we needed to 
do something about protecting against the risks related to the health and well-being. That 
was the reason for starting the health care sector reform” (Lagos 2013).  
As some interviewees noted, Lagos' motivation and knowledge about health were also 
influenced the people surrounding him with expertise in Public Health, such as his father-in-law 
Hernan Duran and his friend Hernan Sandoval (who was later nominated by Lagos for the position 
of executive secretary of the health reform commission).  
One member of the legal team for the Health Ministry describes the essence of the reform, 
saying that:  
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“When you are in law school, they teach you that there are two different types of human 
rights: civil/political rights and social/cultural rights. The first ones are guaranteed and the 
second are not. Somehow it was very radical to guarantee a social right that is not usually 
ensured by the Constitution” (Romero 2013). 
This idea represented the core of the social democratic agenda of President Lagos, who 
sought, in contrast to the individualistic approach of the dictatorship, to redefine health care as an 
entitlement. The most controversial new proposal had a redistributive component in which wealthy 
users would subsidise the AUGE Plan for the poorest. Specifically, President Lagos proposed a set 
of bills that comprised of five main policies:26 a regulatory framework for ISAPRES (two bills), new 
managerial and administrative guidelines for public authorities, the Plan AUGE, and the Funding 
Law (as part of the Law 19.888). The components of the reform represent the range of issues that 
were part of the debate. As noted before, it were the last two policies that caused the most 
disagreement between coalitions, given that both involved the transfer and redistribution of 
economic resources. In the next section, I identify the coalitions around these policy changes.  
 
6.3 IDENTIFICATION OF COALITIONS: COMPETING VIEWS ON HEALTH REFORM 
The identification of coalition was primarily guided by the various positions of actors based on 
the analysis of the data. It is worth noting that in general, there was no opposition to having a 
reform to the health system because there was a general understanding about the deficiencies of 
the sector, but the main disagreement was about the scope of the changes and the outcome 
expected of a reform. My data shows there was a clear separation of those committed to the 
reform – as the executive branch actors originally planned it – and on the other side, there was 
another group of actors who still wanted to have a reform, but they were against the plan 
elaborated by the Government for various reasons. From the analysis of their reflections founded in 
Congressional Hearings and other documents as well as the responses during the interviews, the 
division between actors was clearer regarding the outcome expected from the reform; and what 
                                                   
 
 
26 The content of the reform is described in Chapter 4. 
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policies they were supporting in each case. According to the data, the process could be divided 
into two periods. The first period began in May 2000, when President Lagos announced the reform 
in his annual speech in the Congress until the reforms were passed from the Chamber of Deputies 
to the Senate in January 2003. The second phase started with the legislative debate at the Senate 
and ended with the enactment of the last reform, in May 2005. 
At the beginning of the process, I identified there were four coalitions: the first coalition was 
the reformer, represented by governmental authorities; the second was the radical coalition, 
which had its support base in those actors who were seeking a radical transformation of the health 
sector. The third coalition could be named as moderate that included individuals who were keen to 
maintain the status quo; and fourth, the neoliberal who supported market-oriented policies and 
protected the further autonomy of the private sector.  
In a second period, I identified the conformation of one coalition that I called pragmatic, which 
was framed in a scenario of plural participation between authorities, union workers, and 
professionals. These participants were also invited to the first part of the legislative process, at the 
Chamber of Deputies, where a very politicised debate continued, when several actors attended 
meetings to express their ideas and concerns about the proposal. At this stage, some of the 
coalitions supported or opposed different aspects of the proposal, based on particular interests and 
broad ideological principles that determined the views from each coalition. As it is explained by a 
former Minister of Health, Osvaldo Artaza,  
“During the discussion, different alternatives about how to face health sector issues were 
proposed by actors, and several of them were very contradictory. We had proposals that 
went from a single insurance fund; a national health system; to a competitive system 
between insurers, and competition of providers. We could say that the NHS model, a state 
model unified in its functions, funds and the provision of services, to a proposal with a 
multi-insurance providers competition. It goes to A to Z, so to speak” (Artaza 2014). 
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REFORMER  
 This coalition was comprised of governmental authorities that sought to carry out an 
extensive reform of the health sector but maintaining the dual structure created in the eighties. The 
main goal for Reformers was to strengthen the capacity of the public system, providing better 
access, quality, and financial protection for all citizens, and to introduce a stronger regulation 
framework for the private sector. A solidarity goal would be mainly reached through the 
Compensatory Fund between ISAPRES and FONASA. The proponents of the health reform were 
mostly people from the executive branch, led by President Ricardo Lagos, the executive secretary 
of the committee Hernan Sandoval, the second and the third Minister of Health, Osvaldo Artaza and 
Pedro Garcia. Other actors were representatives of the Finance Minister and members of the 
Congress from the Concertación, who supported the proposal, advisors within the minister, and 
think tanks closest to the centre-left pact.   
In June of 2000, a Committee of Ministers was formed to ensure that the proposal was 
coherent at all ministerial levels. This committee was comprised of the Home Office (Minister 
Ricardo Solari), the Secretary General of the Presidency Ministry (Minister Alvaro Garcia), the 
Ministry of Health, (Minister Michelle Bachelet) and, the Ministry of Finance (Minister Nicolas 
Eyzaguirre). This inter-ministerial committee was responsible, for instance, for discussing the 
guidelines and basis for the Primary Care Law (Estatuto de Atencion Primaria) with the health 
union workers, before it was submitted to the Congress.  
  An important role was played by the team from the Finance Ministry led by Marcelo 
Tokman, who was, in practice, the second most powerful actor after the President, given the fact 
that the majority of public policies regarding the use of public funds required the approval of this 
Ministry. Their role was to translate the political goals of the governments into feasible policies. As 
one member of this team said, 
“The idea of AUGE was previously defined, and the responsibility of the finance team was 
to translate the proposals into concrete policies…it defined the 56 pathologies covered by 
the AUGE, therefore we had to put a price and check if there were financial resources 
available, and to adjust the budget” (Espinoza 2014). 
This team backed the reformers' views becoming a key factor to guarantee the support within 
governmental authorities. As some respondents suggest, if a project or bill did not have the 
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approval of the Finance Minister, it was unlikely that the project could pass. Tokman saw himself 
as a decisive negotiator, and he acknowledged that he was the only person who remained in the 
whole process from the very beginning as part of the inter-ministerial committee until the last bill 
was approved in the Congress:  
“In fact, I think I was the only one who was at the first meeting when we constituted the 
reform team until we approved the last project in the Congress. People from other 
ministries were changing all the time” (Tokman 2014). 
Although the reformers’ team played a role in creating a cohesive group behind the initiative, 
the government also had internal disagreements into how to approach the reform, challenging the 
political parties discipline within the Concertación. This was reflected in the opposition from its 
authorities in charge of the reform, specifically the first Minister of Health, Michelle Bachelet, whom 
I include in the radical coalition. Hernan Sandoval said 
“I was aware of the Bachelet's opinion against the reform, but for me: my focus was to go 
ahead with the presidential mandate, pushing forward the reform. However, Bachelet did 
the opposite, postponing the reform during 2001…” (Sandoval 2013). 
 President Lagos sought to end the conflicts between factions within the Executive 
(Bachelet vs. Sandoval) and consolidate a unified position on the reform through a cabinet 
reshuffle during January 2002. He appointed a DC militant, Osvaldo Artaza, as the new Health 
Minister with the mandate to submit the bill to Congress within the next three months and to 
construct a closely-knit network of support around the reform. With this change of authority, it was 
the end of a period of immobility of the reform, and the beginning of the legislative phase of the 
reform, having an executive team, all committed to the Lagos' views.  
 
RADICAL  
Against the reformers, there was the coalition I call Radical, which was composed of a group 
of actors from the Concertación, who expected a more radical transformation of the health system, 
including the elimination or the reduction of the minimum expression of private institutions in the 
sector. People or organisations in this coalition are the First Minister of Health, Michelle Bachelet, 
congressional representatives from different parties, Colegio Medico, and health workers unions. 
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The fact that Michelle Bachelet and her collaborators from the Socialist Party rejected the idea of 
the reform was an obstacle for the Executive Committee led by Hernan Sandoval. According to 
Hector Sanchez:  
“Bachelet was a classical socialist, and she did not have the interest in implementing the 
reform in the health sector; and with Sandoval in the commission, there was a 
cohabitation –not pacifically– of almost two ministers” (Sanchez 2014).  
Another interviewee confirmed that the delay of the reform was intentionally promoted from 
the Minister, because, 
“They were not convinced about the model proposed… and Marisol Barria, Hernan 
Monasterio from FONASA had the reform totally blocked because they did not believe in it” 
(Romero 2013). 
“There was ideological opposition in some areas. Curiously, the socialists thought that as 
this model (the reform) was promoted by the World Bank, it was the expression of 
neoliberalism, the revenge of capitalism; and that is what they presented…there was an 
enigma because I think this reform was pro-socialist, as the aim was to strengthen the 
state in the public sector. There were socialist doctors who declared themselves against 
this reform because it was going to reduce their salaries, and they said so” (Jimenez 
2013). 
While the elaboration of the reform draft was assigned to the commission led by Sandoval, in 
parallel Minister Bachelet opened a debate inviting a number of actors to roundtables in different 
cities, to discuss the general ideas and plausible guidelines for the proposal. The period of Bachelet 
as Minister was not seen as a very productive time for the government goals because there were 
not concrete outcomes regarding the reforms' content. Nevertheless, the delay for this reform is 
subject to interpretation in the interviews. While the majority of interviewees suggest, this delay 
was caused by the personal conflict between Bachelet and the executive secretary Hernan 
Sandoval. However, an alternative explanation is raised by a couple of the respondents, who 
mentioned that the delay might be explained by the fact that there was a parliamentary election at 
the end of the second year of the Lagos term (December 2001). Also, in that scenario, it was very 
unlikely that the government would be interested in jeopardising the results of the election, creating 
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more divisions between the factions of the Socialist Party represented by Bachelet and the rest of 
the Concertación parties. Thus, the delay in the submission of the bill could be explained as an 
electoral strategy from the government and not necessary as a boycott from Bachelet to 
Sandoval's plan.   
In this group, I also include the medical professional and health workers, who saw the reform 
as a threat to their working conditions and as an attempt at a full privatisation of the health sector. 
At that time, Colegio Medico was lead by Enrique Accorsi27 until 2001, and then by Jose Luis 
Castro from 2002 to 2008, and it represented around 15.000 doctors28. He argued that the state 
would finally be subsidised for-profit providers as if public health services could not provide the 
treatment of the AUGE Plan, FONASA had to buy services in the private sector.  
Some respondents explained that another argument from the Colegio Medico against the 
governmental plan was the defence of their autonomy and the right to decide about what 
treatments should be prescribed. This autonomy is something that the AUGE Plan would change as 
the Ministry defines protocols for medical attentions, limiting doctors’ discretion in decision-
making. The former Minister Artaza noted the double face of the discourse from Colegio Medico,  
“The Colegio Medico was not against the reform because of the unfairness of the private 
sector, it was because they were afraid of losing power; that meant a regulation of the 
medical practice, and the control of the power of the decisions of doctors because the list 
of treatable diseases was defined by the AUGE” (Artaza 2014). 
In the same line, during the parliamentary discussion, a congress member from the Socialist 
Party and a doctor, Deputy Fulvio Rossi who defended the reform stated,  
“This is the moment to produce the reform that the people need…Not the one needed by 
Juan Luis Castro [President of Colegio Medico] or Esteban Maturana [CONFUSAM 
Leader], not for us [the congress representatives]. It is a solidarity reform that Chileans 
needed, especially the poorest... 66 percent of medical appointments are in the private 
                                                   
 
 
27 After his presidency at Colegio Medico, Enrique Accorsi won a seat in the Congress as a deputy from one district of 
the Metropolitan Region. 
28 Data from Diario La Segunda (10 May 2002). 
	   82 
sector, providing services just for 20 percent of the population; and just a third of those 
appointments are in public hospitals, which deliver attention to 80 percent of the 
population. I ask to doctor Juan Luis Castro: Are you going to stop working in private 
clinics and medical centres when you are doing strikes in public hospitals? It’s easier for 
you to not go to work if you don’t have to pay for the consequences from your pocket, but 
you are manipulating the health of the poorest…” (Deputy Fulvio Rossi, Congressional 
Hearings Nº 19.966).   
This point was at the centre of the conflict between the doctors and the reformers, autonomy 
versus control that could have affected the income gained from private attentions. A member of the 
ISAPRES, also confirmed this idea adding the factor that doctors worked most of the time –if not 
exclusively– in private practices and clinics, which is a highly convenient scheme in economic 
terms. Andres Tagle noted that, 
“The Colegio Medico always wanted to defend the free choice [of patients to choose their 
doctors], because of the arrangement they have with the private medicine” (Tagle 2013).  
An advisor from the DC, Manuel Inostroza, explained this contradiction, highlighting the 
ideological conflict,  
“Juan Luis Castro (from Colegio Medico) represented an extremely ideological opinion, a 
radical view of the reform; they had this ideological stand…but contradictory, they were 
thinking as doctors, but doctors from the right because they were concerned about their 
income, and they saw AUGE as a threat” (Inostroza 2013). 
However, the position of the Colegio Medico was not shared for all medical professionals who 
were part of this organisation. A think tank organised by doctors, who were also affiliated to the 
Colegio Medico, “Doctors for Chile” (Medicos para Chile) represented a faction that held more 
neoliberal views within the community, felt that the Colegio Medico was highly politicised, and that 
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they did not represent the general views of doctors properly. The president of the think tank, Emilio 
Santelices29 explained,  
“We, being doctors from the opposite side –to the Colegio Medico- were in total 
disagreement; because we think that the improvements in equity, opportunity, and access, 
were attributes expected in any health system. In fact, it was suggested by institutions 
such as World Bank and WHO, and this reform was on that path” (Santelices 2013). 
However, the capacity of influence of this group, and, in general, doctors who were not 
represented by the directive of the Colegio Medico, were not strong enough to challenge the 
monolithic representation of this traditional association. In the case of health workers unions, one 
of its leaders said that,  
“The reform may create an uncovered privatisation because if the public system was 
unable to provide the AUGE requirements, the state should have to transfer economic 
resources to the private sector, paying ISAPRES for the services that the public system 
were unable to provide” (Maturana 2014). 
Nonetheless, for the municipal health workers organisation (Confederacion the trabajadores 
de la salud Municipal-CONFUSAM)30 led by Esteban Maturana, it was in that sense, different from 
the interest of Colegio Medico, because most of them worked exclusively in public institutions, in 
contrast with doctors who worked half of their time in private clinics and practices. Their concerns 
about the reform were basically how they could maintain their entitlements and get extra benefits 
from the reform within the public system, as well as an increase in budgets for hospitals and 
primary centres to improve their working conditions. In my interview with the President of 
CONFUSAM, he stated very clearly that these were the most important goals for his association, 
i.e. to achieve the best job contracts they could get within the public administration.  
                                                   
 
 
29 Emilio Santelices ran as a candidate for an election for president of the Colegio Medico in 2002, but the socialist 
Juan Luis Castro defeated him. 
30 CONFUSAM was comprised of 12.000 members from municipal health workers. CONFENATS gathered around 
60.000 hospitals workers and administrative personnel. 
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Other actors in this coalition were members of the Congress, who had a political affiliation 
with the Concertación parties and opposed the reform because the reform would not have solved 
the deficiencies of the public system. Part of this group was known as the “Bancada Medica” 
composed of deputies and senators who were mostly doctors, such as Patricio Cornejo (DC), 
Enrique Accorsi and Guido Girardi (PPD), Carlos Abel Jarpa and Alberto Robles (PRSD) and the 
Senators Mariano Ruiz Esquide (DC), and the economists Carlos Ominami and Sergio Aguilo (PS). 
Additionally the connections between Colegio Medico and deputies from Bancada Medica made 
the process even more difficult because they were defending the positions of the professional 
association.  
“They were not a political party; they were transversal. The Bancada Medica was against it 
-the reform- and there were people from all parties. They did not like this idea of having 
external requirements for the public sector. They also did not like that the 
Superintendencia [a regulatory agency] had control over the public system…” (Viera 
Gallo 2014).  
 It was in that stage the two deputies who belonged to the Bancada, Accorsi and Girardi 
voted against the reform, provoking wide disappointment within the Concertación and President 
Lagos himself. 
 “There were people from the left that said this reform was neoliberal because you should 
not have protocols…and I said then: how can I make estimates [about money needed]? In 
the end, the dispute was with the doctors within the Concertación because there were a 
number of them in the Congress, for instance, Girardi, who said everything was wrong. In 
the end, they had to accept that because I was the president…in the Socialist Party there 
were people that dislike the reform but nobody dared to reject it” (Lagos 2013) 
 Girardi explained his position to me and said, 
“I talked with the President; I talked with Lagos… at that time I was President of the PPD, 
my party...He was very upset with me, and I said to him that I would vote against the 
project…because of its consequences. I thought this project would emphasise the 
curative approach to the public health (instead of a preventive one). Secondly, it would be 
a depredation of the system by ISAPRES. And third, this reform would mean the 
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privatisation of the public health system…That is why I voted against the reform in the 
end” (Girardi 2014). 
An interviewee from the DC, who worked within the legal advisory team, stressed that, 
“The most leftist members of the Concertación did not understand that the reform was 
progressive, and this could be an example of other reforms on social sectors with similar 
goals” (Romero 2013).  
 
MODERATE 
A moderate coalition was the one composed of politicians and parliamentarians mostly from 
the Christian Democratic Party (DC). They defended the structure of the mixed system, but they 
were also willing to accept some modifications proposed to the health sector as long as the reform 
did not affect areas such as taxes, financial resources, and costs. Alejandro Foxley, member of this 
party and former Ministry of Finance said in a press note,  
“The Christian Democratic Party is against everything that means to touch middle-class 
incomes” (Senator Alejandro Foxley quoted in La Segunda, 14 May 2002). 
Specifically, the debate was focussed between regressive versus progressive taxes, as they 
said it could affect the middle-class. Regarding the content of the proposal, they stated that the 
AUGE Plan was a good idea, but it should be implemented in a gradual way for two reasons: 1) 
because the public sector was not prepared to provide attention for a large number of diseases at 
once, and 2) because there were not enough resources to start the programme immediately. They 
also strongly rejected any attempt of taxes increases as a way to finance the reform, and that the 
transfer of contributions from ISAPRES to FONASA became a key issue of debate within the DC. 
Specifically, for senators such as Alejandro Foxley and Edgardo Boeninger31, who claimed that any 
intervention into individuals’ contributions in the private insurance companies was anti-
                                                   
 
 
31 Once the reform reached the Senate, the role as an opponent of Boeninger changed and he was the key person for 
the reform to articulate support in the Congress 
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constitutional, and that would be a catastrophe for middle-class citizens as they would have to pay 
the costs of the AUGE Plan via taxes.  
The institutional Senator Edgardo Boeninger and Senator Alejandro Foxley presented a 
document approved by the economic committee of the party in May of 2002, in which they 
explained their position about the health reform. This document was published in a Sunday edition 
of one of the most important newspapers to disseminate their views about tax redistribution, where 
both Christian Democrats stated,  
“We do not think it is compatible with a comprehensive approach to solving a national 
problem to propose a redistribution of resources for the middle class to the public 
sector...[the reform] must have a constructive approach of convergence and solidarity of 
the public and private subsystems…” (Boeninger and Foxley's Document published La 
Tercera, 05 May 2002)  
Even though the senators had some internal support within the party, as the document was 
subscribed by other party members within the Congress such as Hosain Sabag (Senator and Vice 
President of the DC, Pablo Lorenzini (Deputy), Andres Zaldivar (President of the Senate) among 
others; there was an internal dispute with other members of the DC. For instance, Senator Ruiz 
Esquide, who supported radical views, rejected the document elaborated by Boeninger and Foxley 
saying that their declaration did not represent the position of the DC.  
“The document approved by the economic committee of the party, doesn't have the 
support of the council neither from the health committee [of the party], so it is not the 
official view of the party. They are isolated…” (Senator Mariano Ruiz Esquide quoted in 
La Tercera, 05 May 2002) 
Moderate views also held by parliamentarians who defended larger companies who were 
threatened directly and indirectly by the reform (Law 19.888), such as the wine and Pisco [grape 
brandy] producers and mining companies. The AUGE Plan and Chile Solidario were included in the 
proposal that established an increase of taxes for alcohol and tobacco; and was strongly opposed 
by those parliamentarians defending commercial interests. Particularly, it was the case of the DC 
Jorge Pizarro, a Senator for the 4th region in Chile, which is the district of Pisco production, who 
argued that tax rises could be a disaster in economic terms for the alcohol producers and 
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international traders, increasing costs, unemployment levels and economy productivity of the 
zone.A statement from Senator Pizarro in a newspaper, stated,  
“I am against the specific taxes, as I said to the President -Lagos- last Monday. I am not 
going to be compelled to vote in favour of taxes that could affect those activities that need 
our support” (Senator Jorge Pizarro quoted in La Tercera, 10 June 2003).   
 
NEOLIBERAL 
Lastly, the right-wing political parties formed a coalition with private insurance companies, 
who supported principles of the neoliberal model and the structure of the socio-economic model 
developed under the dictatorship. They were against the reform proposed by the Government 
because 1) it would increase the costs for the private sector due to the cross-subsidy to the public 
sector and 2) they were concerned about the scope of the new regulatory framework and its 
effects for private providers’ profits. Similar to the moderate coalition, neoliberals rejected the 
alternatives for funding proposed in Law 19.888, arguing that it would have an impact on the 
poorest segments of the population, which according to the UDI, was the electoral basis of the 
party. They claimed that the government should increase public expenditure without raising any 
taxes that could affect their voters.  
In the case of the ISAPRES Association, they had a very well organised group created to 
defend the interests of the insurance companies, composed of people who were previously 
involved in the Ministry of Health during the dictatorship, which also had linkages with right-wing 
parties. Andres Tagle, for instance, was a former vice-president of the Association, member, and 
electoral expert of the UDI party, who explained to me that the situation of these companies with 
the reform was very problematic,  
“All the restrictions imposed by the Congress, about the pre-existening conditions and the 
limits for price modifications, put ISAPRES in a very bad situation, making it almost 
impossible to sign a contract. We had everything against ISAPRES because they had said 
to the public opinion that this question –health care– was free and they thought it was 
legitimate” (Tagle 2013). 
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However, at the same time, informants from this group said the AUGE Plan was not a threat to 
private insurance companies, as their ISAPRES contracts already provided most of the services 
defined in the Plan as Tagle expressed, 
“Regarding coverage and opportunity, it was rather a problem for the public sector, 
because in the ISAPRES you always have guarantees assured by a legal contract” (Tagle 
2013). 
Interestingly, at the Lower Chamber, the neoliberal coalition was not the most important 
obstacle for reformers. Even though their members were invited to attend  the health commission 
sessions regularly to expound their views, some respondents commented that the right-wing 
sector was smart enough to realise that the real problem for the government would come from the 
clash of interests within the Concertación. In that scenario, they did not get involved as they did in 
the next phase of debate in the Senate. Artaza mentioned that during that phase, 
“The Right stood back and watched…as they soon realised that their interests would not 
be affected and because the government had internal sources of conflicts, they did not 
spend efforts to challenge the reform in the Lower Chamber” (Artaza 2014). 
The following table shows the identification of most relevant actors of the policy process in 
each coalition that were frequently mentioned in the collection of data and the examination of 
documentary sources: 
Table 11 Coalitions’ members and policy core beliefs in the first stage 
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6.4 EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL FORCES: A PRAGMATIC COALITION  
The coalitions’ scheme explained in the previous section was transformed when the bills were 
approved by the Lower Chamber in June 2003 and passed to the Senate. The next table presents a 
diagram with this evolution:  
 
Figure 3 Diagram of evolution of coalitions by phase 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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I called this as a pragmatic coalition, which is the result of the fusion of reformers with 
specific actors from other coalitions; which have the capacity to exclude other coalition members 
that were seen as an obstacle to the reform. In this new coalition formation, I included some 
senators who were part of the health commission: Mariano Ruiz Esquide and Edgardo Boeninger 
(DC); Evelyn Matthei (UDI). Although the composition of this committee was of five members as 
regulated by the Senate procedures, which also included Jose Antonio Viera Gallo (PS); Alberto 
Espina (RN); it was constantly repeated by my interviewees, that the first three senators were the 
key persons that led the discussion. There were also think tank members that supported the 
legislative work on technical grounds, and governmental authorities. At the beginning of this phase, 
a third Minister of Health, Pedro Garcia, was appointed by Lagos contributed to the consolidation 
of the pragmatic coalition. Analysing the composition of this coalition, some issues emerged from 
the data analysed. First, key persons from each coalition were engaged and committed to passing 
the bill in the Senate. Reformers were able to consolidate a group of work that, despite the specific 
differences about the content of the reform, were willing to collaborate, adapting their views from 
their previous coalitions. As it was explained in the interviews, people such as the two senators 
from the DC, Mariano Ruiz Esquide and Edgardo Boeninger, were part of the first phase of the 
debate of the radical and moderate coalitions, respectively; and Evelyn Matthei32 was part of those 
who rejected the proposal based on the neoliberal principles. According to the interviewees, after 
the Compensatory Fund was eliminated of the agenda, as this was one of the most controversial 
issues, the bill was passed and the economic support was assured. At the end of the discussion, 
Senator Ruiz Esquide commented, 
“It is very valuable that this initiative was approved by a majority, given the difficulties, 
complexities and public debate, this made it difficult to deal with. As an example, it is 
worth noting that the reform of 1952, which created the National Health Service, took 
more than six years before it was approved…It was not a simple transaction; it was a 
reasonable consensus about what is possible between senators who have different 
                                                   
 
 
32 She was elected as independent but with the support of the UDI in 1998. She was previously member of Renovacion 
Nacional party, but she quits after a political scandal of hacking a telephone conversation of the former Chilean 
President Sebastian Piñera in 1994.  
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perspectives to see society” (Senator Mariano Ruiz Esquide, Congressional Hearings 
Law No 19.966). 
Senator Boeninger highlighted the concessions made and the quality of the work produced by 
the group of senators at the end of the policy process when the reform was approved, 
“The original project included the creation of the compensatory fund for both FONASA and 
ISAPRES. As we know, that proposal was no longer supported and did not count with 
political acceptance, and the executive decided to remove it from the discussion to give us 
more time to evaluate an alternative formula…to gather the votes for its approval” 
(Senator Edgardo Boeninger, Congressional Hearings Law No 19.966).  
“I would like to emphasise the spirit and serious work of the Health Committee, and its 
enormous will to get to an agreement in what we were working long months for… this 
project, and the others as well, are potentially the starting point for a real revolution in 
health provision”  (Senator Edgardo Boeninger, Congressional Hearings Law No 
19.966). 
At the point in which the reform was close to being passed, Senator Matthei also explained the 
reasons why she approved the project at the end of the policy process,  
“I consider that the global project, as it was presented to the Senate today, with the 
guarantee of access and attention, with financial coverage for users in ISAPRES and 
FONASA, with no discrimination by gender or age in ISAPRES, is good and deserved to be 
approved by unanimity” (Senator Evelyn Matthei, Congressional Hearings Law No 
19.966). 
Hence, reformer coalition was finally able to build the consensus need it around these issues 
and to get the favourable votes of these senators. 
The second characteristic of this coalition was the high level of expertise in different areas of 
its members, such as the knowledge about the health sector of the Senator Ruiz-Esquide, or Evelyn 
Matthei’s prowess in economics, or Boeninger’s command of politics. In the health committee, 
Senator Viera Gallo explained,  
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“We had to translate the guarantees offered by the State. In the beginning, the bill was too 
vague and, as I am a lawyer, we then introduced judicial precision…for instance, what 
means quality, what means professional attention, deadlines, free charges… I think we 
made important specifications in an original project that was very naïve” (Viera Gallo 
2014).  
 Thirdly, the designation of a new sectorial minister Pedro Garcia, replacing Osvaldo Artaza, 
was crucial for the approval of the reform. He was a DC, from the most conservative faction of the 
group and he was close to the Party leaders, which differed from the Artaza position inside the DC. 
He was able to coordinate the forces within the Concertación political parties and to extend ties to 
the right-wing senators. His goal was to articulate a consensus within the DC and, more 
importantly, to get the votes from the right. According to the respondents, he was seen as a good 
manager, with a good relationship with Sandoval, and he had the support of the DC president, 
Adolfo Zaldivar. But more importantly, it was his personality that helped to create a consensus,  
“Pedro was the key person in this agreement. I think his role has not been recognised 
enough because he was brave and prudent to accept the criticisms…during the 
negotiation, he did not impose his views; he was reflexive and open minded…unlike the 
previous minister. He had the patience and the will to wait for the decisions of the 
parliamentarians” (Sanchez 2014).  
Garcia recognised that he was indeed very patient during the process, but he was able to 
manage the struggles between the actors adequately, mainly because he knew that he had the 
support of President Lagos and Sandoval, and the respect of the senators within the Commission, 
in particular from Evelyn Matthei, who was a crucial actor from the right.  
Fourth, the exclusion of actors and one issue, in particular, was strategy to get a consensus. 
Radical views from Colegio Medico and health workers were excluded at this point. Although, 
representatives of the Colegio Medico and ISAPRES were invited to the public sessions as it was 
recorded in the Congressional Hearings, it seems that these invitations were more a symbolic 
procedure because a small group of the pragmatic coalition took the relevant decisions. While the 
Colegio Medico concentrated all its efforts to have influence in the process at the Lower Chamber, 
through an aggressive campaign in the media and the interaction with the Bancada Medica; in the 
Senate, despite the fact that they attended these sessions, they were aware that they had lost any 
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chance to modify the bill in its favour. Furthermore, there were episodes of strikes against the 
AUGE Plan organised by doctors and health workers associations, the leader of the CONFUSAM 
explained,  
“We went to every session at the Congress, all of them…we fought constantly; we had 
the support of the deputies, such as Girardi, that were strongly opposed to the reform that 
Ricardo Lagos wanted to impose. The Bancada Medica gave us their support, but within 
the Congress, Ricardo Lagos finally took control and put discipline in the Concertación, 
because at the end, the reform was implemented because they had an agreement with the 
right-wing parties We had to recognise that we were defeated and that Lagos won” 
(Maturana 2014). 
The exclusion of ISAPRES seems to respond to a different reason. Although, ISAPRES were 
permanently invited to the health commission sessions, I argue that they were no longer active 
participants in the debate because they did not have specific interests to defend. This happened 
after Evelyn Matthei said that the right would not approve the reform if the Government did not take 
the Compensatory Fund out from the bill. As such, the executive made the concession to ensure 
the feasibility of the rest of the package. In the Congressional Hearings it is stated that,  
“Senator Matthei did appreciate the withdraw of the Compensatory Fund…because its 
inclusion would obstruct the chances to pass the bill. This withdrawal make it possible to 
get the votes from senators of the Alianza por Chile” (Congressional Hearings Law No 
19.888). 
According to a note in a newspaper, after the bill was passed, Matthei said,  
“There were no winners or losers, but we made the best of the situation; we eliminated the 
worst thing…but we did not get everything because there will not be portable 
vouchers…” (Senator Evelyn Matthei quoted in El Mercurio, 13 May 2004) 
Once the main obstacle for the right-wing political parties and the ISAPRES was eliminated, 
the private insurance companies did not have any other substantial battle against the government. 
Hence, it is possible to say that it was more like a self-exclusion than an intentional manoeuvre 
from the Senate. Sebastian Soto, advisor from Libertad y Desarrollo explained to me that,  
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“The Right soon realised that it was more convenient for them to support the reform 
because they had the options to shape it… there was a possibility to improve it, and 
therefore they agreed to approve it” (Soto 2014). 
All in all, this stage shows that some actors were able to modify their initial positions and to 
make sacrifices, after assessing whether the benefits would be higher than the costs if they 
reached agreements with former opponents. Hector Sanchez illustrates this idea, explaining why 
the government sacrificed the Compensatory Fund, 
“They had a strategic view, and they said we cannot fail because we already spent all of 
our political capital on this reform, and the senators were thinking the same…therefore, 
they accepted to renounce the Compensatory Fund” (Sanchez 2014). 
This pragmatic coalition finally adopted a course of action that made the reform feasible to be 
approved in the Senate. Senator Viera-Gallo, emphasised the particularity of this reform, 
“I have always said that this is an example of a law, that after a strong ideological 
confrontation, the discussion became practical. And the reform was approved almost for 
unanimity…that was strange, because it started like this was a world war” (Viera Gallo 
2014). 
A negative view from one of the two deputies from the Concertación that voted against the 
reform, Guido Girardi explained that the decision of withdrawing the Compensatory Fund was 
rather a failure of the executive with negative consequences for the health sector.  
“When President Lagos realised there was a possibility to fail because of the veto of the 
right-wing parties about the Compensatory Fund; He accepted to take this out to get, at 
least, some parts of the reform approved. I would say that they finally made a reform 
irrelevant, that did not affect ISAPRES at all…that is why I voted against the reform” 
(Girardi 2014). 
Instead of the reflection about the political costs, Hernan Sandoval explained that the reason to 
make the concession was also practical and based on the availability of resources. He 
commented,  
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“We saw that we would get 19 million from the transfer from ISAPRE to FONASA, but we 
also realised that AUGE Plan could bring an increase of more than 500 million pesos, so 
we did not really need the Compensatory Fund at that particular time. The fund had no 
sense in financial terms…I did not care about sacrificing three or four insignificant pesos 
[Chilean currency]… my position was: I am willing to sacrifice the monies, but not the 
principles” (Sandoval 2014). 
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
The main target of this chapter was to identify the coalitions within the Chilean health policy 
subsystems, guided by the assumptions of the Advocacy Coalition Framework regarding the 
beliefs systems, and the behaviours of coalition members. Findings show that the process was 
clearly divided into two phases: the first one started with the announcement of the reform in May 
2000 and ended when the first bill was passed from the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate, and 
then second phase lasted until the last bill was finally enacted in May of 2005. As it has emerged 
from the data, instead of having homogenous and rigid coalitions, findings provide evidence that 
there was an evolution of four coalitions in the first phase of the reform, to a pragmatic one that 
pushed  the bills forward in the Congress.  
The first part of the debate was characterised by the internal conflict within the executive 
branch, and with the early disputes within the Christian Democratic party, both disruptive factors 
for the reformers aim. Strong opposition from the Colegio Medico was also a feature of this period, 
but with less impact in the governmental agenda. In the second stage, during the debate that took 
place at the Senate, reformers were able to get the support of key people who were initially against 
the proposal. In the next two empirical chapters, I explore the strategies and resources used by 
these coalitions and the institutional settings as factors that framed the policy process, assessing 
their implications for the health reform. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE MOBILISATION OF RESOURCES AND STRATEGIES OF 
INFLUENCE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The findings examined in the previous chapter showed a dynamic configuration of the 
coalitions that evolved along the policy process, from a competitive scenario to a collaborative one. 
As Jenkins Smith et al. (2014) points out, the utilisation and redistribution of resources are key 
factors for explaining the outcomes of coalition struggles; and power capacities are translated into 
the strategies that determine the course of the process. Therefore, this chapter looks at the 
strategies employed by coalitions during the two phases of the discussion, seeking to shape the 
policy process according to their goals.  
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section explains the tactics developed by the 
four initial coalitions for the mobilisation of public opinion. The second section examines the 
technical team as a source of expertise and knowledge; and thirdly, I explore the role played by the 
policy brokers in the Senate. Finally, I conclude by summarising the findings regarding the 
strategies employed by coalitions in the policy process.  
 
7.2 PUBLIC OPINION AND MOBILISATION OF POLITICAL RESOURCES  
In the management of public opinion, the first two years of the Lagos administration were less 
intense than the second phase as there was a delay in the development of the proposal. In the 
newspaper coverage for the Bachelet period, I found that the recurrent issue in the press was the 
problem of waiting lists for FONASA patients. After this, President Lagos announced publicly that 
Bachelet had a very tight timeframe in which to solve this problem. She had simultaneous meetings 
with committees, local leaders and union representatives around the country, but, as noted 
previously, her period as a minister was seen by the respondents as fruitless, as she just sent one 
proposal, the patients' rights bill, to Congress. 
The internal strategy developed by the reformer coalition was to move the discussion from the 
open debate implemented by Bachelet to the legislative context, where the Minister was in charge 
of the action plan. The second minister of the period asserted,  
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“During the first two years –of Bachelet–, the reform was in the living room with FENATS, 
Colegio Medico and ISAPRES. But the President, with a clever communicational strategy 
took the discussion out of this living room and put the lights on the parliamentarians to 
show how they were voting” (Artaza 2014). 
It was with the appointment of Osvaldo Artaza as Minister in January 2002 that the coalitions 
undertook a strategy of mobilisation.  According to Dr. Jimenez,  
“During the period of Bachelet as a minister, there were spaces of debates and 
discussions to elaborate ideas and documents, but there were delays in the roundtables 
and no agreements at all… But this situation changed when Bachelet was replaced by 
Artaza” (Jimenez 2013). 
This strategy was translated iton two main activities: on the one hand, they launched a 
campaign to raise awareness about the meaning of the reform when the bill was sent to the 
Congress. On the other hand, they started to pilot the AUGE Programme in some municipalities in 
order to obtain visible results and to convince citizens about the feasibility of the program.    
In order to generate social support from the citizens, the first activity of the reformer coalition 
was to mount a mass media campaign in April 2002. In this campaign, they took advantage of 
Artaza's profile: a very well known doctor with a “hippie look” (because of his long hair) who was 
the director of an important paediatric hospital in Santiago (Hospital Luis Calvo Mackenna). He 
became well known after performing the first surgery to separate Siamese twins in Chile in the mid 
90's, which was widely covered by the press. After this episode, the citizenry knew him, as public 
opinion polls from that period confirm33. In order to disseminate the contents of the reform and get 
more support for the process, reformers tried to make the most of his personal qualities. People 
involved in the reform recognised that his figure was crucial to supporting the communication 
strategy. Artaza described a particular event,  
                                                   
 
 
33 A survey of Centro de Estudios Publicos (CEP) of July 2002 and December of 2002 shows that Osvaldo Artaza 
support started with a 60% approval rating. However, once the process was more conflictive, his support decreased to 
38% in six months. 
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“The day before the bill was sent to Congress, the President asked me to speak in a 
national broadcast message on television and radio, to announce that the reform proposal 
would be sent to Congress the next day. That was something historical, never seen before, 
as all the messages were delivered by the President…This time, it was a conversation 
between the doctor and his patients...about peoples’ aspirations and expectations…and it 
was very successful because although people did not understand what was the AUGE 
about well, the polls surveys showed that everybody was supporting it, and that was 
decisive for parliamentarians to approve the reform. The government acted with an 
extraordinary audacity as they made a public campaign of a reform that was not yet 
approved … it had never been done before” (Artaza 2014).  
The second activity carried out by the reformer coalition was the implementation of a pilot of 
the AUGE Plan. The pilot started on  August 1 2000, including three specific conditions for 
FONASA patients. Reformers' hopes were to gain empirical results to support the reform while it 
was being discussed in Congress, and, according to the former minister, to create a positive 
perception of the plan, 
“We were given the instruction to begin as soon as possible with a pilot [of the Plan 
AUGE] as people needed to understand how the reform would work in reality…a few days 
after the pilot began, the President could visit children and adults being treated, who were 
on waiting lists, hopeless. We gave the reform a face, eyes, nose, and a name. And I think 
none of this had to do with technical issues” (Artaza 2014). 
The mobilisation of coalitions via public opinion reached its height during the weeks preceding 
the Presidential Message of 2002,34 when Ricardo Lagos finally announced the reform. As a 
response to the reformers' strategies, radical coalition members, led by members of the Colegio 
Medico and the CONGRES35, mobilised their troops in a more aggressive way than the rest of rival 
coalitions. Colegio Medico joined or co-organised strikes and demonstrations with health workers 
                                                   
 
 
34 Every 21st of May, the Chilean president delivers an annual message to the Nation at the Congress in Valparaiso, 
giving an account of their achievements of the last year and their goals for the period ahead. 
35 The CONGRES was an organization composed by health workers unions from primary attention centres 
(consultorios) and health workers from public hospitals. 
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and, simultaneously, developed their own communication strategy with an aggressive attack on the 
reformers media campaign. Their aim was twofold: to discredit the governmental proposal and to 
announce an alternate programme, developed by the doctors association, called “A 
Comprehensive Health Plan” (Plan Integral de Salud - PAIS).  
They invested their economic resources into hiring a slot on a regional –though not very 
influential– TV channel (Canal 5, Quinta Region), and also started an advertising campaign on 
public transport in Santiago with messages against the reform. Their critics focused on Artaza. 
Colegio Medico criticised his role because they saw him as a doctor who was supposed to be on 
their side, but who was against the interests of the medical association. A representative of the 
ISAPRE commented,  
"Artaza was very effective in communicating the reform. I think he used up his prestige 
with the reform… he was a good player, and he was the target for the Colegio Medico 
darts" (Tagle 2013). 
A member of the government advisory team used the imagery of a battle and a hero to 
characterise the role of the former Minister,  
"I think the Osvaldo Artaza's period was key in terms of disseminating the proposal to the 
citizens…when the AUGE publicity came out, it was a very risky option… sadly Osvaldo 
went out to bite the bullets publicly. But this phase was crucial and Osvaldo suffered the 
worst, the lower chamber was like a ‘guerrilla’…the costs he paid were high, but, in the 
end, we got what we were looking for, a reform that was accepted and supported by the 
citizenry" (Romero 2013). 
The former minister Artaza said,  
"There was an effort to diminish the reform's support. The Colegio Medico mounted a 
millionaire campaign, with ads on TV, on the public transport…All the Buses in Santiago 
had large stickers with phrases against the reform. They had pictures of me and they drew 
a big nose on my face, like Pinocchio, saying that I was a liar" (Artaza 2014). 
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Adverts And Flyers Colegio Medico  
 
 
“The AUGE Plan is a fairy tale.  
Fight for your rights to health. Get information at 
www.colegiomedico.cl and UCV Television on 
Thursday 22 pm” 
 
“The AUGE is trying to cover the sun with one 
finger…It is imperative to change the AUGE…The 
reform proposed by the Government will not 
resolve the health issues of the Chileans. The 
AUGE will create first and second-class 
patients…The reform will stop doctors making the 
best decisions for the benefits of their patients. 
Doctor: Let’s defend the profession, yours and 
your patients’ dignity. Get involved and fight for 
your rights…” 
COLEGIO MEDICO 
 “Let’s make a true reform” 
 
Protest of Colegio Medico members, holding a 
poster with a picture of Pinocchio saying:  
“[The AUGE] do not cover lung, liver bones and 
kidney  cancer” 
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“Vida Medica” Covers - Colegio Medico Journal  
 
 
“Because the AUGE is a fairy tale, let’s do a real 
reform” 
 
“The AUGE ends free choice, let’s break the 
bonds” 
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Figure 4 Graphical pieces of Colegio Medico campaign 
 
Declaration Colegio Medico 
                        
Source: Published in Newspaper El Mercurio, 29 December 2002 
 
The Colegio Medico succeed in getting their message against the reformer coalition heard, 
but was not very effective for gaining allies as their campaign was seen as confrontational and 
negative by the public.  
“I was mandated by the Minister for two years, to organise roundtables with the Colegio 
Medico, to open a dialogue as a political effort. …They played two games, they did 
participate in the roundtables and they won some things… but in parallel, they had a 
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parallel strategy showing themselves as enemies who did not believe in the reform...In the 
end, they did not change and their public discourse was that the AUGE was bad” 
(Inostroza 2013).  
As Minister Artaza explained, health workers unions were more favourable to giving their 
conditional support on improvements to the salaries and working conditions of their organisations. 
He commented that,  
“The behaviour of the CM was different from other unions because they resisted until the 
end. While the rest of the unions, around September, October, got what they wanted, 
which was to increase their salaries. And this implied an effort in negotiation with unions 
and other medical professionals: Fenats, Confenats, Confusam, and all of them achieved 
better working conditions. And therefore, the resistance of the unions was less ideological 
and more opportunist, so to speak” (Artaza 2014). 
These differing goals between the Colegio Medico and the groups of unions of health workers 
might have been stimulated as a tactic developed by reformers, to divide the power of the radical 
coalitions and diminish the number of opponents. Ottone commented that political struggles with 
radical members favoured the perception of the reformer coalition,   
“We created a public debate in which we won more and more, in which we made a 
definition: for us, our goal, was not to improve working conditions of health sector 
employees… for us, they were not our target, our problem was about patients. Being a 
reformist has to do with helping patients and not to deal with health workers, even when 
they asked us: what about the dignity of the health workers? And we replied, what about 
the dignity of the patients? The dignity of the woman that goes to the doctor and the 
waiting lists? And little by little this idea gained more support…When this fight was 
debilitated? When there was a strike in an emergency hospital (La Posta) and President 
Lagos said "As you are not working in the morning I hope your are not working in the 
afternoon as well" [he referred to those who worked the rest of the day on the private 
sector] and that made a change, they realised the reform was definitely going ahead” 
(Ottone 2013). 
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 In the case of moderate groups, the target of their actions was the mobilisation of the elite. 
The main strategy employed by Boeninger and Foxley was to make public statements via 
interviews or notes in newspapers. They also presented their views in internal DC party meetings 
as well with governmental authorities when their main concern, the funding plan presented by the 
reformers, was discussed. This was the case, for instance, of the insertion published in the 
dominical edition of La Tercera (03 May 2002), as well as a number of individual interviews in 
other publications in which they voiced their opinions. It seems that they exploited their capacity to 
determine the course of the reform based on their reputation as former ministers36 and well-known 
politicians. 
The neoliberal coalition also based their strategies on the dissemination of their views via 
press articles showing data supporting their discourse. They emphasised the deficiencies of the 
public system and looked at the implications of the reform for the private sector. Another activity 
suggested by some respondents was the utilisation of economic resources and networks with the 
entrepreneurial Chilean elite. These elites were involved, not just in the health sector, but also in 
alcohol, tobacco, and mining companies, which were supposed to be affected by the tax increase 
proposed by reformers. As implied by the answers of people outside this coalition, this type of 
relationship had a negative connotation. For instance, Esteban Maturana from the radical coalition 
explained,  
“Obviously, the ISAPRES were in tune with the world of the right, they have a closed 
relationship, very supportive… it was an open secret that the congress representatives 
from the right had systematic and permanent coordination with the ISAPRES, and that 
allowed them to have very clear ideas (Maturana 2014). 
Furthermore, the executive secretary of the reform, Hernan Sandoval explained the link 
between ISAPRES and right-wing parties, emphasising the specific role played by Andres Tagle, 
                                                   
 
 
36 Edgardo Boeninger was appointed by President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) as Minister of the Presidency, and 
Alejandro Foxley as Minister of Finance in the same period. 
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“Very strong, they were always present. The one who acted as a representative of the 
ISAPRES in the parliamentarian committees was Mr. Tagle, who at the same time was a 
member of the UDI and a representative of the Association of ISAPRES…. He was the one 
who lobbied and gave instructions to the parliamentarians as to how they should vote in 
the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate” (Sandoval 2013). 
However, these mechanisms of influence are more difficult to trace, as for instance, lobbying 
is not a regulated activity in Chile and therefore no records can be found of lobbyist activities. 
Financial connections between entrepreneurship and legislators are also difficult to find, though 
some cases demonstrate linkages that are more evident. For instance, an article from La Tercera 
established the connections of Andres Tagle,  
“One of the visible faces defending the ISAPRE was the engineer Andres Tagle, vice 
president of Association of ISAPRES who was part, until last week, of the political 
commission of the UDI, and was the electoral expert of the ‘gremialismo’37 in the 
municipal elections from 1992 onwards. Tagle played a crucial role in the Joaquin Lavin38 
campaign…but Tagle was not the only guy that made things complicated for the UDI. One 
of the members of Lavin’s crew is the entrepreneur Carlos Alberto Delano. The owner of 
the holding PENTA was an advisor of Lavin when he was a Major of Santiago and he was 
part of the ‘samurais’ [a nickname for their groups of friends]. Currently he is part of the 
board of the ISAPRES Banmedica and VIDA TRES” (La Tercera, 13 July 2002). 
It is also worth noting that when I interviewed Andres Tagle, he emphasised that his 
participation in the reform discussion was on behalf of ISAPRES, but did not mention his political 
affiliation to the UDI party. In the case of the representatives of ISAPRES, they were also very 
cautious during the conversation to avoid connections with the right-wing parties.  
                                                   
 
 
37 People affiliated to the UDI political party are also called "gremialistas" as some of its old members were of the 
"movimiento gremial" which was a group founded by Jaime Guzman created in the sixties formed by students within 
the Universidad Catolica de Chile. Guzman was the lawyer mandated by Pinochet to define the legal-political 
framework that resulted in the Constitution of 1980. See more about 'Gremialismo' in Huneeus (2000). 
38 Joaquin Lavin was the presidential candidate from the UDI party who ran against Ricardo Lagos in 1999. 
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Regarding strategies of this sector, the initiative “The Pro-growth Agenda” (Agenda Pro-
Crecimiento) was published in a number of press articles but scarcely mentioned in the interviews. 
It was pushed by the government and two institutions comprised of the wealthiest entrepreneurs in 
Chile: the Federation of Chilean Industry (Sociedad of Fomento Fabril-SOFOFA) and the 
Confederation for Production and Commerce (Confederacion de Produccion y Comercio-CPC). 
This initiative took place at the same time that the health reform was being discussed, with the aim 
of designing a set of joint actions to improve the business development framework and the national 
economic environment. A press note from El Mercurio (10 May 2002) mentioned that the CPC 
began a round of talks with political party leaders before the presidential message of 2002. In this 
matter, an advisor from La Moneda discloses,  
“I remembered one day in the SOFOFA with Juan Claro [the President of the business 
organisation], when the board of the entrepreneurs were changing their opinions, from 
ones less committed to Pinochet and more committed with the country…they told us that 
the ISAPRES would not be an impenetrable wall [and they would be open to negotiate]” 
(Ottone 2013).  
Thus, it might be plausible that this particular context, the collaboration between the 
government and the business sector, affected the way that the discussion of the health reform was 
framed, making previous adversaries adopt a more flexible approach to negotiate issues like the 
transference of funds or the regulation of the private companies in this area.  
Indeed, changes in the ISAPRES system were given priority by the Lagos administration and 
they introduced two initiatives to regulate private sector businesses. The first one, Law Nº19.895 
(informally called “the short-law of ISAPRES”) was focused on the establishment of financial 
stability procedures for private companies, in order to protect affiliates from bankruptcies. The 
second initiative was the Law Nº20.015 (the “Long Law of ISAPRES”) which sought to improve all 
aspects, regarding ISAPRES' transparency in contracts and premiums, not included in the first bill, 
seeking to eliminate discrimination by gender and age in private insurance plans.   
At the time these laws were submitted to the Congress, a particular event determined the 
outcome of these initiatives'. As some interviewees mentioned, “the short law” quickly materialised 
due to an internal crisis in one of the conglomerates that managed private health services (ISAPRE 
Vida Plena) and pensions funds, called Inverlink. At the beginning of 2003, this company was 
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involved in a financial crisis and went bankrupt, causing economic loss for hundred of affiliates. 
This particular event favoured the reformer' plans, as a set of norms to ensure the solvency of 
private insurances companies and to oblige them to disclose their financial status to their affiliates 
that were included in the health reform package. The lead advisor for the Ministry of Finance 
recalled,  
“We had the Monsterio's crisis –Inverlink– and we had to write a specific project about 
what we should do if an ISAPRE or an insurance company was at risk of bankruptcy, what 
was going to happen with the affiliates and other suggestions to increase the regulation of 
ISAPRES. We had to do this very quickly because we did not know how long this 
opportunity would last” (Tokman 2013).  
As both initiatives were focused on increasing the rules and norms for ISAPRES, members of 
the neoliberal coalition would be keener to defend their interests. Nonetheless, given that the 
INVERLINK crisis explicitly revealed the deficiencies and risks associated with the unregulated 
business of ISAPRES, former neoliberal representatives at the Senate cooperated in legislative 
debate. They took a pragmatic attitude towards the bill as the former minister of Health, Pedro 
Garcia, mentioned,  
“When the INVERLINK issue happened, it was useful for me because I could honestly talk 
with the right-wing parties…it was an evident scandal, we were not inventing 
anything…The vertical integration, the transfer of funds from a financial holding to 
ISAPRES, to private clinics that belong to the same holding… We stated that they [the 
financial holdings] can exist, but they must have the monies separate. That event helped 
us a lot in the discussion” (Garcia 2013).  
 
7.3 USING TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE TO BUILD CONSENSUS 
Data from the interviews suggest that each of the four coalitions had their own team of 
advisors, who provided expertise and technical knowledge during the first phase. Most of the initial 
design of the reform proposal took place within the government, where the reformer coalition had a 
forum of specialists working within the government. People that participated as an advisors of this 
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coalition explaining that while during the first two new democratic governments, the Ministry of 
Health received external funds from the World Bank to developed the basis for a plan to reform the 
health sector, based on the principles of cost containment and efficiency reducing the role of the 
state; during the period of Lagos’ due to the political and economic stability reached by the 
country, credits and loans were substantially reduced, by still the ideas of some international 
organisations as the Bank and the World Health Organisation were circulated within the 
governmental team. The first Minister of Health after de dictatorship, Jorge Jimenez explained that 
at the time,  
“There was a huge investment of external resources to improve the public infraestracture. 
There were loans from the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, and 
collaboration from other governments who supported the internal democratic forces 
against the dictatorship in Chile…there was an internationalisation of the Chilean health 
policies as it was one of the first countries to think in a major reform…but there was no 
political will to do it. Instead, several principles that appeared in the World Health Report 
of 2000 such as the promotion of health, justice and equity were present in our reform” 
(Jimenez 2013). 
The inspiration of these ideas were adopted and put in place by the governmental team, as 
Andres Romero recalled,  
 “Until Artaza came, the committee appointed by President Lagos, led by Hernan Sandoval, 
was the group that technically worked on the project, or the idea rather than the project…this 
committee worked well apart from the ministry in a very controversial context, but when Artaza 
took office, we brought the reform to the Ministry” (Romero 2013).  
The Ministry of Health hired Andres Romero when Artaza took office in January 2002 to write 
the legal framework of the reform. He remained an advisor of the Ministry until the bill was 
approved by the Senate in 2004. He and other advisors were part of a large decision-making 
structure organised by the Presidency: i.e. The Inter-ministerial Committee, where public policies 
were coordinated among the different governmental institutions. However, the technical aspects 
and particularities of the project were developed within a small group of advisors that made 
decisions on behalf of their own ministers. Romero explained their role as an advisory team for the 
inter-ministerial committee, 
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“This committee of ministers was translated into a technical committee, and we had the 
same work plan, so to speak. For instance, Tokman was the person from the Ministry of 
Finance, representing the Ministry of the Presidency (SEGPRES) was Carlos Carmona and 
his lawyer Ulises Nancuante39 and I was there as a representative of the Ministry of Health. 
Then, if we could not get an agreement about an issue, that issue was passed to the 
Minister’s committee and if they did not agree, they passed the problem to the President. 
So, there was always an incentive to not pass the issue to the committee ministers. Also 
the ministers tried not to pass the problems to the President. I recall just two occasions in 
which we brought the problem to the President, very few. The rest of the issues were 
negotiated, of course. I had to check everything with my minister, Tokman with Finance… 
and it was an interesting formula to work with the rest of the ministries” (Romero 2013).  
In order to produce a proposal that produced consensus about the financial issues of the 
reform, technical members from the Minister of Finance collaborated with specific parliamentarians 
from the DC to settle the various opinions (La Tercera, 06 June 2002). The representative of the 
Ministry of Finances, Marcelo Tokman illustrated this collaboration,  
“When the bill was in Sentate, I had to, on behalf of the government, to negotiate the 
details of the project with people from the DC …I was accompanied by Consuelo 
(Espinoza)…sometimes with Manuel Inostroza from the DC, and Hector Sanchez, and we 
made several changes to pass the bill in the Senate quickly” (Tokman 2013). 
Radical members had people close to the Socialist Party that were working with Bachelet, as 
advisors, in the first two years. Minister Artaza mentioned in particular the name of Soledad Barria,  
“This is very comical, because I told you about the advisors of Bancada Medica. One of 
the main advisor was Soledad Barria, who years later was appointed as the Minister of 
Health –during the first period of Bachelet– and she had to implement the AUGE. You 
                                                   
 
 
39 Andres Romero and Ulises Nancuante published a book with the legal details of the reform. Romero, A. y U. 
Nancuante. 2008. La Reforma a la salud. Editorial Instituto Salud y Futuro: Universidad Andres Bello. 
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never know where life will take you…because she was a brutal opponent to the AUGE, and 
then she was the Minister responsible for its implementation” (Artaza 2014). 
In the case of the neoliberal coalition, the think tanks were relevant actors as they provided 
technical data to the legislators from the UDI and RN. The advisor from Fundacion, Jaime Guzman, 
explained that they had an internal team to work in this reform, 
 “In Libertad y Desarrollo, we had our own advisors and a small team where we discussed 
the issues of the reform, with people that were working in hospitals and those that had 
experiences in public health” (Figari 2014).  
After the bill was passed to the Senate, in order to craft a passable proposal, reformers drove 
the integration of the experts from the moderate and neoliberal coalitions with the team from the 
executive branch. Furthermore, the technical knowledge required at this point was supplied by a 
diverse group of advisors from the Ministry of Health and Finance, as well as from right and centre-
left think tanks.   
Hector Sanchez, Director of Salud y Futuro, a think tank close to the DC, told me that he was 
asked by Edgardo Boeninger to gather these crosscutting actors into a group that advocated 
political parties to endorse the bill. He had previous experiences working in the public sector as 
advisors of the Ministry of Health during the Aylwin and Frei Administrations and he then occupied 
a position in the private sector. He became the director of a private medical centre, Integramedica, 
and simultaneously, the director of Salud y Futuro, which was a think tank based in a private 
university in Santiago. He explained that this combination of experiences in both the public and 
private sectors helped him to manage the process in Congress,  
“I conducted different types of research, organised seminars and roundtables in which I 
invited leaders from different sides and political colours, and we circulated the different 
proposals. We perpetually appeared in mass media, radios, TV, newspapers…and some 
of these proposals were included by the commission…I organised roundtables with 
everyone from the political world and with entrepreneurs. I learned as a businessperson 
that they [entrepreneurs] can ruin everything, so I started to meet all of the ones from the 
private insurances companies” (Sanchez 2014).  
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This became a small but very influential network called the Health Studies Centres Network 
(Red de Centros de Estudios de Salud-CESAL), which was composed of Salud y Futuro, Instituto 
Libertad (IL), Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CED), Fundacion Jaime Guzman (FJG) and the 
Corporacion de Promocion Universitaria (CPU). Hector Sanchez mentioned,  
“Most of the conceptual content, proposals and guidelines of the reform were elaborate 
by this group. As opposed to the notion that everything was made inside the executive 
committee headed by Sandoval and his team” (Sanchez 2014).  
The next illustration shows the cover and first page of a document created by CESAL, which 
was signed by all the think tanks mentioned:  
 




Despite this document reflecting that think tanks were coordinated by CESAL, most of the 
people interviewed did not come across this network. They recognised the individual roles of 
people from CESAL, for instance, Hector Sanchez was one of the convenors of this event, but there 
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was no mention of formal agreements emanated from this group. Those who participated in the 
reform debate as advisors, told me that the group who played the most important role was not the 
whole network of think tanks, but a group of 5 or 6 people. This group worked with the 
parliamentarians Matthei and Boeninger and the Minister Pedro Garcia. Nicolas Figari from 
Fundacion Jaime Guzman asserted, 
“It was a group that worked without interruption during those years, Andres Romero, 
Marcelo Tokman, Consuelo Espinoza… In spite of the guidelines that came from the 
government, the proposal was addressed as a state issue during the legislative process. It 
was discussed on a technical basis but also with the political will to create a consensus 
that this reform would make significant changes to the health system. So, consensus was 
needed and I think the Lagos government was clever to understand that” (Figari 2014).  
A quote from the interview with Esteban Maturana captures the sense of collaboration by 
actors who were previously antagonists, 
“In fact, during the reform discussion, Ricardo Lagos’ ideas were supported by  the right 
wing think tanks, such as Libertad y Desarrollo and Instituto Libertad…People 
ideologically neoliberal from right wing think tanks” (Maturana 2014).  
As perceived by the interviewees, in order to pass the bill, there was a serious and meticulous 
process of work developed by this group. The result was that technical information and expertise 
provided support to the political will of legislators in the Senate health committee.  
Considering that the DC had internal factions that systematically opposed the reform, the role 
of the technical group within this party in this process is interesting. This is particularly the case as, 
in the end, they became a key part of the negotiations in both political and technical spectrum. The 
narrative of the DC emphasised that this party had more expertise in the health sector, than that 
that was developed through ten years of leading the Ministry of Health in the post-Pinochet period. 
A former Minister of Health in the Aylwin administration commented,  
“We have more knowledge, expertise, we had technical groups, and we had the support 
of the establishment within the public sector. In the socialist party, there were no public 
figures in the health sector. There were some communists, but they were outside…the 
PDC was, during the first 20 years of the Concertación the 50%… before, the DC had 
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more votes than all the other parties of the Concertación. Besides that, the two first 
presidents were DC. It was a privilege, I had to lead the health commission during the 
previous years before the plebiscite, and after that, I was minister, and all the other 
ministers until Bachelet, were DC. After Bachelet there was Artaza and Garcia and so on” 
(Jimenez 2013). 
“Historically the DC had led the health sector, the majority of health ministers had been 
from the DC. The DC had a strong technical team in health... The DC took a relevant role in 
this, they organised a team that accompanied the whole process from a very political 
standpoint” (Romero 2013).  
Despite the fact that the strongest factions within the DC party blocked the reform proposal 
until the Senate stage, they had an accumulated experience in the health sector that was a valuable 
source of knowledge for the design of public policies. This expertise, information, and knowledge, 
helps to explain the capacity of some party members to manipulate the debate. It was after 
Bachelet that the government again appointed DC militants as health ministers, Doctors Osvaldo 
Artaza and Pedro Garcia. While Artaza went through a highly conflictive period with three opponent 
coalitions (and not always with the support from the party leaders), the interviewees suggested that 
it was Pedro Garcia (largely due to his personality) who played an important role in promoting 
consensus. Furthermore, in his role as a member of the DC health team, he had already been 
working on preparing alternatives to the government proposal. The vice president of ISAPRES in 
that period, Andres Tagle, commented on Garcia's position,  
“When the last minister [of the Lagos administration] arrived, he was the one who pushed 
the reform forward, and it was with him that things really started to move. There was a 
union, I would say, between Sandoval with the La Moneda [Presidential Palace] 
team…about the real reform they wanted and from then, they moved ahead. It was very 
straightforward” (Tagle 2013). 
In addition to nominating a DC as the Health Minister, the inclusion of other militants on the 
technical team was also a tactical move to bring about consensus within the party, ensuring 
compliance with the health commission. Sanchez realised that the party needed to sort out internal 
problems before building support in Congress,  
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“We learned that we needed to negotiate this project at home and then sell it outside. 
Then, we began to operate within the DC, and we took control of the internal committee of 
health within the DC, Manuel (Inostroza) and I, and when we took control of the board 
members of the party, we got the political support to negotiate with the government” 
(Sanchez 2014). 
As the internal conflicts within the DC were managed, the collaboration of technical experts 
was the essence of the negotiations in Senate. As the advisor of the Fundacion Jaime Guzman 
explained, 
“In spite of the number of the interest groups, and I want to be honest in this, in general 
we made decisions based on consensus…But in the end, we did very professional work, 
making the best decisions based on technical data” (Figari 2014). 
 
7.4 POLICY BROKERS 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (2007) suggest that the struggles between coalitions can be 
mediated by specific persons that assumed the role of policy brokers, with the aim of reducing the 
polarisation between the groups involved. This mechanism of influence was used by the dominant 
pragmatic coalition at the Senate. In this scenario, reformers had the ability to transform 
themselves into a coalition composed of people from different political parties, enabling the bill to 
pass in Congress. In spite of their different viewpoints, policy brokers became relevant actors, 
defending a common goal, instead of fighting about individual preferences. An interviewee stated 
that a process of negotiation required people capable of bringing about specific conditions, 
“You have to have agents able to articulate, that allows you to create agreements between 
actors, and in this point, it is crucial to mend fences, to create trust” (Sanchez 2014). 
Although during the reform debate in the Senate different actors from rival coalitions, such as 
Colegio Medico and ISAPRES, were invited to the public sessions of the health committee, these 
did not fundamentally change the bill that was being discussed in Congress. Furthermore, the draft 
bill mainly reflected the views from members of the pragmatic coalition supported by a 
	   115 
crosscutting technical team. An advisor from the Ministry of Health observed that in comparison 
with the first phase, the Senate was a less polarised context to negotiate in,   
“The Lower Chamber was more conflictive, the most difficult to convince…with the 
senators I mentioned: Boeninger, Viera Gallo y Mathei, Espina, we achieved an agreement, 
and then we could impose political discipline on the rest of Congress” (Inostroza 2013). 
With the leadership of two specific actors: Evelyn Matthei and Edgardo Boeninger from the 
neoliberal and moderate coalitions, the pragmatic coalition succeeded in controlling the reform 
agenda and consolidating a block to support the bill. Sebastian Soto confirmed this, saying that: 
“The leadership of some politicians was very relevant to moving forward and getting an 
agreement over the agenda. I am thinking especially of Matthei and Boeninger” (Soto 
2014). 
As former Minister Garcia noted, despite the policy process being smoother in the Senate due 
to the consensus within the sectorial committee members, he still had to manage struggles within 
the health committee,  
“I was lucky, I had to negotiate the bill in the Senate after the first legislative step with the 
committee members, for instance, Alberto Espina, who had a good understanding, and 
Evelyn Matthei who understood a lot more than anyone else. She was the leader of the 
opposition at that time. And there were other senators from the Concertación, Viera Gallo 
and Ruiz Esquide. And Ruiz Esquide was the only DC, who was supposed to be closer to 
me, but he was very conservative in the way, he saw health issues and was very difficult to 
manage” (Garcia 2013).  
The strategy employed by the reformer coalition was to approach Senator Boeninger, who 
was less extreme than Ruiz Esquide, as a way of taking control of the DC’s internal factions and 
managing the opposition within the Concertación parties. The legal advisor of the Ministry of Health 
and a DC militant said,  
“The President knew what was going on, and that the negotiation had to do with the DC, 
and Edgardo Boeninger was a key actor to the effect of getting an agreement and he took 
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this role as mediator very seriously, and a specific team was built for this” (Romero 
2013). 
The narrative of the respondents confirms that Edgardo Boeninger was a "primus inter pares" 
in the Senate, one who organised the discussion and negotiation of the reform at Congress in 
agreement with La Moneda. This was reflected in the opinion of Sebastian Soto, from the think tank 
Libertad y Desarrollo, 
“He was unique, unique in the sense that he was the voice of the Concertación, and the 
one who made the most important decisions, and he was present in every detail” (Soto 
2014).  
Pedro Garcia mentioned that when he was appointed as minister, President Lagos said to him,  
“If you have any questions, talk to Boeninger…He was indeed the person there, he was 
the man in Congress and in the health committee” (Garcia 2013).  
The lawyer for the ministry and part of the technical team in the Senate describes one situation 
that illustrates the skilful guidance of the Senator. It was during a discussion about creating one or 
two different bodies to supervise the function of insurance institutions,  
“For socialist legislators, it was impossible to accept that FONASA was classified as health 
insurance, it was unacceptable, as for them, it was a solidarity fund. They wanted to reject 
the creation of Superintendencia of Insurances because of the name. In that moment, 
Boeninger was very clever and he said: ‘what about if we add [to the Superintendencia] 
Provisional Insurance Funds to the name?' And it was approved but it was silly, because 
there was just one fund! It was finally called Superintendencia of Funds and Provisional 
Insurances of Health” (Romero 2013). 
Along with the identification of Boeninger as a helpful and skilful member of the pragmatic 
coalition, Senator Evelyn Matthei also emerged as a relevant part of the policy process. Former 
Minister Pedro Garcia explains,  
“I can tell you, Evelyn Matthei was the woman. I appreciated her, because she was 
reckless and sometimes rude, but she was a very serious woman. If you could explain to 
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her that something was wrong, she understood because she had experience, and because 
she did not like foolery” (Garcia 2013).  
The advisors from the think tanks close to the right wing parties shared this sentiment,   
“Evelyn Matthei, the senator, was powerful, with argumentative capacity, very intense, with 
a strong character and presence. She assumed leadership very quickly…”(Soto 2014).  
Nicolas Figari described the Senator as follows:  
“She was smart, intelligent. She was very incisive with the government, she asked 
questions and then the government had to call for a meeting to see how they would reply 
to her. It happened several times that she left them with no answers…Her focus was on 
technical and economic issues…She brought empirical examples to challenge the 
applicability of the reform” (Figari 2014).  
What respondents implicitly insinuated is that Evelyn Matthei became a key person in this 
process for two reasons: First, she had a degree in economics; and second, because she had 
German ancestors, for which she earned a reputation as a very serious and meticulous person, 
giving her “enough credentials” to be part of that debate. These characteristics (factors that were 
not mentioned in the case of Senator Boeninger who also studied economics and had German 
ancestors) made her to be perceived as an independent-reasoning person that was not influenced 
by pressure from interest groups like ISAPRES.  It is worthwhile explaining some features of Evelyn 
Matthei’s political career to put these findings into context. She was the daughter of Fernando 
Matthei, a member of Pinochet’s Military Junta as Air Force Commander, where she was 
responsible for the Ministry of Health from 1976-1978. She was also served as the Minister of 
Labour in President Pinera’s Administration (2010-2014). When she left the Cabinet, and after two 
other candidates from the right-wing alliance abandoned their presidential campaigns in 2013 for 
personal issues40 she ran for president against Michelle Bachelet. Matthei did not have the backing 
                                                   
 
 
40 One was involved in money laundry and the other quit because he was suffering depression.  
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of all the right-wing political parties, and she was running a campaign with little expectations. After 
she lost in December of that year, she retired from politics.  
Getting back to her role in the health reform process, when I asked Sebastian Soto, from 
Libertad y Desarrollo, if there was any communication between the Senator and the private 
insurance companies during the negotiation, he responded that,  
"I do not think that Evelyn called them and asked them what they thought about the article 
number 26, I think there was a way to go, and that way was very clear and we needed to 
go ahead, defending and negotiating this [the reform approval]” (Soto 2014). 
The advisor to the Finance Minister also commented that there was no clear link between 
ISAPRES and the work of Evelyn Matthei in the Senate,  
“I do not think so, it was not that absurd, I would say she defended the ISAPRES from an 
ideological point of view, she defended their existence. But she was also critical of some 
aspects, except with the solidarity fund, but she agreed in general with one compulsory 
plan to ISAPRES and Fonasa” (Espinoza 2014).  
Despite the comments about the sources of her capabilities, a quote from the interview with 
former Minister Garcia gives a sense of her power, 
“Eyzaguirre and Tokman -authorities from the Ministry of Treasure- had very good 
relationships with a number of parliamentarians, a very good relationship with Evelyn 
Matthei. Evelyn Matthei trusted in both. And if they, Eyzaguirre and Tokman, validated me, 
Evelyn Matthei validated me…She was the one who made decisions in the Senate” 
(Garcia 2013)  
Even though the Senate was less conflictive than the discussion carried out Chamber of 
Deputies, the pragmatic coalition still faced obstacles and challenges in passing the bill in the 
second phase of the policy process. In the end they had to make concessions about important 
elements, the initial funding scheme and the solidarity compensatory fund, from the original reform 
project to achieve an agreement. Pedro Garcia described the rejection of the right-wing parties to 
the Solidarity Compensatory Fund and how it was managed by President Lagos’ team, 
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“And Matthei said to me 'Look Minister: we like all this idea [of the reform]… but if you do 
not take out the Compensatory Fund, we are going to vote against the idea to legislate the 
AUGE'. And if they rejected the bill, that meant we failed…There were people from the left 
who also thought this Fund was negative for FONASA, supporting the argument of the right 
…I explained this to the President, and he said that although they were blackmailing us, 
we must take this policy out from the bill” (Garcia 2013).  
Once the disputes that concerned Matthei and Boeninger were sorted out via transaction, both 
legislators were keen to pass the bill and to align their political parties to vote through the health 
reform in the Senate. A member of the pragmatic coalition explained, 
“We were able to get this reform through by giving away the things that we needed to. 
And we got what we got. Like Obama, he wanted an ambitious reform, but he got what he 
could…At least we got the AUGE, which was the most important thing for the FONASA 
people, and we made a partial reform to the ISAPRES system. But we could not make it 
with the lack of solidarity and the transfer of risks, which were the final goals of the 
reform” (Inostroza 2013).  
This quote captures the sense that, at this stage, coalition members adopted strategic 
negotiation, where they made concessions in order to achieve a partial but still a substantive 
reform of the health sector.  
 
Table 12 Distribution of political parties in the Health Committee at the Senate 














*Senator Rios was replaced by Senator Espina 
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Table 13 Distribution of political parties in the Finance Committee at the Senate 
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The aim of this chapter was to show the different resources employed by the four coalitions in 
the process of formulation and discussion at the Lower Chamber. Acknowledging the different 
contexts in the first and second phases, I show the different resources employed by the four 
coalitions in the process of formulation and discussion at the Lower Chamber. These strategies 
changed with the context in the legislative debate in the Senate. The evolution of coalitions 
explained in Chapter 6 and this chapter reflected on how the strategies of the coalitions evolved as 
well. They were public and confrontational at the beginning, and less polarised when the pragmatic 
coalition replaced the four initial coalitions.  
Despite the factionalism and opposition from the three coalitions (neoliberal, moderate, and 
radical) against the reformers plan, the reformers managed to mobilise the resource and employed 
strategies that pushed the reform through the different stages of the policy process. As there was a 
dynamic evolution of coalitions, the type of strategies used by the actors also varied. These 
strategies had different outcomes and changed when the bill passed to the Senate. In this second 
phase, there was a process of consensus building based on the assistance of an advisory team, 
which provided technical knowledge to coalition members. In addition, the role of the policy 
brokers and their skilful leadership was crucial to brokering a negotiated settlement within the 
pragmatic coalition. 
The next chapter will examine the findings from interviews and congressional hearings 
regarding the implications of institutional arrangements in shaping the coalitions’ interaction 
through the two phases of the health reform process.  
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CHAPTER 8 THE IMPACT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES ON THE HEALTH 
SECTOR REFORM 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
After arguing in chapter 7 about that the mobilisation of resources, the contribution of a 
group of advisor and technocrats, and the role of policy brokers facilitated the achievement of 
agreements, the present chapter tackles the implication of institutional arrangements of the Chilean 
political system, by reviewing the interviews to relevant actors and congressional hearings from the 
health reform process.  
The focus of this chapter is to further analyse in to what extent these factors enabled or 
constrained the policy shifts on the health sector. From the analysis of data, three main institutional 
structures are assessed for their impact on the health reform: two legacies directly derived from 
the Constitution, as formal arrangements within the political system; and the third one resulting 
from the introduction of market-based reforms in social policies. The findings of this study show 
that political participation in the health sector, the presidential powers and the electoral system 
became relevant factors in the policy process. Therefore, I examine how coalitions coped with 
them. 
 
8.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND CONTESTATION WITHIN THE HEALTH 
SECTOR  
As explained in Chapter 4 and confirmed by my interviews, the re-organisation of the health 
system during the dictatorship created new actors and new rules for the game, imposing market 
mechanisms in this sector. Two particular features that had implications for the health reform 
processes emerged from the structural transformation. First, there was the creation of an 
economic elite in the health sector industry, composed of owners of private insurances companies, 
private practices, and clinics. Second, following the logic of the military authorities regarding civil 
society demobilisation and de-politicisation, citizens became outsiders of the policy process as 
participation was severely banned. Although the democratisation process was supposed to bring 
back a balance into political participation, the evidence shows that influence of the coalitions 
identified stuck to the distribution of power that arose during the years of the dictatorship. 
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In terms of opportunities for participation, according to the data, some activities were specially 
organised for civil society groups. The first such activity was led by Minister Bachelet and took 
place in January 2001, attempting to integrate several social actors in the discussion of the 
national health goals for the decade by extending invitations to community leaders across the 
country. These meetings were described in different data sources,  
“More than four thousand social leaders with community representatives were invited to 
join the discussion on the reform, in 50 participation days since January 11, in 
Concepcion, Santiago and Porvenir, to determine regional issues and to define the goals 
for the decade” (El Mercurio, 06 January 2001). 
“There were meetings organised by the Ministry of Health, directors of health institutions 
were asked to organise meetings with communal actors. And we, as authorities from the 
Ministry, went to support these regional meetings…in which there were presentations and 
participative discussions…there were more than 2,000 meetings with neighbourhood-
based organisations…they participated actively” (Herrera 2014). 
A quote from Minister Bachelet in a newspaper illustrated the character of those meetings,  
“We do not want a reform made on the back of the Chileans…the health reform should be 
a participative process, in which users and citizens play a significant role. We believe that 
it is quite important that the decisions we make are based on peoples' orientations, as we 
think the focus of the reform is precisely the people” (La Nacion, 06 January 2001). 
 Additional activities to integrate citizens and unions were organised in August of the same 
year, in which various working groups discussed the scope and content of the reform. There were 
four groups comprised of all the actors involved in the health sector: ISAPRES representatives, 
health workers unions, medical associations, users from both private and public services, civil 
society, and community leaders. The opinion of one of the participants illustrates that the 
roundtables were important to the process,  
“With Bachelet, there were working committees with representatives from the civil 
society, I mean, users, unions, from different organisations interested in health. For 
instance, there were organisations of people with rare diseases, political parties, 
organisations from primary care and parliamentarians, and people from the government. 
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There were different activities to share and discuss the basic principles of the 
reform…Initially, there was a feeling that we could shape its content…but when we had to 
analyse critical points such as funding, private insurances and so on, the problems began. 
There were different opinions from ISAPRES, private clinics representatives, people from 
the private sector. But we also had problems with people within the Government…but 
overall, the roundtables were very important, they took place in different regions of the 
country, and they were very participative” (Maturana 2014).  
As they did not see any progress during her administration in terms of the reform, some 
respondents viewed the consultation process as Bachelet’s strategy to delay the process, blocking 
President Lagos' agenda. In fact, in legislative terms, there was just one project submitted to the 
Congress by Bachelet in June 2001, the law about the rights and duties of patients (Law 
Nº20.584). This project was the first to be sent and the last to be approved, in April 2012, more 
than ten years after the project was delivered to the Congress. Although, the informants and the 
press mentioned these regional meetings and roundtables, I could not find the specific names of 
those who participated in the meetings, which could be an indication of the lack of influence the 
community had in this process. Instead, some health workers organisations: nurses, paramedics, 
regional representatives, among others, were clearly identified in media sources. 
A second initiative mentioned by the informants took place within Congress, where public 
audiences were organised by the permanent health commissions of the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate.41 While the four coalitions had parliamentarian representatives, the transcriptions of 
these public audiences show that different groups of actors attended these sessions in first and 
second legislative stages. Although the initiatives were seen as a democratic channel of 
participation, the impact of the organisations formed by patients or users of health systems was 
limited. Given that they did not have formal access to the centres of decision-making and that there 
were no binding decisions from the activities in which they participated, it seems that these 
initiatives were focused on technical and expert knowledge from the government team, rather than 
the needs expressed by societal actors. Congressional hearings showed that the participants were 
                                                   
 
 
41 See Appendix F, with the diagram of the law making process. 
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mainly health workers and private sector representatives. The exception to this is the discussion of 
the ISAPRES Law, where Pedro Barría, President of an organisation of affiliates and users of 
ISAPRES were invited (Congressional Hearings Law No 20.015). In fact, during the discussion 
about the content of the Authority Law, a deputy from the Bancada Medica emphasised that the 
lack of participation needed to change, 
“Another very important aspect of the project, which must be included, is the issue of 
citizen participation in management. It is not acceptable that, in the current situation, 
citizens do not have any participation in the knowledge of primary or hospital services. For 
that reason, we are going to present one suggestion about the participation of 
neighbourhood councils and social organisations in primary services, to get them involved 
in the management. We need to open channels of communication based on reciprocity 
with health sectors workers, and vice versa” (Deputy Enrique Accorsi, Congressional 
Hearings No.19.937, 08 October 2002). 
Indeed, Lagos took steps to address some of the issues derived from the unbalanced situation 
in terms of citizen participation in public policy decisions. For instance, in his reform he included 
citizen participation in policy-making bodies known as Advisory Councils (Consejos Asesores) to 
develop sanitary policies and help in the management of public health centres. Additionally, citizens 
were given the prerogative to systematically evaluate public health services (Law No.19.937) and 
the capacity to demand the fulfilment of deadlines in the AUGE Plan (Law No.19.966). These were 
stated in the legal framework to create a more balanced relationship between citizens and health 
sector providers after the enactment of the laws. However, what became clear in the interviews is 
that the policy process was concentrated and managed by the Chilean political elite with access to 
formal power centres. As the former Health Minister said, this reform did not emerge from citizen 
involvement, 
“The way it was approved – the reform – was curious, because in theory, it should have a 
degree of involvement from the citizenship in its design and implementation, and here, it 
was nothing like that. It was totally top down, and I would say it was because, at the 
moment, the country was not prepared to have a bottom-up reform” (Artaza 2014). 
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8.3 LAGOS AND HIS PRESIDENTIAL POWERS  
 One of the institutional arrangements highlighted in the interviews was the considerable 
advantage the executive was given over the legislative branch in the 1980 Constitution. As stated 
by articles 62-64 of the Constitution, the President has the legal initiative (a capacity to start the 
legislative process) on issues of political and administrative divisions, financial matters, and 
policies concerning the national budget and taxes.42 The president’s right of veto is one of these 
powers. The president can veto any legislation enacted by Congress, while allowing Congress to 
propose modifications to, but not dismiss, legislation presented by the President. Furthermore, 
respondents agreed with the idea that the presidential regime in Chile influenced the public policy 
process but did not provide details on how the President exercises this leverage over other 
institutions. In this respect, a neoliberal and radical coalition members commented,   
“There is, yes, a presidentialism, in which some issues are initiatives of the Executive 
exclusively. The Congress cannot make, for instance, an ISAPRES law by itself or in the 
pensions sector, because the initiative comes exclusively from the President” (Tagle 
2013). 
“He [the President] decides which issues are discussed and which are not…and the most 
important issues for the country, the ones that have to do with money, the legal initiative is 
decided by the President, and Congress does not have any capacity on these matters” 
(Maturana 2014). 
 In exploring this through a combination of data sources, what emerged was that President 
Lagos simultaneously exercised his presidential power through formal and informal means to 
ensure the approval of the reform within his administration. In this context, the reformer coalition 
counted on the prerogatives inherited by the President that favoured the introduction of the bill. In a 
formal exercise of this power, Ricardo Lagos submitted a health reform package that included a 
redistribution of public budget, increases in taxes, and the transfer of funds between the private 
                                                   
 
 
42 See Chapter 2 about presidential prerogatives. 
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and public sector. This package also had policies related to the reassignment of the functions of 
regional authorities, and the creation of the Superintendencia of Health as a regulator body.  
 The Executive also defines the priorities for the discussion of the bills, and when setting up 
the deadlines, the President is able to define the legislative priorities and the timing of the 
discussion. The specific bills were sent to the Congress with a “simple urgency “(urgencia 
simple),43 which means they had 30 days after their submission to analyse the proposals in both 
chambers. The only exception was Law Nº19.888 about funding for social programmes, which 
was sent with “summa urgency” (suma urgencia) and therefore, had to be analysed in 15 days. As 
the president could modify these urgencies freely, he could decide to change the agenda if the 
government realised that the bills were subject to controversy and could result in the delay or 
rejection of the initiatives. During the discussion of the Authority Law, Deputy Lorenzini stated,  
“The legislative urgencies are not defined by us. We [the parliamentarians] are still waiting 
for a reform that gives us the possibility to define our rhythm of work. Currently, the 
President defines urgencies and we work according to that. For that reason, the Chamber 
of Deputies and the commissions – Finance and Health – have responded to those 
urgencies…I would like to make this point clear” (Deputy Pablo Lorenzini, 
Congressional Hearings No.19.937, 20 November 2002).   
 Although the President has discretion on the management of urgencies, interviewees did 
not mention this capacity as something distinctive in this reform. By contrast, several press notes 
covering the period commented that the potential change of urgencies was a game played by the 
Government to handle coalition struggles in the context of the legislative discussion. The following 
quotes from a newspaper capture the sense that this was key in the process, 
 “The increasingly politicised health reform was affected by another unexpected change. 
Although in the last days President Lagos and the Minister Artaza confirmed they will not 
                                                   
 
 
43 Legislation can be send by the Executive to the Congress with three degrees of urgencies: 1) “simple urgency” 
(urgencia simple), in which the bill has to be reviewed and delivery to the next chamber within 30 days. 2) “summa 
urgency” (suma urgencia) which had a deadline of 15 days. 3) “immediate urgency” (urgencia inmediata) that should 
be analysed and dispatched by the Congress within 6 days. However, the government can change the degree of 
urgencies any time and there are no sanctions if the Congress exceeds the deadlines. 
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change the urgency of the bills, in private, La Moneda [Presidential Palace] negotiated a 
withdrawal of the urgency in exchange for a deal with congressmen from the commission 
of health and finance that defined a strict timetable of work. The Executive pretends to use 
this change of urgency as a more efficient way to face the opposition and to make the UDI 
accept publicly that they are supporting the ISAPRES” (El Mercurio, 12 July 2002). 
 “What La Moneda did? They re-installed the urgency for the legislative process and when 
the government does this, as stated by a Concertacionist deputy, it is because they accept 
that there is a conflict” (El Mercurio, 29 December 2002). 
A press note said that a couple of neoliberal representatives suggested the Government was 
using the urgencies to manipulate the voting process,  
 “The vice president and general secretary of the UDI, Carlos Bombal and Patricio Melero, 
respectively, said that the decision to withdraw the urgency from the health reform 
projects was a manoeuvre to damage the "gremialismo". They challenged the Government 
to get the initiatives approved in 30 days because they had the votes needed in the 
Congress to pass them quickly. This was demonstrated with the constitutional accusation 
of the provincial governor Trivelli.44 They have the votes – to approve the reform – and now 
they withdraw the urgency. They do not care about health, as they know we are available to 
approve in 24 hours if the government wants” (Senator Carlos Bombal45 quoted in La 
Nacion 13 July 2002). 
 The debate about the urgencies continued when the reform advanced to the Senate, as 
they could not guarantee that they had the votes in the second legislative phase. President Lagos 
stated that he would have second thoughts about changing the agenda,  
 “Minister Garcia knows the efforts we must make to get the AUGE Plan working in 
2004…there was a moment at the Chamber of Deputies when we did not need to put an 
                                                   
 
 
44 This comment refers to a constitutional accusation presented by the Alianza por Chile against the DC governor of 
Santiago that was rejected by all the deputies from the Concertación, and therefore, was declared inadmissible. 
45 Carlos Bombal, a lawyer from UDI, was President of the Health Commission of the Senate until 2002. 
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urgency, but there was a commitment to get the projects approved in one period. But now 
in the Senate, we do not discard anything [in reference to a change of the urgency]” 
(President Ricardo Lagos quoted in La Tercera, 07 March 2003). 
 Another formal capacity defined by the Presidential attributes was the organisation of a 
working procedure via the Inter-ministerial Committee that allowed him to control the policy 
process. As such, the advantage of the reformers was again substantially higher than other 
coalitions, as they accumulated expertise and technical capacity from ministries' teams. 
Specifically, Lagos sought to get the health and finance ministers and their advisors fully involved 
in the Congressional debate, where they represented Lagos' views.  
 In June of 2000, Lagos mandated the Health Minister to coordinate an inter-ministerial 
group to define the guidelines and deadlines for the health reform. As stated in the Public 
Administration Statute, a minister is a collaborator of the president, which conducts a Ministry and 
proposes national policies for executive consideration. In this context, Michelle Bachelet led the 
committee, comprised of ministers from the presidency as well as the Ministries of Finance and 
Labour, from 2000 to 2001 on behalf of the president to produce the contents of the bills. 
However, as explained in the previous chapter, President Lagos lost control over the Health 
ministry's agenda due to Bachelet's radical stand about the direction of the reform. The 
confrontation between the two coalitions within the ministry, reformer and radical, blocked the 
advancement of the reform. It ended when Osvaldo Artaza, who was able to deliver the reform 
package to the Congress immediately after the presidential speech in May 2002, was appointed as 
minister.  
 Once the projects reached the legislative phase, the president oversight over the policy 
process was performed by his formal representatives, the Ministers of Health and Finance. They 
defended the content and the economic feasibility of the reform against the neoliberal, radical and 
moderate parliamentarians. Strictly following the president’s guidelines, both ministers and their 
respective teams were responsible for discussing the comments raised by parliamentarians and re-
drafting accordingly. For instance, in the congressional sessions that were devoted to funding 
issues and the redistribution of resources, the Ministry of Finance presented technical reports 
demonstrating the economic feasibility of the bills (Congressional Hearings Law No.19.888 and 
Congressional Hearings Law No.19.937).  
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 One of the interviewees highlighted a very interesting example of the coordination between 
Lagos and the Minister of Finance, in a strategy to gain support for the Authority Sanitary Law from 
politicians. The representative of this ministry, Marcelo Tokman explained that they decided to 
publish, at the end of 2000, a report about the deficiencies of the public sector in a volume of 
working papers from ECLAC.46 This report called "Results and performance of public spending in 
the Chilean public health sector 1990-1999"47 was written by Tokman and Jorge Rodriguez Rossi48 
(as members of the Office of Budget's department of research). The main goal of this publication 
was to call attention to the necessity of restructuring the public system and extending the reforms 
focus beyond the private sector. The paper showed data on the number of beds available in 
hospitals, records of attendance for doctors and health sector workers and other points which 
painted a negative picture of public institutions and services. This report was widely disseminated 
and criticised by health workers who claimed that the information was incorrect. They argued that 
the lack of resources and deficient administration of hospitals and primary centres was caused by 
the negligence of government authorities, not of public system workers. 
The controversy created by this report was captured by press notes of the period. For 
instance, a headline from an article in the La Nacion newspaper read "The report that seeks to 
block the reform" and presented the opinion of two radical representatives, Juan Luis Castro and 
Soledad Barria. This article criticised the methodology of the document as well as the intentions 
behind its publication. According to the article, Juan Luis Castro said, 
 “There are groups from the economic area of the government who are very interested in 
delaying the health reform. The report is biased and incorrect, and it was published with 
the sole purpose of blocking the process” (La Nacion, 06 May 2001).  
                                                   
 
 
46 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations. 
47 Rodriguez, J. and Tokman, M. 2000.”Resultados y Rendimiento del gasto en el sector publico de salud en Chile 
1990-1999” Serie Financiamiento del Desarrollo Nº106 CEPAL. 
48 An economist from the PDC that was later appointed as a Minister of Mining, and then as a Minister of Economy 
during the Lagos administration. 
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Furthermore, this report also provoked a conflict with Minister Bachelet, as she had to defend 
the public system even when it was being criticised by the governments’ own employees. A press 
note outlines what the minister said about Tokman and Rodriguez's paper,  
 “Minister Bachelet made a strong defence for the public health system in the last decade, 
in terms of productivity and sanitary goals. Even though she declined to comment on the 
report of the Ministry of Finance’s specialists, she indicated that it was not good to 
calculate the productivity with one or two factors, and estimations must include quality 
factors. She also stated that it is a mistake to say that there is a lack of productivity in 
public institutions, saying that these comments only affect people that use public 
services” (La Nacion, 15 May 2001). 
This publication legitimated and generated consensus about the restructuring of the public 
systems, as “it was the voice of the experts”. Specifically, the Health Authority Law (Law 
No.19.937) was approved by a majority. However, these facts unveiled that the influential role of 
the Ministry of Finance actors lessened the authority of the Health Ministry, as it was confirmed by 
one of the informants,  
 “Because in the end, the Ministry of Finance makes the decisions, and this is indicative of 
where the centre of power was… decisions were not made in La Moneda [presidential 
palace] but in the Ministry of Finance…The Minister of Finance mandated Marcelo, and he 
was the negotiator within the Government…In the end, public policies decisions are 
always made by Finance; no matter who the proposal is coming from” (Sanchez 2013). 
In a context where there was a strong president supervising the process and an influential 
minister of finance, the capacity and autonomy of the minister of health was diminished. Indeed, 
the second Minister of Health, Osvaldo Artaza, conceded that, due to Lagos’ involvement, he felt 
displaced in his role as leader of the inter-ministerial committee, 
“I said to you that, theoretically, the one who led the inter-ministerial committee was the 
Minister of Health. That was in theory. In the reality, the one who led the committee was 
the president himself. The president attended each session of the Committee. That gives 
you a very clear idea about his interest in the reform. So, what could the minister of health 
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do in a meeting if the president was there? With his personality and irascible character? 
The one who always led the inter-ministerial committee was the President” (Artaza 2014). 
 Employing an informal resource, President Lagos cemented his power over the ministry 
when he established an ad-hoc organisation to prepare and to follow-up the reform proposal in 
parallel to the Health Ministry’s work. He appointed Doctor Hernan Sandoval, his close friend and 
an expert in public health, as an executive secretary of the Inter-ministerial Committee in June 
2000. Sandoval's appointment caused controversy, as it was interpreted as Lagos taking control of 
the reform at all levels and showed will to exercise his authority beyond formal institutions. The role 
of Sandoval and his friendship with the president became an obstacle for Bachelet's agenda, which 
defended a radical change in the health system. This conflict ended with a cabinet reshuffle that 
kicked Bachelet out of the Ministry. After this change, Ministers Artaza and Garcia were able 
collaborate with Sandoval in pushing the reform forward, in tune with President Lagos plan. A 
member of the reformer coalition said,  
“Lagos made "a jugada" [a strategic decision], he said: Michelle has to stay there [at the 
Ministry] doing specific work. And you [Sandoval] are responsible for the reform, which is 
the only thing that matters. The problem was that this design did not work well…As 
Michelle did not like the AUGE, she had problems with Sandoval…because they both had 
different standpoints, and the reform did not progress…Then Lagos said, I need to solve 
this internal conflict and I am going to designate a minister that does not eclipse Sandoval, 
so they can work together” (Inostroza 2014).  
In contrast, a couple of interviewees from the reformer team mentioned that Sandoval's 
nomination had positive goals and effects, as it took pressure off the Minister and allowed her to be 
focused on managerial issues. Ottone, an advisor to Lagos, explained that they chose to have 
another group in parallel to the Ministry because,  
“We needed a different structure, one that worked with the ministry but outside the 
Ministry, with a different logic, with another composition, which was not linked with the 
public administration, and without corporative pressures…with enough liberty from the 
bureaucracy, corporations, unions…You needed a place from where you could provoke an 
earthquake and not a place of confusion. That is why we had a different group with 
Sandoval as the leader of a professional group…” (Ottone 2013).  
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 The last aspect, on which the majority of the interviewees agreed, was that the leadership, 
personality, and commitment of Ricardo Lagos to get the reform approved by all means, was 
something distinctive from other presidents and other social policy sectors. The analysis of the 
data suggests that it was a combination of informal characteristics and formal procedures in which 
the president got involved that contributed to the success of the reform. A quote from a reformer 
coalition member captures this idea,  
“This excessive presidentialism, it was indeed in our favour…In our case, Lagos always 
wanted to say publicly: this is my reform, and is part of my legacy, my stamp!...He was a 
president who asked every fifteen days how everything was going and how the negotiation 
with ISAPRES and the unions was going. Lagos was omnipresent in every detail…and he 
fought with everyone needed, e.g. Colegio Medico, with ISAPRES, as long as he could get 
his reform approved” (Inostroza 2013).  
 
8.4 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESS 
  Even though the Constitution concentrated legislative powers in the executive branch, the 
president was also forced to negotiate with parliamentarians, as the governmental agenda has to 
be authorised by legislation enacted in Congress. As such, the feasibility of the health reform 
depended very much on the majorities inside Congress, the minimums require, and on the ability of 
the Executive to garner support within the political parties, and for that reason, the mechanism for 
distribution of seats in the Congress was considered as a constraint for policy making and coalition 
interplay. Particularly, one of the consequences of the binominal electoral method for parliamentary 
elections, was the exclusive representation of the two electoral alliances that contained the main 
political parties, Alianza and the Concertación, result that, as I explained in Chapter 2 this system 
over represent the second majority even when they just get 33,4% of the votes. The purpose of this 
mechanism, designed during the dictatorship, was to exclude those outside of these groups, such 
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as the Communist party and other smaller parties who had seats in Congress.49 As noted by a 
representative of the Radical Coalition, while Lagos, during the presidential campaign, promised a 
more radical change to the health workers unions, once he got elected, he had to adapt his 
programme to the results of the parliamentary elections. Although the results of the elections were 
somewhat predictable under the binomial system, the CONFUSAM leader commented,   
“The electoral system allows this equilibrium, to maintain the forces in Congress…at that 
time, there was a virtual draw between the government and the right. In spite of the 
Concertación getting 60% of votes and the right 40%, as a result of the electoral system, 
there was a technical draw. Therefore, the authoritarian enclaves gave the right the tools it 
needed to have this political equilibrium, to block the reform that Lagos promised us at the 
beginning” (Maturana 2014).  
Table 14 shows the distribution of seats in the Congress during the period examined. 
 
Table 14 Distribution of seats in the Congress (2000-2006) 
Political Parties Conglomerates Deputies Senators 
La Concertación 62 18 
Alianza por Chile 57 16 
Independents 1 3 
Appointed senators  8 
Lifetime senators  1 
Source: www.elecciones.gov.cl 
 
At the time, the president sent the health reform to Congress, the Concertación had a majority 
of 4 votes over the right-wing political parties in the Chamber of Deputies, which potentially gave 
the advantage to the reformer coalition. However, despite the majority, the debate in the Lower 
                                                   
 
 
49 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of the binominal system.  
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Chamber was extremely conflictive for the centre-left pact. Jose Antonio Viera Gallo, a former 
Socialist senator, recalled his meetings with parliamentarians from other centre-left political parties,  
“When the project reached the Lower Chamber, me and the rest of the Concertación 
parliamentarians, had weekly meetings to discuss the bill…but such was the level of 
discussion, the conflict was mainly between those deputies who were doctors and the 
government, so I decided not to go again. My thought was: I am going to see what I can 
do as a Senator in the Senate, not here…and then I decided to go away from these 
debates between deputies because it was too ideological” (Viera Gallo 2014). 
   
Specifically, the difficulties for the reformer coalition came from the permanent health 
commission in the Lower Chamber, which was the place where the proposals were reviewed and 
analysed in-depth.50 In the Chamber of Deputies, the health commission was composed of a group 
of 13 permanent members nominated by the president of the Senate (previously agreed with 
political parties). As expertise in the subject was relevant, deputies with medical background were 
usually nominated in this committee as the following table shows:  
 
Table 15 Distribution of political parties in the health committee, Chamber of Deputies. 






































                                                   
 
 
50 These committees are composed by parliamentarians nominated from a names' proposal by the president of the 
respective Chamber, in agreement with political parties. Most of the time, this group makes decisions that informally 
bind the votes of the rest of the parliamentarians. 
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Due to the linkages between Bancada Medica with professional and health workers 
associations, the defence of their interests in the Lower Chamber became an obstacle for the 
government. In this committee, the confrontation between radicals and reformers was clear. As ex-
Minister Artaza said,   
“The health commission [in the Chamber of Deputies] was comprised a majority of the 
Concertación members. Therefore, we had the votes to pass the bill quickly. But there was 
no cohesion on how to vote…but, there were at least five deputies that were doctors, 
such as Accorsi, Girardi…and they were completely aligned with the Colegio Medico and 
against the reform” (Artaza 2014). 
A press note from the period indicated, 
“The reform was sent to Congress in May, and the parliamentarians from the 
Concertación made a commitment with Lagos and Artaza, to get it approved in the Lower 
Chamber and then to dispatch it to the Senate in December. But, it seems that the 
commitments are made to be broken, as Deputies Accorsi and Cornejo led a mini-
insurrection and they decided not to pass the initiative because, they said they wanted to 
hear the voice of the unions” (El Mercurio, 29 December 2002). 
Although my interviewees and the press notes indicate that the first legislative phase in the 
Lower Chamber was highly polarising and a real obstacle to advance in the reform, due to the 
opposition of politicians within the Concertación; members of the reformer team recognised that 
the debate at the Chamber of Deputies was not a crucial step for the bill, because most decisions 
would be made in the Senate. A quote from one of the advisors explain,  
“The strategy defined by the SEGPRES was to quickly go to the Senate, to negotiate and to 
get the reform approved unanimously; and then go back to the Chamber of Deputies, to 
impose. Therefore, it did not matter how the bill would come out from the Chamber of 
Deputies [in the first legislative step]. It did not really matter. We made concessions to 
deputies because, after all, we could re-write the whole bill” (Romero 2013). 
Furthermore, the statements transcribed from the legislative discussions showed that while 
there were comments and indications about specific articles of the bills, deputies finally agreed 
with “the idea to legislate” and therefore, they passed the project to the second legislative step. For 
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instance, the deputies approved bill 19.966 about the AUGE Plan with 89 of 120 votes51 that were 
in the Congress in December 2002, with no abstentions or rejections. In the third and final 
legislative round at the Lower Chamber in January of 2004, they approved the proposal with 103 
votes in favour, one abstention (Girardi), and one rejection (Accorsi).  
In the Senate, because of the non-elected senators, who were not explicitly aligned neither 
with the Alianza or the Concertación, there were no clear majorities. In this context, the reformer 
coalition had to focus their efforts on securing the votes of people within and beyond the 
Concertación to pass the health reform bill. Reinforcing this idea, Inostroza said, 
“Remember Lagos still had the appointed senators… with those senators close to the 
right, they had the majority to block the reform. We had a majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies but not in the Senate. Therefore, we were forced to negotiate in the Senate. That 
was the option we took to get the AUGE approved” (Inostroza 2013).  
In 2002, the composition of the group of non-elected senators was the following: three of the 
appointed senators designated during President Eduardo Frei’s administration were part of the 
Concertación parties: Augusto Parra (PRSD) and Edgardo Boeninger (DC), along with Enrique 
Silva-Cimma (PRSD) as the ex-General Comptroller. The rest of the senators did not declare a 
political affiliation, and presented themselves as independents; however, as they were former 
military commanders during the dictatorship, it was assumed they had strong ties with the right-
wing parties. 
Though the perception was that the designated senators were always at the service of the 
right-wing parties, the designation of Boeninger in 1998 and Frei (as former president) in 2000, 
changed this scenario. With these non-elected senators from the Christian Democratic Party, the 
Lagos administration would have their votes for the health reform. However, during the political 
discussion, both senators were strong opponents of those aspects of the reform related to the 
funding proposal for social policies. While Boeninger became a supporter of the reform later on as 
                                                   
 
 
51 As an ordinary law, this bill just required a simple majority and did not require a minimum of deputies in the 
Congress.   
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a broker of the pragmatic coalition, Senator Frei voted against tax increases causing the majority to 
reject the measure, against the party’s decision. As President Lagos recalled,  
 “When I tried to get funding for the reform, increasing alcohol and tobacco taxes, Frei 
voted against me…oh my god! That was too much for me! A Senator of the Republic was 
voting against these tax increases…Finally, we had to choose an alternative solution, to 
raise the added tax value, which was absurd…” (Lagos 2013). 
Besides this, the capacity of reformers to manage the minimums needed to vote the bills 
through was also very important. Interviewees did recognise that the requirements of votes were a 
legacy from the authoritarian regime as it had defined the majorities needed at the Congress, which 
was determined by the results of the binominal system.  
 The health reform package was a set of laws that required a simple majority; therefore, the 
reformer coalition needed to have the votes of the majority of parliamentarians in Congress at the 
moment of voting. Because of that, a few respondents emphasised that the role of Eduardo Frei 
was also crucial for the discussion of this bill, because he was not present during the last period of 
the reform debate due to illness. Therefore, right-wing politicians took advantage of his absence to 
demand modifications to the bill. In this context, some interviewees noted how quorum differences 
affected the health reform. For instance, they pointed out how “Ordinary laws” differed from ones 
called “Organic Constitutional Laws”52 that required the approval of four sevenths of Congress (i.e., 
69 deputies and 22 senators) and the “Qualified Quorum”, which needed an absolute majority of 
Congress members. Hernan Sandoval remembered that, 
“There was a threat from Hernan Larrain [a UDI senator] about converting the ISAPRES bill 
to a bill within the social security laws that, since Jose Piñera53, are laws which required a 
"qualified quorum" and we had at that time designated senators, and Frei was recovering 
                                                   
 
 
52 See section 2.3.3 regarding the Constitutional laws and quorums defined in the Constitution of 1980 
53 Jose Piñera was a Minister of Labour and the main promoter of the social security system reform that determined the 
privatisation of social policies under the authoritarian regime. The introduction of the ISAPRES in the health sector 
should be understood as part of this scheme. 
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from surgery, unable to move. And that made everything worse for us…” (Sandoval 
2013). 
In contrast, Andres Tagle, a neoliberal member, strongly rejected the idea that the electoral 
system had determined the result of the health reform. He stated that the project did not require a 
high majority,  
“This thing about the draw at the Congress, it has never been true. The electoral system 
never produced a standoff. Furthermore, the electoral system has been very proportional. 
In the case of the health sector, there are no organic constitutional acts, so they work with 
simple majorities in the Congress. That is the only thing that counts” (Tagle 2013).  
Even though the informants suggest that electoral mechanisms affected the policy process of 
the health reform, the bills, after the incorporation of changes from the Health and Finance 
Committees, were finally passed unanimously by the senators. The reform was then approved in 
the Chamber of Deputies, in the last legislative step in May of 2005.  
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8.5 SUMMARY  
The last chapter of the findings aimed to analyse the data on some of the stable parameters 
and opportunities structures in the Chilean political system that were put in place during the 
authoritarian period, and how they affected the course of health policy reform. The first section 
reviewed the feasibility of reforms, and their dependence on the heaviness and the deep-rooted 
nature of institutions in a new political scenario. It was mentioned that the privatisation of social 
policies during the eighties created powerful institutions, such as ISAPRES. Some of the initiatives 
that were included in the health reform were intended to improve the regulatory framework and 
administration of private and public institutions. In addition, this structure of power also impeded 
the formation of constituencies around the health sector to challenge the unfairness of the system.  
In the second section, and regarding the presidential attributes, the Constitution of 1980 
intensified the power of the president. According to the data, Ricardo Lagos exercised his authority 
in promoting the health reform via his legislative initiative and the management of urgencies. He 
also utilised informal venues to supervise the policy process and to the battle opponents of his 
agenda with the appointment of Hernan Sandoval. Furthermore, informants commented that 
President Lagos's personality made a difference in the reform outcome. 
 The last part analysed the binominal system and the distribution of seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate. While, in the Lower Chamber, the reformer coalition had a majority, the 
discussion and process was very conflictive due to the opposition of radical members in the 
Concertación. In the Senate, the existence of appointed senators and quorums required posed 
challenges for the reformer coalition. Nonetheless, as the centre of the discussion was the 
permanent health committee, where its members were driven by consensus-building, the process 
was able to move forward. The outcomes of the final vote on the AUGE Plan bill in the Senate 
confirmed that, although the Concertación did not have majority, they did manage to garner the 
necessary votes to pass the reform.  
The concluding chapter will discuss the findings within the context of the broader literature, as 
well as the specific theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous three chapters considered the results of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
analysis of the health policy reforms in Chile. As stated earlier, many have argued that after the 
political regime change in 1990 the policy process in Chile, due to the constitutional arrangements 
set up by the Pinochet dictatorship, has been characterised by inertia. This inertia has favoured the 
stability of the socio-economic model created during the authoritarian years and the inability to 
bring about radical changes. Considering this context, this research aims to answer the question: 
How was the health reform during the Lagos administration between 2000 to 2006 achieved within 
the institutional arrangements that had been put in place by the Pinochet dictatorship? In answering 
this query, a qualitative case study was conducted to examine the policy process within this 
period. Data collection and the documents review were informed by previous ACF studies and 
literature on health policy reforms focused on post-authoritarian regimes (Kaufman and Nelson 
2004; Castiglioni 2005; Wong 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008, among others). This literature 
helped me identify my sample of interviewees and design the interview schedule. Driven by the 
ACF assumptions, a largely deductive thematic analysis was conducted of the 26 semi-structured 
elite interviews and transcriptions of congressional hearings. 
The results of the data analysis suggests that, in spite of the post-authoritarian inertia in the 
policy field, approval of the health reforms was achieved via a “negotiated agreement” as one of 
the policy change paths suggested by the ACF. Therefore, this final chapter discusses the main 
findings that emerged from the data analysis and the appraisal of the relevant ACF literature. The 
chapter is structured as follows: the first section begins with a discussion of the findings related to 
policy change and the path adopted in the Chilean case. The next three sections appraise the 
findings regarding the dynamic configuration of advocacy, followed by an exploration of the use 
resources and strategies by coalitions, and finally, the effects of institutional arrangements and 
policy legacies are examined. In closing, the main contributions and limitations of this research are 
considered, and areas for future studies applying the ACF approach are suggested.  
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9.2 UNDERSTANDING HEALTH POLICY CHANGE IN CHILE 
Using the empirical data provided in previous chapters and the theoretical contribution of the 
Chilean case to the ACF about the policy change conceptualisation, two main topics were 
identified. On the one side, and the one related with the drivers or sources of policy change as it is 
presented in the foci of the ACF; and, on the other side, the one which refers to the discussion 
about to what extent the health reform in Chile represents a major policy change, and not an 
incremental one as it is suggested by historical institutionalists in the post-authoritarian period. As 
the latter is concerned, academic efforts to create a definition of what is radical or incremental (the 
replacement of older institutions by new ones), for instance, the work of Streeck and Thelen and 
(2005), or the definition of universalism coverage proposed by Pribble (2014) to define a degree of 
change, is explained in the last section of Chapter 2. The debate about what kind of change can be 
typified as major/radical versus minor/incremental, was a query of concern when I was doing my 
research as, at first, my perception about the reform was closer to the incremental perspective of 
the historical institutionalism, this is as the mixed structure of the system of private and public 
providers remained identical after the reform. Nevertheless, the more interviews I did the more I 
changed the perception about the scope of policy change.  
The ACF conceptualisation of policy change permits the understanding of how the health 
reform, as a major shift can be understood. One of the fundamental premises of the ACF is that 
coalitions are kept together by belief systems, and this has been the focus of many applications of 
the framework (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). As explained in Chapter 3, there are three 
levels of beliefs identified in this approach: deep, policy core and secondary. The deep core beliefs, 
which are based on notions of human nature, are extremely resistant to change. As Henry (2011, 
36) points out, this leads “to situations where coalitions of like-minded policy actors entrench 
themselves in ideological bunkers and talk past one another policy issues.” The policy core and 
secondary beliefs are more adaptable under specific circumstances. If issues are perceived as less 
conflictive, coalitions are more likely to be willing to adapt their views (Zafonte and Sabatier 2004). 
In this case, it is important to understand what the sources of division between the coalitions were, 
or in words of the ACF, what the beliefs they shared were. The findings show that, in the Chilean 
health sector reform, the coalitions’ positions were directly related to the post-dictatorship political 
cleavages of Chilean society. The division of society was marked by the divergent views of liberty 
and equality, the role of the state and the market in the economy, and, to a large extent, about 
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whether they supported or opposed the Pinochet regime when it was in power.  That would be the 
deep core beliefs, and, as it is expected, almost impossible to be radically changed. Considering 
this, major policy changes could be taking place at the policy core level, which is precisely what 
my findings shows.  
The results of the data analysis suggests that although the system is still divideed into both 
public and private (following deep core beliefs’ cleavages), the enactment of a new set of laws 
regarding the provision and regulation of healthcare in Chile since 2005, represents a major policy 
change in how the subsystem is perceived. For instance, the fact that there are new principles that 
impose higher levels of regulations for private insurance companies, and the delivery of health 
services in a frame of social right were transformations that according to most of the interviewers, 
can be seen as a radical departure from the system established by Pinochet. One could say 
therefore, that the simple enactment of a new legislation package that increases regulation and a 
new way to deliver services in the long term can be measured as a major change, different to 
technical and small adaptations of the same legal framework that reiterates new policies whichtend 
to maintain the status quo.  
Various respondents emphasise that there is no chance for any future to revert the AUGE Plan, 
as people are now aware that they are right holders with the capacity to demand that both private 
and public institutions should fulfil their principles of access and guarantees. This became a new 
empowered constituency, which in Chile has means and increases the judicialisation of health, 
where users are presenting lawsuits in courts against private insurance companies to make them 
act according to the new laws enacted during the Lagos mandate. As such, the combination of 
rights and constituencies create a path which has become dependent and difficult to revert. 
Interviewers emphasis that there is a precedent for public policies, and other social sectors must 
replicate the guarantees of access of AUGE, for instance an educational AUGE.  
The second issue as a main contribution of this study is to understand policy change from the 
Chilean case is the explanation about how this major policy change was reached. In explaining how 
policy change occurred, the ACF and a other institutionalist (Hall 1993; Pierson 1996, 2000; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005) and public policy scholars (Kingdon 1984; Kingdon 2003; Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007) have argued that transformations are a 
result of external shocks, which break the stability of political systems. In this way, the political 
transitions occurred during the 80s and 90s in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia have been 
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seen as shocks that opened windows of opportunity for the implementation of change in various 
areas. However, research indicates that the routes, times, and mechanisms of policy change are 
wide-ranging, as they depend on the type of regime change and the nature of the political legacies 
inherited from the authoritarian periods (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). The effects of 
democratisation on the pace of reforms are not uniform, rather they are complex and linked to the 
particularities of domestic political features (Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 
2008).  
To unravel the complexity of the policy process, the ACF proposes three other paths of policy 
change (Studlar and Cairney 2014). These are internal shocks, policy-oriented learning, and a 
negotiated agreement. The argument of the ACF is that any of these sources of policy change may 
induce an alteration of a coalitions’ belief system and promote an understanding of the issue that 
increases the feasibility of policy change (Sabatier and Weible 2007). Despite the increased 
theoretical development of these new paths, many scholars using the advocacy coalition 
perspective in countries that have experienced political regime transitions have continued to argue 
that policy change is explained by events outside the policy subsystem. For instance, the study of 
flood management in Hungary conducted by Albright (2011) and the study on the development of 
water policies in Spain carried out by Bukowski (2007) demonstrate that democratisation and 
accession to the European Union were crucial to explaining the policy change outcomes in both 
subsystems. In contrast, the results of the data analysis conducted for this research show that a 
different path to policy making was operating in the health sector. The theory of external shocks 
does not adequately explain policy making during democratisation or the momentum that, in some 
circumstances, can stimulate transformation in a policy subsystem such as health. In this case 
there were no specific exogenous shocks that increased the pressure for a major policy change in 
the sector. In contrast with the general trend in post-authoritarian countries (Kaufman and Nelson 
(2004), international institutions, such as World Bank (WB) or the Inter American Development 
Bank (IDB), were not a source of pressure for policy reforms in Chile at that time. 
The results of the data analysis suggests that, in spite of the post-authoritarian inertia in the 
policy field, approval of the health reforms was achieved via a “negotiated agreement” as one of 
the policy change paths suggested by the ACF. What the findings from the analysis do support is 
that the approval of the health reform in Chile, a major policy change, was reached through 
negotiated agreement and, to a lesser extent, through policy-oriented learning. As far as the former 
is concerned, ACF scholars stress that achieving agreements requires compromise and the will of 
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coalition members to reach the best solution for a certain policy problem (Schlager 1995). Sotirov 
and Memmler (2012, 53) summarise four conditions that stimulate a collaborative approach: 1) 
mutual dissatisfaction with the status quo; 2) the absence of promising alternative institutional 
venues; 3) the promotion of collaborative trust and commitment; and, 4) an inclusive decision-
making process and independent mediators.  
In Chile, the economic stability reached during the nineties left the Concertacion government 
with a good and sustained financial base to be independent of external loans and therefore, as the 
interviewees responses suggested, the influence was likely in the ideas about the content rather 
than direct control over the design of the Plan AUGE , as the first wave of reform in the post 
authoritarian context was marked by the neoliberal trends and focused on the poorest, in the first 
decade of the 21st century there was a promotion of more equitable goals, stressing the need of 
more solidarity and wide scope of beneficiaries of social policies.  Although external forces are not 
an explicit source of change according to the findings, it is possible to identify that beliefs of the 
International Organisations were disseminate to the Chilean policy makers through previous 
collaboration, in particular, some of them who worked as a consultancy as it is explained by former 
Minister Jimenez and the advisor of the Minister of Finance, Consuelo Espinosa, which is 
elaborated in section 9.4 of this chapter.  
Another external event considered in the literature is the wave of presidential elections in Latin 
America. While the “turn to the left” in the regional governments during the 2000s is a contextual 
feature mentioned by Ewig and Kay (2011), Pribble (2013) and Gideon (2014), the research 
findings do not support this as a causal mechanism for the Chilean health reform, as governments 
took different paths and degrees in reforming their health systems (when they did). It could be said 
then, that the influence of external forces did not become a sufficient promoter of policy change in 
the Chilean case, in turn, it could be considered as part of the beliefs system of some participants 
in coalitions, who supported the ideas presented by the international organisations or the 
ideological positions of leaders in the region. In that way, the indirect guidance can be analysed 
within the coalitions´ structures and not as an external driver. Nonetheless, this is a topic of study 
that could be explored in-depth as part of future research that explores specifically the role of 
international institutions through the lens of the ACF either as exogenous factor of policy change or 
within policy subsystem.  
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In terms of internal aspects, it is true that there was a build-up of problems in the health sector 
and there was a change of president. But, both factors were also present in the first two 
governments of the new democratic period and did not result in a political decision to implement a 
comprehensive reform. The findings do not provide evidence of internal shocks either, as the 
proposed reform responded to long-standing issues in this area, but not to a particular event that 
raised the concern of authorities.  
The reasons how the negotiated agreement path was achieved are assessed in the following 
three sections, answering the sub-set of questions posited in the introductory chapter: What was 
the role of coalition structure in explaining the policy change? How did the distribution of resources 
and the use of various strategies influence policymaking in this case? How did institutional 
arrangements and policy legacies affect coalition interactions? The answers to these queries will 
be explored further in the discussion of this thesis, taking the issues that emerged from the review 
of existing ACF literature, specifically, those studies dealing with post-authoritarian cases into 
account. In the Chilean case, the findings provide evidence that this agreement was reached by a 
combination of three factors: an evolution of coalitions that pursued a consensus-building strategy; 
the use of formal and informal resources and venues to influence the policy process; and the skilful 
exploitation of the institutional arrangements in Chile’s post-authoritarian political system.  
 
9.3 SHIFTING COALITIONS OVER TIME 
The clash of interests from various political actors precisely corresponds to the political 
dimension of health reforms (Walt 1994; Moran 1995; Gonzalez-Rossetti and Bossert 1999). In the 
Chilean case, as different individuals and organisations sougth to influence the decision-making 
process as the process unfolded, there was a clash of interests from various political actors, a 
different picture of what Garreton (2003) called “the apparent consensus” during the Concertación, 
which implied that there was an absence of debate about various aspects of Chilean politics (for 
instance, human rights and economic transformation) by the governmental authorities. The 
accounts provided by the media documents on the health reform during the Lagos administration 
and the informants of this study demonstrate rather a different picture from what Garreton (2003) 
described as a consensus. They indicate that this process was characterised by high levels of 
	   146 
conflict and debate among political and economic elites, which only later evolved into an 
agreement. 
While most ACF studies in long-term democracies and post-authoritarian regimes show a 
configuration of two advocacy coalitions (in favour and opposed), a few have identified a greater 
number of actors that coalesce around different issues within a policy subsystem (Carvalho 2001; 
Albright 2011). Further, a few ACF studies have examined cases in which coalitions evolved over 
time, generally showing a pattern of stability in which the same configurations of coalitions 
remained steady in the long term (Leifield 2013; Zafonte and Sabatier 2004). 
In this regards, this research differs from previous applications as the analysis identified four 
initial competitive coalitions that shifted into one pragmatic group, a shift that fostered the health 
policy reform. The evolution of the Chilean coalitions occurred in two phases. The first period 
began with the announcement of the reform by President Lagos in May 2000 and ended, after the 
initial discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, when the first bill in the reform package was 
submitted to the Senate for consideration. The second period began with the discussion in the 
upper Chamber in January 2003 and ended when the last bill (Law N° 20.015) was approved in the 
third legislative step, in May of 2005. The identification of coalitions, based on the outcomes 
expected (major or minor change), shows that actors were organised as follows: The “reformer” 
coalition comprised of the government that had proposed the initiative. This coalition had to face 
the opposition of three coalitions: the “radicals”, the “moderates” and the “neoliberals”, which held 
clearly distinguishable beliefs during the first period. In the second phase, there was a merger of 
some of these adversaries with governmental actors. This merger resulted in a new and unique 
coalition that facilitated the path for the bill approval. This coalition, which has been named the 
“pragmatic”, was comprised of actors that previously challenged the reformers’ plan, a team of 
authorities and advisors from the executive branch, plus a former radical (Senator Mariano Ruiz 
Ezquide), a previous neoliberal (Senator Evelyn Matthei), and a moderate (a designated Senator 
Edgardo Boeninger).  
The neoliberal coalition was composed of supporters of the free market, who emphasized the 
value of individual freedom and capacities, and defended Pinochet’s accomplishments. The beliefs 
in the other three coalitions were similar to the formation of the Concertación as an electoral pact. 
Coalition members from the Centre-left pact, adherents to Socialist (PS), Radical (PRSD) and 
people from the Party for Democracy (PPD) defended social democratic principles and rejected the 
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legacies of the military regime. The internal dissonances between the Christian Democrats (DC), 
also part of the centre-left pact, with the more progressive parties such as the PPD and PS was a 
constant source of conflict during the first phase in the health reform discussion. The 
disagreements with the DC were based on the degree of state intervention in economic issues, as 
well as moral value matters (deep core beliefs which rarely change), which were permanently 
vetoed by the DC. In fact, as there were no policies about reproductive rights in the Lagos reform 
package (although, in parallel to this debate, there was a discussion regarding the distribution of 
the emergency contraceptive pill), the initial opposition of the DC members to the reform was 
mainly economic.  
In the case of the other components of beliefs systems, data from this Chilean case suggests 
that policy core and secondary aspects were translated into the outcomes expected by each 
coalition and thus were more malleable than the deep beliefs. Members of the right leaning 
coalition, the neoliberals, were seeking to protect their health market businesses against the 
regulatory and redistributive policies proposed in the original reform. The group of parliamentarians 
from the Christian Democrats held an opposing position, as they defended the interest of the 
private entrepreneurs, but supported social policies for the poor and middle classes. Finally, the 
radicals wanted to return to the state-based health system before the reform of 1981. Reformers 
sought to persuade all of these groups, proposing an expansion of social rights within the dual 
system, providing guarantees for access and opportunity, and protection against market failures. 
The internal conflicts and the fragmentation of the political power in the Concertación were 
strategically used by the neoliberal coalition which, as mentioned by a few interviewees, decided to 
stay away from the discussion in the Lower Chamber. In this situation, the reformers had, in the 
first stage, to manage the disagreements between the centre-left parties and La Moneda. 
Coalitions may shift, as Zafonte and Sabatier (2004) indicate, as changes in their policy core 
beliefs and secondary beliefs might occur through policy-learning. This is an instrumental process 
by which coalition members are able to modify their understanding about an issue when new 
information enhances their standpoints. The findings show that policy learning did not occur in the 
first stage of the discussion, and that it was during the discussion in the Senate where the 
positions of pragmatic coalition members came closer together. In the Lower Chamber, the main 
feature of the discussion was the disagreement on several points of the reform proposal. While 
health workers were defending the status of their jobs within the radical coalition, neoliberals 
sought to stop regulation that could affect their commercial investments. Due to the high levels of 
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conflict within the Lower Chamber, agreements and adaption of beliefs systems were not plausible 
alternatives. However, despite the disagreements and the lack of commitment from some 
Concertación parliamentarians, at the end of the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, the bills 
were passed to the Senate almost unanimously. According to the respondents, some factors 
allowed the proposal to obtain the necessary votes to advance to the next legislative stage. 
Critically, President Lagos suggested that nobody had the courage to reject the bill in Congress, as 
politicians were aware of the electoral consequences, in the following elections, of appearing to be 
an opponent of the reform. 
In answering the question: what was the role of coalition structure in explaining the policy 
change? It is be possible to say that, in the first phase, the core beliefs remained steady, as 
coalitions were constantly struggling to shape the bill according to the outcomes they sought. 
However, the data reveals that not all the coalitions could exercise their power in the same way 
throughout the process. At a certain point, the debate moved from the Lower Chamber to the 
Senate, where the control of discussion was limited to a reduced number of Congress members 
and health committee members, which prompted the formation of a single coalition that pushed the 
bills forward.  
Additionally, in the second phase, collaboration was achieved because the government agreed 
to leave out the Compensatory Fund, which was seen as the main obstacle for neoliberal and 
moderate members. Once it was taken off the agenda, internal conflicts were minimised and the 
pragmatic coalition consolidated the negotiation to push the reform forward. There was also a 
situation of “hurting stalemate” where the lack of alternative courses of action increased the 
chances of collaborative actions among coalitions (Schlager 1995; Sotirov and Memmler 2012). 
Actors in the Senate realised that the reform was definitely going through and that delays would not 
be acceptable, and therefore, they took actions accordingly. As such, compromise, as a key 
element of the negotiated agreement path (Schlager 1995), was prompted by the cabinet reshuffle 
in which Osvaldo Artaza was replaced with Pedro Garcia as Minister of Health. Information from 
the interviews indicates that this encouraged the commitment of rest of the actors in the Upper 
Chamber. Some respondents indicates that this engagement was facilitated because new Minister 
Garcia’s personality was less confrontational than Artaza’s; acting more as an administrator of the 
process rather than a leader of the reformer coalition. This is not to say that he was a weak 
authority, but to acknowledge that in the second phase, he was more compliant to the 
Presidency’s instructions than previous ministers. What is interesting to note, is that the ministerial 
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authority did not directly lead the negotiation in the Senate. As will be demonstrated in the next 
section of this chapter, this was in the hands of policy brokers.  
 
9.4 RESOURCES AND STRATEGIES 
While the creators of the ACF state that resource mobilisation is a key component of advocacy 
coalitions and provide a typology of the sources of power (Sabatier 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014), only a few studies explore these strategies and the use of power resources by coalitions 
aiming to change existing policies. These include the analysis conducted by Larsen et al. (2006) 
on pharmacy policies in Denmark, Nohrstedt (2011) on Swedish on intelligence policy, and a study 
of an environmental project in China, carried out by Han et al. (2014). This study contributes to this 
body of literature by providing an elaboration of both factors: the use of resources and strategies in 
the policy process. It explains how they affect the evolution of coalitions and the implications they 
have for policy change. Findings of this section answer the second specific question: How did the 
distribution of resources and the use of various strategies influence policymaking in this case?  
As the ACF would predict (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Sotirov and Memmler 2012), every 
coalition involved in the Chilean health reform carried out a series of coordinated activities, 
employing their own set of resources and power, attempting to put their interests on the political 
agenda and disseminate their views. The mobilisation of resources was mainly directed to three 
strategies: first and widely used by all coalitions, was the search to influence public opinion; 
second, the use of information/expertise; and third, the exploitation of skilful leadership by 
appointing key people as policy brokers in the Senate. The management of public opinion, where 
they tried to influence the citizens' views about the reform, was the main strategy employed by 
coalitions during the first phase. In the second phase, the main goal of the pragmatic coalition was 
building a consensus and they employed two particular strategies to this end: a consolidation of a 
piece of collaborative work between authorities and advisors; and second, an engagement of policy 
brokers, who were formerly members of other coalitions, to take charge of the negotiation. 
The reformer coalition had a considerable amount of resources in comparison to the rest of 
the coalitions. For instance, the formal power to make political decisions, the accumulation of 
knowledge within governmental advisory teams, and, in this case, investing public resources to 
develop communicational campaign, as well as to pilot the AUGE Plan. The public campaign 
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conducted by the government, which argued that the AUGE Plan was a tool to defend patients from 
the “inefficient- white –elephant” of the public sector and from the “unfair cover” of ISAPRES, 
proved to be effective at generating support. Reformers adopted the strategy of “going public” 
(Kernell 1997), rather than trying to convince deputies and political parties within the Concertación, 
even though they were major obstacles in the first phase. It was in the Senate that reformers put 
their efforts into gathering support from adversaries. Another strategy used by the reformer 
coalition which increased popular support, was to implement a pilot of the AUGE Plan before it was 
legally enacted. The mobilisation of these resources certainly facilitated the position of reformer 
coalition in the policy process, but did not ensure the approval of their plan.  
Members of the radical coalition, who advocated for a return to a public health system, also 
“went public” through a broad media campaign against the government and focused on the former 
Ministry of Health, Osvaldo Artaza. In reaching the attention from public opinion about the 
inadequacies of the reform, doctors and health workers organised strikes and demonstrations 
particularly during the legislative debate. However, their message was perceived rather as a 
vindication of their autonomy and privilege within the public-private scheme of the health system; 
rather than a defence of the citizens’ rights. The strategies like strikes and demonstrations used by 
professionals and technicians working in public hospitals and primary centres as a way to 
pressure authorities, seemed to be fruitless when it came to get public opinion support because 
patients were the ones affected by these types of actions provoking the rejection to their cause. 
Consequently, they lost influence and control of the agenda over the reform’ discussion due to their 
obstructing behaviour, being excluded from the key decision-making arena that mainly took place 
in the health committee at the Senate.  
The neoliberals, as can be seen from the press, used unregulated lobby between business 
groups, which had a less publically obvious impact. In connection with a different policy 
subsystem, press notes reveal that governmental authorities sought to generate a favourable 
investment climate and to control potential political conflicts that could resonate in the health 
reform debate, engaging specifically in activities with business associations, for instance, the Pro-
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Growth Agenda54 to incentivise a collaborative environment. Indeed some comments in the press 
stated that President Lagos was the favourite president of the business class, as they pursued 
similar goals and developed informal strategies to reach them. It would be plausible to argue that 
this collaboration between business groups and the government was also translated to the health 
policy subsystem, promoting a similar approach to the reform discussion. However, what the 
research shows is that the process of health reform, even though it was not isolated from 
negotiations outside the policy subsystem, was embedded in an institutional context very specific 
to the second phase. The data reveals that, although substantial efforts were made in the first years 
by coalitions to create alternatives to the reformer plans, the mobilisation of non-governmental 
advocates was ultimately ineffective. In the second phase, as the context of the Senate narrowed 
down the space of involvement, the control of the agenda moved to the members of the pragmatic 
coalition and excluded other participants from the decision-making process.  
A second important finding related to resources and strategies was the use of technical 
knowledge to back up the negotiations and facilitate policy-oriented learning. Other ACF scholars 
explain that, in a scenario of competition among coalition members, information elaborated by 
professional experts, because it is seen as based in scientific evidence, provides credibility to 
beliefs and behaviours (Zafonte and Sabatier 2004; Leifield 2013). It would fair to say then, that the 
expert knowledge provided by the group of technocrats within the Finance Ministry, as well as legal 
advisors in the Ministry of Health who built strong ties with researchers from right-wing think tanks, 
provided synergistic inputs to the learning and negotiation paths. A limitation of the study, that 
became clear during the analysis of the data, is that the findings do not provide sufficient 
information to demonstrate that policy learning occurred. This is because there was no substantial 
transformation of the deep core beliefs, as would be expected according to the ACF, and learning 
remained at the levels of policy core and secondary aspects. 
 As noted earlier, the experts that provided technical knowledge to the pragmatic coalition 
were the advisors to the Ministries of Health and Finance, and researchers from right leaning think 
tanks. As a general assumption, the successful exploitation of these resources depends on the 
                                                   
 
 
54 See an explanation of these strategies in section 7.2. 
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capacity of policy makers to convince others that they have the knowledge and information about 
what the best solution for a policy problem is. In this debate, coalitions were supported by a 
number of organisations. On the political right, think tanks such as Libertad y Desarrollo and 
Instituto Libertad were created in 1990 by people who occupied government positions during the 
military regime. These formed the intellectual arm that sustained right wing ideas and maintained 
the legacy of the Pinochet regime in parliamentary work. Some of the advisors from the 
Concertación, also had experience as researchers in think tanks, such as CIEPLAN, CED, and 
organisations such as CEPAL and PNUD, during the dictatorship. In 1990, they took different 
positions in the new democratic government. 
Respondents mentioned that they incorporation to the governmental team in the Finance 
Minister was after the decision about the package were decided and indeed an expert says that this 
idea responded to the guidelines of international organisations. Additionally, much of the policy 
diffusion of the neoliberal orientations were early adopted in Chile during the 80s. Nonetheless,  
one of the advisor minister stated that the formula of the Plan AUGE was already designed when 
she arrived to the team, and they were focus on calculations  to make the AUGE economically 
substaintable, but the model of social rights and guarantees were previously worked by the 
Sandoval team following guidelines of international organisations as the World Health Organisation 
and World Bank, which post Washington Consensus where looking to promote more equitable 
goals. The Lagos’s reform was framed in that wave of policy diffusion, with a different emphasis 
than the reform under the Pinochet’s dictatorship.  
 What is clear is that a critical group of technocrats imposed a work procedure within public 
organisations, which allowed the collaboration of political advisors in the decision making process. 
These appointments, of course, also reacted to political interests, as having representation in both 
formal and informal positions was important, but, in this case, they were able to reach an 
agreement in order to pass the health reform.  
Embracing collaborative and “open to knowledge” behaviour does not necessary ensure 
policy change. Here, the ACF indicates that particular individuals, policy brokers, may encourage 
consensus-seeking behaviours from coalition members. Policy brokers are crucial actors that 
occupy formal positions, have moderate views, and contribute to reducing the polarisation between 
competitive coalitions (Sotirov and Memmler 2012). Some scholars such as Ingold and Varone 
(2012), Diaz Kope (2013) and Leifield (2013) stress that ACF case studies have often overlooked 
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the brokerage role of specific individuals in promoting policy change. In an attempt to fill this gap, 
this research pays great attention to the role played by policy brokers in the Chilean health reform.  
Senators Boeninger and Matthei assumed the role of brokers during the second phase of the 
reform discussion in Congress. Both senators bolstered the work of the health committee, 
engaging other senators and advisory teams in the approval of the different components of the 
reform. They assumed this policy broke role within the committee because of their expertise in 
political and economic issues, and their reputation within their respective political blocs. The 
answers of the respondents who were working in the executive suggest that, rather than resulting 
from a change in their beliefs, the behaviour of the policy brokers was the result of an instrumental 
view of the process. This stand was adopted because they realised, at that point, that the failure or 
rejection of the reform would have more electoral costs than benefits. This is similar to the idea of 
the hurting stalemate described in the first section of this discussion. After all the public battles in 
2002 and 2003, it was impossible, particularly for previous members of the neoliberal coalition, to 
reject the reform. Although some actors from the government recognised that the proposal of the 
Compensatory Fund was not popular among right-wing politicians, the reform was widely seen as 
an opportunity for all coalitions to publicly appear as part of the health system improvement 
process, and to secure votes in the following elections. 
The strategic view of the policy brokers in the Chilean reform suggested by the data analysis, 
challenges previous studies, particularly by those of Sotirov and Memmler (2012) and Arnold 
(2003), who argue that those who play a brokerage role are neutral or independent from coalition 
motivations. In particular, Arnold (2003) says that in the Chilean forest subsystem, governmental 
actors acted as policy brokers in an impartial way. They did not have a particular agenda in the 
policy regulation discussion, and their participation was limited to managing the debate between 
private companies and environmentalist organisations. By contrast, this research demonstrates 
that policy brokers are not disinterested participants and they have political agendas that 
determine, based on their capacities, coalitions´ trajectories. Senator Matthei and Boeninger were 
not neutral actors; they exercised leadership within the Senate because they shared the mutual goal 




	   154 
9.5 POLICY LEGACIES AND COALITIONS’ BEHAVIOUR 
According review in Chapter 2, institutionalist-based studies of health policies tend to focus on 
stability and inertia, emphasising institutional arrangements as obstacles for change (Ewig and Kay 
2011; Pribble 2013). A number of studies focused on health policy, such as those conducted by 
Immergut (1990), Guillen (2002), Kaufman and Nelson (2004) and Wong (2006), have used the 
typology developed by Lijphart (1999), who distinguished democratic systems based on the 
distribution of power and institutional structures. The aim of this literature is to assess the impact 
of intervening factors, such as the type of regime (presidentialist versus parliamentarian) or the 
administrative organisation (federal or centralised), in the health reforms process. Since 2007, with 
the aim of explaining policy change in different political systems and contexts, Sabatier and Weible 
(2007) included an institutional component within the ACF. This responded to criticisms that 
previous studies had paid little attention to subsystems embedded in consensual political systems 
or systems where political parties dominated the decision-making process (Elliott and Schlaepfer 
2001; Ingold and Varone 2012). Recently a number of studies have considered the relevance of 
formal and informal rules and norms in shaping coalitions (Blank and Burau 2010; Gupta 2013; 
Fisher 2014; Montefrio 2014) and the findings in this thesis also provide insights for this.  
The ACF suggests that institutional arrangements may take the form of stable parameters 
and/or opportunity structures within the political system. These then frame the interactions of 
coalitions, and may incite transformation in a particular policy subsystem. As such, this approach 
integrates one of the premises of the historical institutional perspective, the ‘stickiness’ of 
institutions over time (Pierson 1996), into the analysis. This approach has been widely used to 
analyse Chilean health policy reforms. In the reform that this research analysed, the opportunity 
structures defined by the policy legacies from the Pinochet dictatorship favoured collaboration 
between previous opponent coalitions. This facilitated policy change through a negotiated 
agreement. Specifically, the legacies identified from the data, which framed the evolution of 
coalitions around the health reform, were political participation, presidential powers, and the 
electoral system. The findings presented in this section respond the specific question: How did 
institutional arrangements and policy legacies affect coalition interactions? 
The first policy legacy is the degree of political participation inherited from the authoritarian 
period. As reported in the studies reviewed in Chapter 2, one of the main aspects discussed in the 
health policy literature is how the end of authoritarian regimes is supposed to augment civil society 
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participation. This may happen through electoral mechanisms or informal means, giving access to 
those actors that were excluded, under non-democratic conditions. However, the relationship 
between democracy and the improvement of civil society participation is complex and not 
necessarily direct (Kaufman and Nelson 2004). Several studies on health policy reforms in post-
authoritarian contexts, such as Kaufman and Nelson (2004), Kwon and Reich (2005) and Wong 
(2006) recognize the lack of user participation as a feature, due to the concentration of power and 
repression of citizen participation in former regimes. However, some studies show that democracy 
enables participation, as in the Spanish case study conducted by Bukowski (2007), where the 
Constitution enacted after the transition explicitly empowered citizens via legislation, increasing the 
participation of some actors in the decision-making process. This was reflected in the water policy 
subsystem, where two new coalitions emerged after the return to the democracy to challenge the 
dominant coalition.  
The findings of this research paint a different picture from the cases reviewed in previous 
chapters. As the Chilean constitution was conceived and enacted during the period of the Pinochet 
military government in 1981, it did not include binding mechanisms such as referendums or civil 
society legal initiatives to protect and to promote formal participation. For instance, the lack of 
these official procedures in Chile differs from the Spanish experience explained by Bukowski 
(2007), where new democratic authorities transferred formal prerogatives in decision-making to 
regional actors, stimulating the involvement of actors at the local level that were previously 
excluded. While the findings report that there were some participation initiatives in the first stage of 
the process, such as the roundtables organised by Minister Bachelet in 2001, the data confirms a 
general lack of substantial citizen involvement. Furthermore, the reformers did not take the views of 
citizens very seriously. While Bachelet announced, at the beginning of the round tables, that the 
objective of those meetings was to inclusively define the national health goals, the Ministry of 
Health, at almost the same time, in January 2002, published a document detailing the national 
health goals for the decade. That document was developed and signed by specialists and 
technocrats in a committee organised by the Ministry, making the point that the inclusion of civil 
society, and their concerns was actually limited and concentrated in a few actors, challenging the 
expectations of the new democratic governments (Kaufman and Nelson 2004). 
It was particularly striking how the Colegio Medico, traditionally seen as a powerful group in 
these processes which would generally refuse any reform affecting their members´ autonomy and 
salaries, lost power throughout the debate (Immergut 1990; Kaufman and Nelson 2004). This loss 
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of influence is illustrated by the data gathered from the press and interviews, which corroborates 
that Colegio Medico opposed the reform and fought within the radical coalition against the 
reformers. In the end, their extreme positions and permanent obstruction of the government’s plan 
resulted in an intentional exclusion of the Colegio from the pragmatic coalition. Additionally, as 
there was no Bancada Medica in the Senate (this is the group of parliamentarian doctors in the 
Lower Chamber), the power of the medical professions and health workers unions diminished as 
the formal decision-making process progressed.  
Hacker (2004), using the example of the US, has suggested that, as a result of the increase in 
regulatory systems that restrict their professional autonomy and budget control, there has been a 
“decline of medical power” in the last decades. This was compounded by the participation of 
private health companies in managing the provision of services. This situation has some relevance 
to the privatisation of social policies in Chile during the eighties that consolidated the role of private 
actors. The reform of 1981, put economic elites in the health market, which then allowed them to 
become, at the detriment of other actors, key decisions-makers (Gonzalez-Rossetti et al. 2000; 
Castiglioni 2005; Ewig and Kay 2011; Fairfield 2015). 
Furthermore, another aspect, mentioned by the informants and confirmed by the literature, is 
that the specific characteristics of the health sector accentuate the gap in participation (Bernier and 
Clavier 2011; Carpenter 2012). The health sector is seen as an extremely technical field where 
knowledge and expertise are required for decision-making. In addition, the sporadic occurrence of 
medical events makes people only intermittently aware of the system’s deficiencies, as there are 
few incentives to get involved when they are in good health. It should also be mentioned that 
Minister Bachelet sent a bill about patients’ right and duties to Congress in 2001. However, the 
congressional debate was postponed for ten years and it did not reach the legislative agenda until 
the Piñera Administration of 2010-2014. Thus, a bill that was closer to the citizens was not part of 
this debate during the Lagos period. Although it is not argued that this concentration of power in 
the elite and the lack of civil society participation was a positive or desirable legacy, the data 
supports the argument that the progressive exclusion of opponents to the government plan 
expedited the agreement reached by the pragmatic coalition in the legislative phase. 
The second policy legacy identified through the analysis of the data relates to presidential 
powers and their influence in the health reform process. The findings support arguments that argue 
that the successful enactment of health reforms depends on the degree of presidential involvement, 
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as in the Colombian (Ramirez 2004) and South Korea cases (Kwon and Reich 2005; Wong 2006). 
Data from the Chilean case confirms that this reform was a personal project of President Ricardo 
Lagos, who was fully committed throughout his mandate, and wanted to be remembered as the 
first President to make substantial reforms since the return of democracy.55 Lagos’s leadership 
over the health reform is a distinctive feature of the Chilean processes, differing from other post-
authoritarian cases (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, and the Czech Republic), where health reforms emerged 
from proposals elaborated by public health experts or doctors, rather than being initiated by top-
level politicians (Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Roberts 2009).  
The findings show that the combination of two factors prompted the enactment of the bill. On 
the one hand, there were presidential powers granted by the Constitution, particularly, legislative 
initiative, and the decreeing of urgencies, which allowed the President to control the timing of the 
legislative agenda. On the other hand, there was the leadership and personality of Ricardo Lagos, 
who sought to get the reform approved by all means, even by utilising informal strategies. It is 
worthwhile remembering that President Lagos was extremely devoted to making the health reform 
a symbol of his government. The formation of coalitions in the first phase responded to the 
presidential initiative of Lagos. He employed several strategies that allowed him control the reform, 
though the establishment of a committee to coordinate the inter-ministerial work, led by one of his 
closest friend, Doctor Hernan Sandoval, stands out. In this way, he could supervise the work of the 
ministries through Sandoval, controlling the content and timing of the debate. Radical coalition 
members, in particular, criticised this structure, as it was seen as a dual strategy in the negotiation 
with other actors, but also as a way to diminish the power of the Ministry of Health. Additionally, 
President Lagos commanded the Ministry of Finance to join and supervise the debate in all the 
venues in which the reform was discussed. It is important to recall to one of the informal procedure 
explained by Siavelis (2016) and mentioned in Chapter 2, which is known as the “cuoteo” to 
distribute the positions in ministries and undersecretaries. For political party leaders, it was 
important to nominate someone from his or her party heading the key ministries as well as for the 
                                                   
 
 
55 It is worthwhile to mention during his administration there was also passed a Divorce Law in 2004, and in 
September of 2005, President Lagos enacted a set of amendments to the Constitution of 1981, eliminating most of the 
Pinochet’s authoritarian enclaves. After he signed the modified constitutional text, he declared that the transition was 
finally over (Funk 2006; Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2014). 
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president to have someone trustworthy to implement their agendas. As a way to ensure that neither 
the executive or political parties have the total control of one sector, the Concertacion used to 
designate in as a ministry from one party and an undersecretary, to balance political forces. In 
health sector, while Bachelet from the Socialist Party (PS) was a Minister, she had as an 
undersecretary someone from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) (Ernesto Behnke); and the two 
consecutive Christian Democrats ministers; Osvaldo Artaza and Pedro Garcia had undersecretaries 
from the Party for Democracy (PPD). 
Several scholars have argued the Chilean Constitution of 1981 gave the president an 
excessive amount of power through the legislative initiative and control of the urgencies (Siavelis 
2000; Aninat et al. 2011; Dockendorff 2011). However, the findings suggest that policy-making 
depended very much on Congress’ decisions, as the health reform needed to be authorised by 
deputies and senators. This contradicts the independent and excessive power attributed to the 
Chilean president. As such, most of the struggles between the four initial coalitions took place in 
the legislative scenario.  
The third policy legacy inherited from the dictatorship and commented on by the interviewees, 
is the implications of the electoral system on health policy reform, and, more generally, on the 
legislative process and the composition of the Congress. This policy legacy relates specifically to 
the “opportunity structures” mentioned in the ACF, and the components of openness and degree of 
consensus needed for change within the political system. On the one hand, electoral mechanisms 
define who can get access to formal power and how open the system is. On the other hand, they 
define the “rules of the game” within the legislative branch, which determine the requirements for 
policy authorisations (who ultimately make the decisions).  
 As part of the institutional arrangements defined by the 1981 Constitution, the binominal 
election system56 used for deputies and senators, and the resulting distribution of seats in 
Congress, has been “blamed” for the inertia of the Chilean political system. As it is discussed in 
the literature, electoral mechanisms may enhance or diminish citizens’ representation and affect 
those who can influence the policy-making process. The mechanism for presidential elections 
                                                   
 
 
56 See chapter 2 for details of the Chilean electoral system. 
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determines its legitimacy and support while the legislative election determines the degree of 
representation and support for governmental agenda (Siavelis 2000; Swank 2001; Aninat et al. 
2011; Dockendorff 2011). 
In the Chilean legislative election, the proportional representation system is mainly criticism 
because the two main electoral pacts, Concertacion and Alianza, usually get one of their 
candidates elected in each electoral district of two seats. The same electoral bloc could win both 
seats only if they got 66.7% of the votes, and therefore the binominal system allows the second list 
to win a seat even if they get just the 33.4% of the votes. Furthermore, the results of the elections 
since 1990 have been consistently tied in most districts, dividing the Congress into the electoral 
pacts from the right and the centre-left. This traditionally excludes candidates from other parties 
who are not included in the lists of the two main blocs. As such, it is expected that, due to having 
half of the votes in the legislative branch, the opposition has the possibility to obstruct the 
legislative agenda of the government. That assumption would be adequate in the fictional scenario 
where political parties are disciplined, and where politicians have no incentives to cooperate. But in 
reality, the policy process it is shaped by struggles and bargains among interested and rational 
actors. The findings reveal that the legislative scenario was not a zero-sum game, instead it was, 
first, a place of a conflictive debate, and then became a space of collaborative work in the second 
phase. In fact, the outcomes of the final vote on the AUGE Plan bill in the Senate confirms that 
although the Concertación did not have a majority, they did manage to garner the necessary votes 
to get most elements of the reform through.  
The rules of the game for policy authorisation within Congress played a significant role in 
funnelling the conflict of coalitions from the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate. As illustrated in the 
findings chapters, the reformer coalition had a majority in the Lower Chamber, but the discussion 
and process were highly conflictive due to the opposition of radical and moderate members in the 
Concertación. What is interesting is that, despite the polarised discussion and the debate within the 
health committee of deputies, the analysis shows that it is possible to argue that the Chamber of 
Deputies was more a space of debate than of decision-making. Therefore, as it was in the Senate 
where decisions were made, the Lower Chamber had a limited impact and it was “a ritualistic 
passage.” 
In addition to the electoral system consequences, the implications of “designated senators” 
were also discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. Posing challenges for the centre-left pact, these 
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senators were traditionally linked with the conservative sectors and the defence of the Pinochet 
legacies. However, in this case, the data shows that at least two of the designated senators were 
members of the Christian Democratic Party, and therefore, supported the centre-left government. 
Specifically, former President Eduardo Frei (a lifelong senator as a former president) and Senator 
Edgardo Boeninger would give Lagos two secure votes for the health reform package. In the first 
phase, they were part of rival coalitions, but once the reform reached the Senate, the reformer 
coalition was able to gain the support of these key actors, and create a single coalition that would 
guarantee the approval of the bills. As the most relevant discussions took place inside the health 
committee of the upper chamber, the reformers needed to convince Senator Boeninger, who was 
one of the members, but was also, initially, an opponent. Additionally, as noted in the interviews, 
his political leadership and networks were seen as valuable assets for developing a consensus 
building strategy within the committee. In that way, the findings demonstrate that the institutional 
arrangements inherited from the authoritarian years were important but not determinant in the 
outcome of the reform. Ultimately, the results of the Chilean health reform depended on a 
combination of stable parameters, opportunity structures and coalition configuration and 
interaction. 
Before concluding, it is important to mention another finding about this particular political 
process. Kaufman and Nelson (2004), in their analysis of health reform processes in Latin 
America, suggest that their cases confirm that authorities usually negotiate the reforms before 
sending them to the legislative branch. Similarly, some scholars suggest that Chilean political 
decision-making is characterised by informal procedures, where political decisions are made 
“behind the doors” or in a pre-legislative discussion (Dockendorff 2011; Pribble 2013; Gideon 
2014). However, the findings of this research challenge this idea, as they show that the 
negotiation, at least in the Senate, was carried out within the formal institutional context. In this 
way, this reform was different from other reforms adopted by Chilean governments, which had 
been decided upon before being submitted for legislative discussion. In this particular case, it was 
in Congress where policy brokers led a pragmatic advocacy coalition, comprised of senators, 
members of the health committee and advisors. Based on technical expertise and knowledge, they 
reached a negotiated agreement to approve the last bill of the health reform in May of 2005. 
 
	   161 
9.6 FINAL REMARKS 
In closing, the purpose of this thesis was to explore how policy change occurred in Chile, a 
context often characterised by inertia and stability after the return to democracy in 1990. Using the 
lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the political process of the Chilean health reform during 
President Ricardo Lagos’s administration (2000-2006) was analysed, looking specifically at the 
factors that enabled the policy change. Although a number of studies have examined health policy 
reforms in Chile, generally based on an historical institutional approach that emphasise the 
immobility of the Chilean political system due to the institutional arrangements inherited from the 
authoritarian period; there has not been strong focus on how despite this context, new policies are 
put into place. As such, this study contributes to this literature by arguing that policy change did 
occur, as demonstrated by the health policy reform approved in 2005.  
In doing so, this thesis draws strongly on the Advocacy Coalition Framework for examining 
this case, where policy change could not be explained by the occurrence of external events or 
exogenous shocks in the national context. The main aim of the ACF is to provide a theoretical 
explanation of policy change by looking at advocacy coalitions within a particular subsystem, that 
shares beliefs and acts in a non-trivial manner to influence the decision-making processes 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). The findings of this study provide 
an example of how one of the paths pointed out by the ACF, the negotiated agreement, can explain 
policy change in the Chilean health subsystem.  
As discussed in this chapter, a number of factors were crucial for reaching an agreement and 
facilitating policy change. First, the evolution of the coalition structure, which moved from a 
competitive scenario of four coalitions, into a collaborative situation in which one coalition pursued 
a consensus-building strategy. Second, advocate groups used formal and informal resources and 
strategies, such as the provision of expert support and the presence of policy brokers that had 
political will to pass the bill, strengthening the position of the pragmatic coalition. An additional 
conclusion of this thesis is that policy legacies from the authoritarian years were important, as they 
provided the framework for interplay of coalitions, but they did not constrain health policy change.   
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9.6.1 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to discussions about policy change and the expansion of the ACF in 
several ways. First, using Chile as a case study permits the expansion of the theoretical knowledge 
of the ACF as little research has been done regarding negotiated agreement in the literature so far. 
Perhaps, as it was one of the latest elements elaborated by the ACF main authors, this is not 
surprising (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Furthermore, a the dynamic view 
of the configuration of coalitions over time is also a contribution of this research, as generally 
studies applying the ACF show that coalitions are more stable than changing. Additionally, this 
thesis enriches the understanding of the resources and strategies employed by coalitions, 
including the role played by policy brokers to deescalate potential conflicts and to stimulate a 
collaborative relationship. Another contribution is the analysis of the institutional arrangements that 
provides insights for examining the opportunity structures identified by the ACF, which have been 
overlooked until recently. This thesis, considering the policy legacies from the authoritarian period, 
unpacks how these factors affected the process of health policy reform in Chile. Based on this 
analysis, this thesis challenges the widely accepted argument of institutionalist scholars that 
suggests that the lack of structural reforms in Chile is the result of the heaviness of the legacies 
inherited from the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). As demonstrated, the policy 
legacies framed the policy process but did not define the outcomes of it. Lastly, this research has 
also made an empirical contribution to decision-making. As a retrospective analysis, the results 
may shed light on the complexities of the process, generating knowledge on who the key actors 
were and factors that determine the feasibility of reforms in post-authoritarian countries. This may 
help policy makers in designing future public policies.  
 
 
9.6.2 Limitations  
In terms of limitations, as this study investigated the perceptions of elites, there is a lack of 
opinions from other segments of the population that were affected by the reform, such as users, 
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NGOs, or community representatives57. Additionally, as the interviews were used to capture the 
perceptions and meanings of people involved in the process, the fact that some persons were 
inaccessible, such as Senators Boeninger and Matthei, means the picture of the process is 
incomplete. Related with the inaccessibility of some key actors, the timeframe of the second part 
of my fieldwork affected the possibility of getting more interviews, as it was in the last two months 
of the presidential and congressional electoral campaign.  
A methodological limitation of this research is related to the identification of beliefs as, 
unfortunately, the nature of the data (it was not part of the topic guide), did not allow the researcher 
to determine whether there was transformation in the beliefs system of coalition members. The 
lack of explanation of beliefs means that there cannot be certainty into what extent the policy 
change was motivated by a real modification of individuals understanding about the health sector.  
 
9.6.3 Further research 
Some recommendation can be made for future research. Further studies should incorporate 
an analysis of the implementation phase at the meso and micro levels, to evaluate the empirical 
consequences of the design and formulation of policies. This could provide a long-term 
perspective of the policy process. Linked to one of the limitations of the study mentioned above, 
the inclusion of other actors from the civil society and their perceptions about the impact of the 
reform would be also useful.  
A comparison of policy subsystems in various countries would also be useful, as it would 
definitely increase our understanding of the implications of different institutional arrangements in 
dissimilar settings. In the same vein, comparative studies of different policy subsystems within the 
same country may provide interesting results regarding the existence coalitions under the same 
political system. Future works could also benefit from including other methodological techniques 
for the identification of coalitions. Specifically, social network analysis could enrich the 
                                                   
 
 
57 Even though the findings demonstrate they were not part of the decision-making, this is still an important limitation to 
note.  
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identification of actors, their connections, and the strengths or weaknesses of their beliefs 
systems. 
Finally, a topic that emerged after the health reform in Chile and therefore has not been considered 
in this analysis is the “judicialisation of health”. The new regulatory framework of 2005 increased 
governmental control of ISAPRES, and guaranteed access to healthcare for specified conditions. 
This has empowered private sector users to make complaints and to sue these companies in 
courts, with claims about the change in prices, or breach of health contracts. This legal 
controversy is an issue that gauges the levels of civil society participation and therefore, could be 
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Figari, Nicolas Advisor Fundacion Jaime Guzman (Right-wing think tank) Coffee Shop 
García, Pedro Former Minister of Health Personal Office 
Girardi, Guido Former Deputy Bancada Medica Chilean Embassy, London 
Herrera, Gerardo Former SEREMI (regional authority) Skype 
Inostroza, Manuel Director of Superintendencia of Health (Regulatory body) Personal Office 
Jiménez, Jorge Former Minister of Health Personal Office 
Lagos, Ricardo Past President Personal Office 
Lorenzini, Pablo Deputy-Ex President Lower Chamber Home 
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Ottone, Ernesto Advisor President Lagos Personal Office 
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Appendix E. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Oriana Piffre  King’s College London    Enero 2014 
 
 
   
1 
“UNDERSTANDING HEALTH POLICY CHANGE IN POST-DICTATORSHIP CHILE:  




 BACKGROUND Y RELACION CON EL SECTOR SALUD –  
 
1.Me podría contar acerca de 
a) acerca de su rol durante el proceso de la reforma.  
 
I. POSTURAS Y POSICIONES  SOBRE LA REFORMA  
 
2. Al inicio del proceso, cual era su nivel de conocimiento acerca de la 
propuesta del Presidente Lagos,  
Respecto de:  
-sus orígenes, porque surgió la idea de reforma? 
-contenidos específicos del proyecto 
 
 
3.  Cual fue su posición acerca de aspectos particulares de la reforma:  
a) financiamiento 
b) contenido de la reforma 
 
II. CONTEXTO INSTITUCIONAL DE LA REFORMA 
 
4. Recuerda eventos claves durante el periodo que a su juicio determinaron 
el resultado? 
(-por ejemplo la decisión de aumentar el IVA para financiar la reforma. O las 
acusaciones de malversación de fondos del Ministerio de salud para 
promover la reforma en los medios de comunicación. O el cambio o salida 
de ministros del sector, producto de conflictos políticos al interior de la 
concertación (salida Bachelet).  
 
5. Que instituciones o conjunto de normas y reglas – afectaron el curso de la 
reforma?  
 
III. ACTORES RELEVANTES  
 
-quienes eran los actores involucrados inicialmente y sus posiciones 
 
6. En base a su experiencia, cuales fueron las personas o actores que 
tuvieron mayor influencia en dicho proceso?   
 
De que manera o que estrategias utilizaron? Que obstáculos debieron 
enfrentar? Obtuvieron los resultados que buscaban?   
 
7. Cree que el sector de salud se asemeja en alguna medida a otros sectores 
sociales, como educación o el sistema de pensiones? Cuales son sus 
particularidades?  
 !
	   190 
 
  
Oriana Piffre  King’s College London    Enero 2014 
 
 
   
 
 
IV. TOMA DE DECISIONES 
 
9) Respecto del sector salud, usted considera que es un derecho, que debe 
ser provisto y resguardado por el Estado, o es mas un bien individual a cargo 
de cada persona? 
 
10) En ese sentido, cual es a su juicio el rol que debe cumplir el estado 
respecto del sector salud?  Promoción de la equidad? o mas bien permitir el 
funcionamiento del Mercado?; o un balance de ambas? En este sentido, su 
visión particular cambio durante la reforma? 
 
11) A su juicio, como fue la participación en el proceso de decisiones: fue 
mas bien un proceso liderado por técnicos, por los gremios, por la elite 
política, los partidos políticos o algún otro actor?  
 
12) Finalmente, en su opinión, pudo haber una reforma mas radical en el 
sistema de salud, dado que es una sistema que es siempre señalado como 
prioridad para los ciudadanos?  !
13) Hay alguna otra persona que crea usted que pueda ser importante 
contactar para este estudio? !!!
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